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This Exposure Draft presents the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
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airing the Commission’s initial findings and conclusions and stating some of the initial recom­
mendations to “pre-expose” the Exposure Draft and start the comment process in advance.
Dozens of interested organizations and persons have expressed their points of view. For the most 
part, reactions to the Commission’s initial efforts have been positive. Whether the comments 
received were positive, negative or neutral, the Commission considered them in its deliberations. 
In a number of areas, the Commission’s recommendations bear the imprint of these comments. The 
Commission also benefitted from comments provided by members of the panel of distinguished 
advisors from the public and the private sectors.
The release of this Exposure Draft will expand and extend the comment process that already has 
begun. By distributing the Exposure Draft widely, the Commission hopes to generate many more 
reactions, suggestions, and opinions from those concerned with or affected by fraudulent financial 
reporting. The comment process is indispensable to us in completing and issuing our final report.
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INTRODUCTION
Since October 1985 the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the Commis­
sion) has studied the financial reporting system in the United States. Our mission has been to 
identify causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting and steps to reduce its 
incidence.
Fraudulent financial reporting is indeed a serious problem. Infrequent though its occurrence 
arguably may be, its consequences can be widespread and significant. Although fraud in any form 
can be difficult to deter, fraudulent financial reporting can be reduced, perhaps substantially, if 
each party for whom we have recommendations takes the steps we recommend. The Commission’s 
set of recommendations embraces: the top management and board of directors of all public 
companies, independent public accountants and the public accounting profession, the SEC and 
other regulatory and law enforcement bodies, and the academic world.
As background to the Commission and its work, this introduction discusses the Commission’s 
sponsors, members, and advisors, the definition of fraudulent financial reporting that the Com­
mission used, the Commission’s objectives, the scope of its study, and its research program.
Following this background information is a discussion of the major conclusions that guided the 
Commission in developing its recommendations.
I. The Commission
Sponsors, Members, and Advisors
The Commission is a private-sector initiative, jointly sponsored and funded by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the American Accounting Association (AAA), 
the Financial Executives Institute (FEI), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the National 
Association of Accountants (NAA).
The six-member Commission is independent of its sponsoring organizations. Its chairman is James 
C. Treadway, Jr., formerly a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
and presently a partner in the law firm of Baker & Botts. William M. Batten is the immediate past 
Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange and the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of J.C. 
Penney Co. William S. Kanaga is Chairman of the Advisory Board of Arthur Young & Company, 
and served as Chairman of that firm and of the AICPA. Hugh L. Marsh is the Director-Internal 
Audit for ALCOA, responsible for its worldwide audit activities. He also is a past Chairman of 
the IIA. Thomas I. Storrs is the immediate past Chairman and CEO of NCNB Corp., a bank 
holding company, and continues to serve as a Director of NCNB. Donald H. Trautlein recently 
retired as Chairman and CEO of Bethlehem Steel and was formerly a partner with the accounting 
firm of Price Waterhouse. Appendix B includes more complete biographies of the Commissioners.
An Advisory Board, representing a broad spectrum of experience and points of view, assisted the 
Commission. Appendix C identifies the members of the Advisory Board.
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Definition of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
For purposes of its study and report, the Commission defined fraudulent financial reporting as 
intentional or reckless conduct, whether act or omission, that results in materially misleading 
financial statements. Fraudulent financial reporting can involve many factors and take many forms. 
It may entail gross and deliberate distortion of corporate records, such as inventory count tags, or 
falsified transactions, such as fictitious sales or orders. It may entail the misapplication of ac­
counting principles. Company employees at any level may be involved, from top to middle 
management to lower-level personnel. If the conduct is intentional, or so reckless that it is the legal 
equivalent of intentional conduct, and results in fraudulent financial statements, it comes within 
the Commission’s operating definition of the term fraudulent financial reporting.
Fraudulent financial reporting differs from other causes of materially misleading financial state­
ments, such as unintentional errors. The Commission also distinguishes fraudulent financial 
reporting from other corporate improprieties, such as employee embezzlements, violations of 
environmental or product safety regulations, and tax fraud, which do not necessarily cause the 
financial statements to be materially inaccurate.
Objectives
The Commission had three major objectives:
1. Consider the extent to which acts of fraudulent financial reporting undermine the integrity of 
financial reporting; the forces and the opportunities, environmental, institutional, or individ­
ual, that may contribute to these acts; the extent to which fraudulent financial reporting can 
be prevented or deterred and to which it can be detected sooner after occurrence; the extent, 
if any, to which incidents of this type of fraud may be the product of a decline in profes­
sionalism of corporate financial officers and internal auditors; and the extent, if any, to which 
the regulatory and law enforcement environment unwittingly may have tolerated or contrib­
uted to the occurrence of this type of fraud.
2. Examine the role of the independent public accountant in detecting fraud, focusing particu­
larly on whether the detection of fraudulent financial reporting has been neglected or insuf­
ficiently focused on and whether the ability of the independent public accountant to detect such 
fraud can be enhanced, and consider whether changes in auditing standards or procedures—  
internal and external— would reduce the extent of fraudulent financial reporting.
3. Identify attributes of corporate structure that may contribute to acts of fraudulent financial 
reporting or to the failure to detect such acts promptly.
Scope: Public Companies
The Commission’s study focused on public companies. The term public company generally 
includes companies owned by public investors. Several types of companies fall within the 
Commission’s definition of public company: (1) public companies that report to the SEC; (2) 
certain publicly owned banks, savings and loan associations, and other financial institutions that 
are subject to the disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws but report to one of the 
financial institution regulatory agencies; and (3) certain mutual thrift institutions.
The Commission has included public companies of this third type for several reasons. The same 
federal agencies that regulate the publicly owned financial institutions regulate these mutual thrift 
institutions. Their ownership by depositors resembles public ownership since these companies
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accept public funds as capital and give depositors equity-like interests. A number of cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting have occurred in these institutions, with far-reaching impact.
Other entities, such as mutual insurance companies, also may accept public funds as capital. 
Unaware of similar instances of fraudulent financial reporting among these entities, however, the 
Commision did not include them in its study. The Commission’s focus on public companies does 
not imply that fraudulent financial reporting does not occur in private companies or that its impact 
there is insignificant.
Research Program and Interviews
A thorough understanding of the environment in which fraudulent financial reporting occurs is a 
prerequisite to identifying appropriate responses. Too often, the subject has been considered from 
a narrow perspective. The Commission placed a high priority on going deeper than the obvious 
in identifying the many forces and opportunities that may contribute to financial reporting fraud.
To this end, the Commission directed an extensive research program. Outside experts who 
conducted research projects for the Commission considered professionalism and codes of corporate 
conduct, corporate pressures, surprise writeoffs, internal control, internal auditing, the role of the 
SEC, litigation against public accountants, the independence of the public accountant, computer 
fraud, and business and accounting education. In addition, the Commission’s staff completed more 
than 20 research projects and briefing papers, including analyses of SEC enforcement actions, 
pressures within public accounting firms, AICPA self-regulatory programs, and the legal and 
regulatory environment. Significant findings of the research efforts are incorporated into the text 
of the report, and Appendices D and E summarize the research.
To supplement this research program, the Commission reviewed previous and current related 
studies and interviewed numerous experts. The related studies the Commission reviewed are listed 
in Appendix E. The Commission interviewed the Chairman of the SEC, the Chairman of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Comptroller General 
of the United States, the Chairman of the AICPA, the Chairman of the Auditing Standards Board, 
the Chairman of the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section’s Public Oversight Board, the Chairman of 
the IIA, the President of the FEI, the President of the NAA, the President of the National 
Association of State Boards of Accountancy, several members of the Commission’s Advisory 
Board, and many other independent public accountants, government regulators, corporate exec­
utives, and university professors. Appendix F lists the persons the Commission consulted.
II. Major Guiding Conclusions
The Commission’s recommendations, taken together, form a balanced response to fraudulent 
financial reporting. The Commission cannot overemphasize the importance of evaluating its 
recommendations in their totality; no single one is meant to be separated from the rest. Indeed, the 
Commission withheld endorsement of any recommendation under consideration until the research 
and briefing papers for substantially all recommendations had been completed and the Commission 
could see the web of relationships among the proposed recommendations.
From the outset, the Commission’s goal was to develop recommendations that would be practical, 
reasonable in the circumstances, justified by the benefits to be achieved, and would lend them­
selves to implementation without undue burden. Guiding the Commission in this task were a 
number of conclusions.
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Accountability
When a company raises funds from the public, that company assumes an obligation of public trust 
and a commensurate level of accountability to the public. If a company wishes access to the public 
capital and credit markets, it must accept and fulfill certain obligations necessary to protect the 
public interest. One of the most fundamental obligations of the public company is the full and fair 
public disclosure of corporate information, including financial results.
The independent public accountant who audits the financial statements of a public company also 
has a public obligation. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, when the independent public 
accountant opines on a public company’s financial statements, he assumes a public responsibility 
that transcends the contractual relationship with his client. The independent public accountant’s 
responsibility extends to the corporation’s stockholders, creditors, customers, and the rest of the 
investing public. The regulations and standards for auditing public companies must be adequate 
to safeguard that public trust and auditors must adhere to those standards.
The Need for Improvement
The extensive financial reporting by public companies is the most critical component of the full 
and fair disclosure that ensures the effective functioning of the capital and credit markets in the 
United States. The financial reporting system in the United States is the best in the world, a model 
for other developed nations. The Commission nonetheless concluded that it should examine the 
system objectively because it is so important and is such a model. Our examination caused us to 
conclude that steps need to be taken to improve our financial reporting system, despite its present 
excellence.
Quantifying the Problem
The Commission sought to quantify the problem of fraudulent financial reporting. That quanti­
fication proved to be impossible. We found no way to gauge either the amount or the significance 
of undetected fraudulent financial reporting or the number of cases detected but, for a variety of 
reasons, not pursued by law enforcement officials. As a result, estimating the true extent of the 
problem is not simply a matter of comparing, for example, the number of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the total number 
of publicly filed financial reports.
Three Relevant Factors
Even though precise quantification proved to be impossible, the Commission concluded that three 
other factors are relevant: (1) the seriousness of the consequences of fraudulent financial reporting, 
(2) the risk of its occurring in any given company, and (3) the realistic potential for reducing that 
risk.
Consequences o f Fraudulent Financial Reporting. First, when fraudulent financial reporting 
occurs, serious consequences ensue. The damage that results is widespread, with a sometimes 
devastating ripple effect. Those affected may range from the immediate victims, the company’s 
shareholders and creditors, to the more remote, those harmed when investor confidence in the stock 
market is shaken. Between these two extremes, many others may be affected: employees who 
suffer job loss or diminished pension fund value; depositors in financial institutions; the company’s 
underwriters, auditors, attorneys, and insurers; and even honest competitors whose reputations 
suffer by association.
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Risk o f  Occurrence. To assess the risk that fraudulent financial reporting may occur, the 
Commission analyzed its causes. We concluded that the causal factors, the forces and opportunities 
that were present in numerous SEC enforcement cases, are present to some extent in all companies. 
No company, regardless of size or business, is immune from the possibility that fraudulent 
financial reporting will occur. That possibility is inherent in doing business.
Realistic Potential fo r  Reducing Risk. We believe a realistic potential exists for reducing the 
risk of fraudulent financial reporting, provided the problem is considered and addressed as mul­
tidimensional. The problem’s multidimensional nature becomes clear when we merely consider the 
many participants who shape the financial reporting process: the company and its management, the 
independent public accountant, regulatory and law enforcement agencies, and even educators. 
Each one has the potential to influence the outcome of the financial reporting process. Thus we 
believe that a multidimensional approach that analyzes and addresses the role of each participant 
has the maximum potential for reducing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.
Participants in the Financial Reporting Process
The responsibility for reliable financial reporting resides first and foremost at the corporate level. 
Top management— starting with the chief executive officer—sets the tone and establishes the 
financial reporting environment. Therefore, reducing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting must 
start within the reporting company.
We have identified a number of practices already in place in many companies that can help all 
public companies meet their responsibilities and reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. One key practice is the board of directors’ establishment of an informed, vigilant and 
effective audit committee to oversee the company’s financial reporting process. Another is es­
tablishing and maintaining an internal audit function.
Prior efforts to reduce the risk of fraudulent financial reporting have tended to focus heavily on the 
independent public accountant and, as such, were inherently limited. Independent public accoun­
tants play a crucial, but secondary role. They are not guarantors of the accuracy or the reliability 
of financial statements. Their role, however, can be enhanced, particularly with respect to de­
tecting fraudulent financial reporting, and financial statement preparers and users should be made 
to understand the enhanced role.
At the same time, however, management’s primary responsibility for reliable financial reporting 
should be emphasized, so that public understanding of the relative and complementary obligations 
of corporate management and independent public accountants is improved.
Regulatory and law enforcement agencies provide the deterrence that is critical to reducing the 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. The SEC, through its financial fraud enforcement 
program, already has significantly raised corporate awareness of the problem and of the potential 
for detection and punishment. But improvements can and should be made, both at the state and 
the federal level.
Although educators are not generally considered participants in the financial reporting process, 
they have an important role in helping to reduce the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Education can prepare business and accounting students to recognize the factors that can contribute 
to this type of fraud and the ethical values and good business practices necessary to guard against 
it.
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Improvements Needed in All Areas
Our analysis of the role of each participant in the financial reporting process led us to conclude that 
no one answer to the problem of fraudulent financial reporting exists. Rather, improvement is 
needed in all areas. This report presents a unified, complementary set of recommendations. In 
some cases we recommend that participants initiate new practices; in others we recommend 
improvements in present practices. In fact, some public companies and public accounting firms, 
as a matter of good business practice, are already doing many of the things we recommend.
Overall Benefits
In developing our recommendations, we weighed the costs and other burdens they would impose 
against the benefits they would achieve. We recognize that there are limits to the ability to prevent 
or detect fraud, no matter how much cost is incurred. We believe our recommendations are 
cost-effective.
Taken collectively, the recommendations can:
• Improve the financial reporting environment in the public company in several important 
respects and thus help to reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting
• Improve auditing standards, the standard-setting process, and the system for ensuring audit 
quality, to detect fraudulent financial reporting earlier and perhaps thus deter it
• Enhance the regulatory and law enforcement environment to strengthen deterrence
• Enhance the education of future participants in the financial reporting process.
Our recommendations are by no means the final answers. Fraud is as complex as human nature, 
and as society changes, the financial reporting system will change. As fraudulent financial re­
porting likewise evolves, so must counter responses. The Commission urges all participants in the 
financial reporting process to implement these recommendations as the next step in the continuing 
process of responding to fraudulent financial reporting. We hope that our report will serve as a 
framework for action now and as a springboard for future efforts.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
This summary is a synopsis of the organization and content of the Commission’s recommenda­
tions, which appear in Chapters Two through Five of the report.
I. Recommendations for the Public Company (Chapter Two)
Prevention and earlier detection of fraudulent financial reporting must start with the entity that 
prepares financial reports. Thus the first focus of the Commission’s recommendations is the public 
company. These recommendations, taken together, will improve a company’s overall financial 
reporting process and increase the likelihood of preventing fraudulent financial reporting and 
detecting it earlier when it occurs. For some companies, implementing these recommendations will 
require little or even no change from current practices; for other companies, it will mean adding 
or improving a recommended practice. Whether it means adding or improving a practice, the 
benefits justify the costs. The Commission’s recommendations for the public company deal with 
(1) the tone set by top management, (2) the internal accounting and audit functions, (3) the audit 
committee, (4) management and audit committee reports, (5) the practice of seeking second 
opinions from independent public accountants, and (6) quarterly reporting.
The Tone at the Top
The first three recommendations focus on an element within the company of overriding importance 
in preventing fraudulent financial reporting: the tone set by top management that influences the 
corporate environment within which financial reporting occurs. To set the right tone, top man­
agement must identify and assess the factors that could lead to fraudulent financial reporting; all 
public companies should maintain adequate internal controls, a broader concept than internal 
accounting controls; and all public companies should develop and enforce effective, written codes 
of corporate conduct. The audit committee should annually review compliance with this code, 
including compliance by top management. The Commission also recommends establishment of a 
private sector body to provide future guidance on internal controls.
Internal Accounting and Audit Functions
The Commission’s recommendations turn next to the ability of the participants in the financial 
reporting process within the company to prevent or detect fraudulent financial reporting. The 
internal accounting function must be adequate to fulfill the financial reporting responsibilities the 
corporation has undertaken as a public company. Moreover, all public companies must have an 
effective and objective internal audit function. The internal auditor’s qualifications, staff, status 
within the company, reporting lines, and relationship with the audit committee of the board of 
directors must be adequate to ensure the internal audit function’s effectiveness and objectivity. The 
internal auditor should consider his audit findings in the context of the company’s financial 
statements and should, to the extent appropriate, coordinate his activities with the activities of the 
independent public accountant.
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The Audit Committee
The audit committee of the board of directors plays a role critical to the integrity of the company’s 
financial reporting. The Commission recommends that all public companies be required to have 
audit committees comprised entirely of independent directors. To be effective, audit committees 
should exercise vigilant and informed oversight of the financial reporting process, including the 
company’s internal controls. The board of directors should set forth the committee’s duties and 
responsibilities in a written charter. Among other things, the audit committee should review 
management’s evaluation of the independence of the public accountant and specifically approve 
areas of management advisory services to be performed by the company’s independent public 
accountant. The Commission highlights additional important audit committee duties and respon­
sibilities in the course of discussing other recommendations affecting public companies. 
Management and Audit Committee Reports
Users of financial statements should be better informed about the roles management and the audit 
committee play in the company’s financial reporting process. The Commission recommends a 
management report that acknowledges that the financial statements are the company’s and that top 
management takes responsibility for the company’s financial reporting process. The report should 
include management’s opinion on the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls. The 
Commission also recommends a letter from the chairman of the audit committee that describes the 
committee’s role. Both of these communications should appear in the annual report to stockholders. 
Seeking a Second Opinion and Quarterly Reporting
Finally, the Commission’s recommendations for the public company focus on two opportunities 
to strengthen the integrity of the financial reporting process. Management should advise the audit 
committee when it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue, explaining why the 
particular accounting treatment was chosen. The Commission also recommends additional public 
disclosure in the event of a change in independent public accountants. Furthermore, the Com­
mission recommends increased audit committee oversight of quarterly reporting.
II. Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant 
(Chapter Three)
The independent public accountant’s role, while secondary to that of management and the board 
of directors, is crucial in detecting and deterring fraudulent financial reporting. To ensure and 
improve the effectiveness of the independent public accountant, the Commission recommends 
changes in auditing standards, in procedures that enhance audit quality, in the independent public 
accountant’s communications about his role, and in the process of setting auditing standards.
The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) recently has exposed for comment a series of proposed 
auditing standards that address many issues the Commission considered and that are responsive to 
many of its concerns. The Commission will consider the ASB’s proposals and the comments they 
elicit in developing its final report.
Responsibility for Detection and Improved Detection Capabilities
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) should be changed first to recognize better the 
independent public accountant’s responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting. The 
standards should restate this responsibility to require the independent public accountant to take
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affirmative steps to assess the potential for fraudulent financial reporting and design tests to provide 
reasonable assurance of detection. Among the affirmative steps recommended is assessment of the 
company’s overall control environment along with improved guidance for identifying risks and 
designing audit tests. In addition, the independent public accountant should be required to make 
greater use of analytical review procedures, to identify areas with a high risk of fraudulent financial 
reporting. The independent public accountant also should be required to review quarterly financial 
data before its release, to improve the likelihood of timely detection of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Audit Quality
Improved audit quality increases the likelihood of detecting fraudulent financial reporting. In this 
regard, the Commission makes three recommendations. The first two are designed to improve two 
aspects of the profession’s existing quality assurance program. Peer review should be strengthened 
by adding reviews, in each office reviewed, of the first audit performed for a public company client 
that is new to the firm. Concurring, or second partner, review should be enhanced by adding more 
explicit guidance as to timing and qualifications. In the third recommendation, the Commission 
encourages greater sensitivity on the part of public accounting firms to pressures within the 
accounting firm that may adversely impact audit quality.
Communications by the Independent Public Accountant
Independent public accountants need to communicate better to those who rely on their work. The 
auditor’s standard report can and should convey a clearer sense of the independent public 
accountant’s role, which does not include guaranteeing the accuracy of the company’s financial 
statements. The standard audit report should explain that an audit is designed to provide reason­
able, but not absolute, assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatements 
arising as a result of fraud or error. It also should describe the extent to which the independent 
public accountant has reviewed and evaluated the system of internal accounting control. These two 
steps will promote a better appreciation of an audit and its purpose and limitations and underscore 
management’s primary responsibility for financial reporting.
Change in the Process of Setting Auditing Standards
Finally, the Commission recommends that the process of setting auditing standards be improved 
by reorganizing the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board (ASB). The conduct of the audit impacts 
a broad range of parties, within both preparer and user groups. Consequently, the auditing 
standard-setting process should incorporate more direct involvement of all interested parties. To 
ensure meaningful participation of these parties, the Commission proposes that half of the mem­
bers of the reorganized ASB be persons who are knowledgeable about auditing and financial 
reporting but not engaged in public accounting. Recognizing that auditing standards present both 
policy and technical issues, the proposed reorganization would enhance the ASB’s policy-making 
capability while preserving the expertise the ASB already brings to technical issues.
III. Recommendations for the SEC and Others to Improve the 
Regulatory and Legal Environment (Chapter Four)
Strong and effective deterrence is essential in reducing the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting. While acknowledging the SEC’s significant efforts and achievements in deterring such 
fraud, the Commission concludes that the public- and private-sector bodies whose activities shape
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the regulatory and law enforcement environment can and should provide stronger deterrence. The 
Commission’s recommendations for increased deterrence involve new SEC sanctions, greater 
criminal prosecution, improved regulation of the public accounting profession, adequate SEC 
resources, improved federal regulation of financial institutions, and improved oversight by state 
boards of accountancy. In addition, the Commission makes two final recommendations in con­
nection with the perceived insurance and liability crises.
New SEC Sanctions and Greater Criminal Prosecution
The range of sanctions available to be imposed on those who violate the law through fraudulent 
financial reporting should be expanded. Congress should give the SEC additional enforcement 
tools so that it can impose fines, bring cease and desist proceedings, and bar or suspend individual 
perpetrators from serving as corporate officers or directors. Moreover, with SEC support and 
assistance, criminal prosecution for fraudulent financial reporting should be made a higher priority.
Improved Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
Another regulatory function, the regulation of the public accounting profession, seeks to reduce 
the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting through ensuring audit quality and thereby enhanc­
ing early detection and prevention of such fraud. The Commission studied the existing regulation 
and oversight, which includes the profession’s quality assurance program, and concluded that 
additional regulation—particularly a statutory self-regulatory organization— is not necessary, pro­
vided two key elements are added to the present system. The first element is mandatory mem­
bership: all public accounting firms that audit public companies must belong to a professional 
organization that has peer review and independent oversight functions and is approved by the SEC. 
The SEC should provide the second element: enforcement actions to impose meaningful sanctions 
when a firm fails to remedy deficiencies cited by a quality assurance program approved by the SEC.
Adequate SEC Resources
The Commission directs many recommendations to the SEC, the agency with primary responsi­
bility to administer the federal securities laws. In that regard, the SEC must have adequate 
resources to perform its existing functions, as well as additional functions, that help prevent, 
detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting.
Improved Federal Regulation of Financial Institutions
Federal regulatory agencies, other than the SEC, have responsibility for financial reporting by 
certain public companies that are banks and savings and loans. The Commission recommends that 
these other agencies adopt measures patterned on the Commission’s recommendations for the 
SEC. To enhance efforts to detect fraudulent financial reporting within financial institutions, the 
Commission also recommends that these federal agencies provide for the exchange of information 
between the regulatory examiner and the independent public accountant.
Improved Oversight by State Boards of Accountancy
State boards of accountancy can and should play an enhanced role in their oversight of the 
independent public accountant. The Commission recommends that these boards implement pos­
itive enforcement programs to review on a periodic basis the quality of services rendered by the 
independent public accountants they license.
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Insurance and Liability Crises
Finally, the Commission’s study of fraudulent financial reporting unavoidably has led to certain 
topics beyond its charge or ability to address. The perceived liability and insurance crises and the 
tort reform movement have causes and implications far beyond the financial reporting system. 
They are truly national issues, touching every profession and business, affecting financial reporting 
as well. Those charged with responding to the various tort reform initiatives should consider the 
implications for long-term audit quality and the independent public accountant’s detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting. Moreover, the SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that 
corporate indemnification of directors for securities law liabilities is against public policy and 
therefore unenforceable.
IV. Recommendations for Education (Chapter Five)
Education can influence present or future participants in the financial reporting system by providing 
knowledge, skills, and ethical values that potentially may help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent 
financial reporting. To encourage educational initiatives toward this end, the Commission rec­
ommends changes in the business and accounting curricula as well as in professional certification 
examinations and continuing professional education.
Business and Accounting Curricula
The complexity and serious nature of fraudulent financial reporting led the Commission to con­
clude that any initiatives encouraged by its recommendations should permeate the undergraduate 
and graduate business and accounting curricula. The Commission first recommends that business 
and accounting students gain knowledge and understanding of the factors that cause fraudulent 
financial reporting and of the strategies that can lead to a reduction in its incidence. To enable 
students to manage risks of such fraud in the future at public companies, the Commission 
recommends that business and accounting curricula convey a deeper understanding of the function 
and the importance of internal controls and the overall control environment within which financial 
reporting takes place. Students should realize that practices aimed at reducing fraudulent financial 
reporting are not simply defensive measures, but also make good business sense.
In addition, part of the knowledge students acquire about the financial reporting system should be 
an understanding of the complex regulatory and law enforcement framework that government and 
private-sector bodies provide to safeguard that system and to protect the public interest. As future 
participants in that system, students should gain a sense of what will be expected of them legally 
and professionally when they are accountable to the public interest.
The Commission recommends that the business and accounting curricula also foster the devel­
opment of skills that can help prevent, detect, and deter such fraud. Analytical reasoning, problem 
solving, and the exercise of sound judgment are some of the skills that will enable students to 
grapple successfully in the future with warning signs or novel situations they will encounter in the 
financial reporting process.
Furthermore, the ethical dimension of financial reporting should receive more emphasis in the 
business and accounting curricula. The curricula should integrate the development of ethical values 
with the acquisition of knowledge and skills. Unfortunately, the lack of challenging case studies 
based on actual incidents of fraudulent financial reporting is a current obstacle to reform. The 
Commission therefore recommends that business schools give their faculty a variety of incentives
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and opportunities to develop personal competence and suitable classroom materials for teaching 
about fraudulent financial reporting.
Professional Certification Examinations and Continuing Professional Education
The Commission makes two additional recommendations relating to education. Both professional 
certification examinations and continuing professional education should emphasize the knowledge, 
skills, and ethical values that further the understanding of fraudulent financial reporting and 
promote a reduction in the incidence of such fraud.
Five-Year Accounting Programs and Corporate Initiatives
The Commission makes no recommendation with regard to the much-discussed proposal to expand 
the undergraduate accounting curriculum from 4 to 5 years. Rather, the Commission offers a 
number of observations based on its research and deliberations. Similarly, the Commission out­
lines some of the numerous opportunities for public companies to educate their directors, man­
agement, and employees about the problem of fraudulent financial reporting.
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Chapter One
OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING SYSTEM AND 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING
I. Background to the Report
Before developing recommendations responsive to fraudulent financial reporting, the Commission 
sought to understand how and why it occurs. The financial reporting system is so complex, 
however, that the Commission began by examining the many components and functions of the 
system itself. Having gained an understanding and appreciation of the complex system in which 
this type of fraud takes place, the Commission then could examine instances where the system 
broke down.
Similarly, this chapter provides background information to facilitate an understanding of the 
recommendations that appear in Chapters Two through Five. The chapter briefly explains the 
financial reporting system and illustrates its components and functions, then summarizes the 
Commission’s analysis of fraudulent financial reporting’s causes, perpetrators and means.
Finally, the chapter takes a more in-depth look at the extent and effect of fraudulent financial 
reporting, its evolutionary nature, and the need for cost-effective responses. These are among the 
fundamental conclusions that guided the Commission in developing its recommendations.
II. Financial Reporting System for Public Companies
The financial reporting system for public companies has many components, broadly organized into 
three major groups:
•  Companies
• Independent public accountants
•  Oversight bodies.
The following exhibits illustrate the functional relationships among these components.
Exhibit 1-1, page 14, illustrates the relationships of the three major groups in the financial reporting 
system to one another and to those who use publicly reported financial information.
The company and its management are the key players in the financial reporting system; they bear 
the primary responsibility for the preparation and content of the financial statements. Financial 
statements are management’s representation as to the company’s financial position and results of 
operations. Several oversight bodies that establish financial reporting standards and monitor 
compliance with those standards influence the reporting function. The company engages inde­
pendent public accountants to render an opinion as to whether the financial reports fairly present 
the company’s financial position and results of operations in conformity with established 
standards.
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EXHIBIT 1-1
FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM
PUBLIC COMPANY
OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING
INDEPENDENT
PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANT
•  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION
•  FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
REGULATORY AGENCIES
•  FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD
•  STATE AUTHORITIES
•  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
SECURITIES DEALERS AND 
STOCK EXCHANGES
•  ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
•  COURTS
AUDIT
OPINION
L___________
▼
FINANCIAL
REPORTS
USERS OF
FINANCIAL REPORTS
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EXHIBIT 1-2
THE PUBLIC COMPANY
 INTERNAL CONTROL ENVIRONMENT -  “CORPORATE CULTURE" -
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
•  INTERNAL 
AUDIT 
FUNCTION
•  CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER
•  CONTROLLER
•  ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT
-  INTERNAL ACCOUNTING 
CONTROLS
-  ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
•  LEGAL
DEPARTMENT
FINANCIAL
REPORTS
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Exhibit 1-2, page 15, expands on Exhibit 1-1, illustrating the components within the company that 
play roles in preparing financial statements.
The company’s accounting department actually prepares the financial statements. The chain of 
command supervising this function typically proceeds from the controller through the chief fi­
nancial officer (CFO) to the chief executive officer (CEO). The legal department, or office of the 
general counsel, typically plays a key role in reviewing disclosure documents for compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. The internal audit function, if present, performs an appraisal 
function within the company to examine, analyze, and make recommendations on matters affect­
ing the company’s internal controls. The board of directors has a responsibility to the company’s 
shareholders to oversee management’s performance. The board of directors generally delegates its 
responsibility to oversee the company’s financial reporting process to an audit committee. All these 
participants and the functions they perform are part of the company’s internal control environment 
for the financial reporting system.
Exhibit 1-3, page 17, illustrates the numerous organizations and agencies whose oversight, 
through standard-setting and compliance activities, affects the company’s preparation of financial 
statements.
The SEC is the federal agency primarily responsible for administering the federal securities laws, 
and it establishes disclosure requirements for public companies. The SEC traditionally has del­
egated much of its responsibility for setting standards for financial reporting to the private sector, 
retaining a role largely of oversight. Accordingly, in preparing its financial statements, the public 
company looks to accounting principles set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
as well as to SEC rules and pronouncements. If a federal banking or financial institution regulatory 
agency administers a public company’s disclosure obligation under the securities laws, the com­
pany looks to that agency’s pronouncements rather than to those of the SEC. In addition, the stock 
exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) set certain disclosure and 
other standards as requirements for listing securities for trading. State securities or other com­
missions may impose regulations on financial reporting at certain times, such as in initial public 
offerings, or on companies in certain industries, such as insurance. With the exception of the 
FASB, each of these parties participates to varying degrees with the company’s independent public 
accountant in overseeing the company’s compliance with established standards. In addition, the 
courts participate when the adequacy of a company’s financial reporting is the subject of a judicial 
proceeding.
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EXHIBIT 1-3
OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY PUBLIC COMPANIES
STANDARD-SETTING COMPLIANCE
SEC
SETS DISCLOSURE 
RULES AND STANDARDS 
(REGULATIONS S -K , 
S -X )
OVERSEES PRIVATE 
SECTOR STANDARD­
SETTING PROCESS
SEC
•  REVIEWS FILINGS ANO 
INTERPRETS STANDARDS
•  ENFORCES COMPLIANCE
FASB
ESTABLISHES GENERALLY 
ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES (GAAP)
FOR ALL REPORTING 
ENTITIES
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
REGULATORY AGENCIES
•  REVIEW FILINGS 
AND INTERPRET 
STANDARDS
•  ENFORCE COMPLIANCE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION  
REGULATORY AGENCIES 
. Fed . FHLBB
. OCC . FSLIC
. FDIC
NASD AND 
STOCK EXCHANGES
•  REVIEW AND ENFORCE 
COMPLIANCE WITH 
LISTING STANDARDS
ESTABLISH SPECIFIC 
REPORTING AND 
DISCLOSURE REQUIRE­
MENTS FOR FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS
STATE GOVERNMENT: 
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, 
LEGISLATURES, ETC.
•  REVIEW AND ENFORCE 
COMPLIANCE WITH 
ESTABLISHED 
REQUIREMENTS
NASD AND 
STOCK EXCHANGES
•  ESTABLISH LISTING 
REQUIREMENTS FOR 
COMPANIES WHOSE 
SECURITIES ARE 
TRADED
COURTS
•  ADJUDICATE 
GOVERNMENT AND 
PRIVATE ACTIONS 
FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
•  INTERPRET LAWS 
AND RULES
STATE GOVERNMENT: 
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, 
LEGISLATURES, ETC.
•  INTERPRET/SET 
STATE LAWS, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS 
ADDRESSING DISCLOSURE 
AT STATE LEVEL
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTANTS
•  AUDIT AND ISSUE
REPORTS ON FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS'
CONFORMITY WITH 
REPORTING STANDARDS
PUBLIC COMPANY
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EXHIBIT 1-4
OVERSIGHT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
STANDARD-SETTING COMPLIANCE
AICPA -  AUDITING  
STANDARDS BOARD (ASB)
•  ESTABLISHES GENERALLY 
ACCEPTED AUDITING  
STANDARDS (GAAS) FOR 
ALL AUDITORS
AICPA -  DIVISION  
| FOR CPA FIRMS -  SECPS
•  ADMINISTERS THE PRO­
FESSION'S QUALITY 
ASSURANCE PROGRAM, THE 
FOUNDATION OF WHICH IS 
THE PEER REVIEW 
PROGRAM
•  MEMBERSHIP IS 
VOLUNTARY
I SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
_______COMMITTEE (SIC)_______
•  REVIEWS ALLEGATIONS 
OF AUDIT FAILURE AND 
CONSIDERS THE NEED 
FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION 
BY INDIVIDUAL FIRM
SEC
INDIRECTLY OVERSEES 
ASB THROUGH REGULAR 
LIAISON
EXERCISES AUTHORITY TO 
ISSUE ITS OWN REGULATIONS 
INDEPENDENTLY
EVALUATES THE PEER 
REVIEW PROCESS 
INDIRECTLY OVERSEES 
ACCOUNTING PRONOUNCE­
MENTS, INFORMAL 
MEETINGS WITH FASB 
ESTABLISHES DISCLOS­
URE RULES AGAINST 
WHICH THE AUDITORS 
MEASURE THE CORP­
ORATION'S FINANCIAL 
REPORTS FOR 
COMPLIANCE
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
•  MONITORS AND 
EVALUATES THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE 
SEC PRACTICE SECTION
AICPA -  PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS PROGRAM
•  DEVELOPS STANDARDS 
AND PROMOTES COMPLIANCE
•  PRESENTS VIOLATIONS 
TO TRIAL BOARD
STATE BOARDS OF 
ACCOUNTANCY
•  ADMINISTER THE 
UNIFORM CPA EXAM
•  LICENSE INDIVIDUAL  
CPAs
•  ADMINISTER OWN 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
PROGRAMS (CERTAIN 
STATE BOARDS)
STATE BOARDS OF 
ACCOUNTANCY
ENFORCE COMPLIANCE 
WITH LICENSING 
REGULATIONS AND 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
PROGRAMS
COURTS
ADJUDICATE 
GOVERNMENT AND 
PRIVATE ACTIONS FOR 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH 
GAAS
QUALITY ASSURANCE
PROGRAMS OF INDIVIDUAL  
CPA FIRMS
•  ADMINISTER OWN 
QUALITY ASSURANCE/ 
PEER REVIEW PROGRAMS
IN THE PROCESS, 
INFLUENCE PERFORM­
ANCE STANDARDS 
THROUGH INTERPRETA­
TIONS AND JUDGMENT 
AWARDS
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
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Exhibit 1-4, page 18, illustrates the various private and government organizations that oversee 
independent public accountants.
The organizations and the agencies that set standards for independent public accountants include 
the SEC, the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board (ASB) and SEC Practice Section (SECPS), state 
boards of accountancy, and quality assurance programs of individual public accounting firms. The 
SEC, the Public Oversight Board (POB), state boards, and the courts monitor the compliance of 
the independent public accountants with established standards.
III. Breakdowns in the Financial Reporting System: Causes, 
Perpetrators, and Means
The financial reporting system functions remarkably well. Public companies generally live up to 
the public trust by disclosing timely, complete, and relevant financial information. In addition, 
organizations charged with overseeing the process of setting standards by and large do an admi­
rable job of appropriately balancing the public interest and the burdens regulation imposes on 
business. Compliance and enforcement efforts are serious and generally effective.
Yet exceptions occur, and the system occasionally breaks down. The Commission studied those 
breakdowns to determine, if possible, how and why they happened.
Causes of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The Commission reviewed both alleged and proven instances of fraudulent financial reporting, 
including 119 enforcement actions against public companies or associated individuals and 42 cases 
against independent public accountants or their firms brought by the SEC during the last 5 years. 
A number of the SEC cases are reflected in 2 composite case studies prepared by researchers at 
the Harvard Business School, included in Appendix G.
The Commission’s studies revealed that fraudulent financial reporting usually occurs as the result 
of certain environmental, institutional, or individual forces and opportunities. These forces and 
opportunities add pressures and incentives that encourage individuals and companies to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting and are present to some degree in all companies. If the right, 
combustible mixture of forces and opportunities is present, fraudulent financial reporting may 
occur.
A frequent incentive for fraudulent financial reporting that improves the company’s financial 
appearance is the desire to obtain a higher price from a stock or debt offering or to meet the 
expectations of investors. Another incentive may be the desire to postpone dealing with financial 
difficulties and thus avoid, for example, violating a restrictive debt covenant. Other times the 
incentive is personal gain: additional compensation, promotion, or escape from penalty for poor 
performance.
Situational pressures on the company or an individual manager also may lead to fraudulent 
financial reporting. Examples of these situational pressures include:
•  Sudden decreases in revenue or market share. A single company or an entire industry can 
experience these decreases.
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• Unrealistic budget pressures, particularly for short-term results. These pressures may occur 
when headquarters arbitrarily determines profit objectives and budgets without taking actual 
conditions into account.
•  Financial pressure resulting from bonus plans that depend on short-term economic perfor­
mance. This pressure is particularly acute when the bonus is a significant component of the 
individual’s total compensation.
Opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting are present when the fraud is easier to commit and 
when detection is less likely. Frequently these opportunities arise from:
•  The absence of a board of directors or audit committee that vigilantly oversees the financial 
reporting process.
•  Weak or nonexistent internal accounting controls. This situation can occur, for example, when 
a company’s revenue system is overloaded from a rapid expansion of sales, an acquisition of 
a new division, or the entry into a new, unfamiliar line of business.
•  Unusual or complex transactions. Examples include the consolidation of two companies, the 
divestiture or closing of a specific operation, and agreements to buy or sell government 
securities under a repurchase agreement.
•  Accounting estimates requiring significant subjective judgment by company management. 
Examples include reserves for loan losses and the yearly provision for warranty expense.
•  Ineffective internal audit staffs. This situation may result from inadequate staff size and 
severely limited audit scope.
A weak corporate ethical climate exacerbates these situations. Opportunities for fraudulent finan­
cial reporting also increase dramatically when the accounting principles for transactions are 
nonexistent, evolving, or subject to varying interpretations.
Perpetrators and the Means They Use
Individuals with many different roles within a company— sales representatives, operating man­
agers, accountants, and executives—have perpetrated fraudulent financial reporting. In a large 
majority of the cases the Commission studied, however, the company’s top management, such as 
the CEO, the president, and the CFO, were the perpetrators. In some cases, the company made 
deliberate misrepresentations to the independent public accountant, sometimes through falsified 
documents and records.
Furthermore, the Commission’s studies revealed that, while the perpetrators of fraudulent financial 
reporting use many different means, the effect of their actions is almost always to inflate or 
“ smooth”  earnings or to overstate the company’s assets. In addition, fraudulent financial reporting 
usually does not begin with an overt intentional act to distort the financial statements. In many 
cases, fraudulent financial reporting is the culmination of a series of acts designed to respond to 
operational difficulties. Initially, the activities may not be fraudulent, but in time they may become 
increasingly questionable. When the tone set by top management permits or encourages such 
activities, eventually the result may be fraudulent financial reporting.
This scenario illustrates how fraudulent financial reporting can occur: The CEO, under pressure 
to continue increasing sales, has the shipping department work longer hours in the days prior to 
the end of the quarter. As the pressure mounts, he compounds the situation by delaying the 
recognition of sales returns, instructing sales representatives to “ make the sales stick.”  Finally, 
he commits a fraudulent act, by recognizing revenue from inventory shipped to a customer without
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authorization or from inventory shipped to a public warehouse. He might also overstate sales by 
recognizing revenue from purported sales that were not consummated owing to materially unsat­
isfied conditions; recognizing revenue from purported fourth-quarter sales even though the ship­
ments did not occur until after year-end; and improperly treating shipments consigned to salesmen 
as sales.
Methods used to defer current-period expenses or to overstate assets are equally diverse. They 
include issuing falsified purchase orders to vendors, who then submit false invoices that fraudu­
lently decrease the cost of routine parts and increase the cost of capitalized equipment, failing to 
write off assets that had been scrapped or could not be located, improperly changing the lives of 
the company’s depreciable assets, failing to create an adequate reserve for known losses on 
obsolete inventory or delinquent loans, and recording nonexistent assets by falsifying inventory 
count tags.
Independent Public Accountants
Almost all the SEC’s fraudulent financial reporting cases against independent public accountants 
alleged a failure to conduct the audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS). The most common alleged deviation from GAAS is the lack of sufficient competent 
evidential matter. Examples of this deficiency include failing to confirm account balances, ne­
glecting to observe inventories, and placing undue reliance on uncorroborated management rep­
resentations instead of obtaining outside verification from third parties.
In many cases, although indications of possible improprieties, or “ red flags,”  existed, indepen­
dent public accountants failed to recognize or pursue them with skepticism. The SEC believed that, 
if the independent public accountants had investigated these red flags, the fraudulent activity would 
have had a greater likelihood of being uncovered. Weak internal controls were the most commonly 
ignored red flag. In a number of cases, the independent public accountant knew or should have 
known that the company’s internal controls were weak, but did nothing to investigate their 
potential impact.
Although national public accounting firms audit 84 percent of public companies, 75 percent of the 
SEC actions against independent public accountants and firms involved nonnational firms or sole 
practitioners. The alleged deficiencies in quality control included failure to train and supervise the 
audit staffs adequately and failure to tailor audit programs to particular specialized industries. 
These deficiencies correlate to the fact that a relatively high percentage of the SEC’s cases against 
smaller, regional or local accounting firms and sole practitioners involved allegations of substan­
dard audit work.
IV. Extent and Effect of Breakdowns
The Commission also considered the extent to which breakdowns occur in the financial reporting 
system and the effect such breakdowns have on affected parties. Both these inquiries, together with 
the Commission’s analysis of the SEC cases, were critical to determining that the problem of 
fraudulent financial reporting should be addressed and to formulating recommendations to combat 
the problem.
Indeterminate Number of Incidents
The incidence of fraudulent financial reporting cannot be quantified with any degree of precision. 
No analysis yields a satisfactory result. The number of SEC proceedings against reporting com­
21
panies over the past 5 years compared to the number of financial reports filed with the SEC during 
the same period, for example, gives an incidence of less than 1 percent. But this figure takes no 
account of instances the SEC did not detect, or of known or suspected instances of fraudulent 
financial reporting that the SEC did not pursue because of the lack of sufficient evidence or 
resources. Moreover, it excludes financial reporting by financial institutions that report to regu­
lators other than the SEC.
The Commission’s reluctance to rely on the small number of SEC cases to quantify the extent of 
fraudulent financial reporting was influenced by the views of others. The Chairman of the FDIC, 
for example, contends that management fraud contributed to one-third of bank failures. Similarly, 
a Commission study of bankruptcies found that 20 percent of the bankruptcies studied involved 
litigation against the independent public accountant. Half of this 20 percent (10 percent of the total 
bankruptcies studied) also involved fraudulent financial reporting. All these findings indicate that 
any numerical estimate of the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting would be unsound.
Furthermore, the Commission has concluded that such an estimate is unnecessary for its purpose. 
Others have found the same to be true when considering other types of securities fraud. The 
magnitude of insider trading, for example, is equally difficult to quantify. SEC Chairman John 
Shad testified before Congress to that effect in June 1986 and roughly estimated that fraudulent 
securities activities, of which insider trading is only one type, amount to a fraction of 1 percent 
of the $50 billion in U.S. corporate and government securities traded daily. At the same time, 
however, because insider trading has such a detrimental effect on public confidence in the fairness 
of the capital markets, Chairman Shad and the SEC recommended passage of the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984 to increase deterrence of this type of fraud, and they have pursued a 
well-publicized enforcement program against insider trading.
Although by available measures fraudulent financial reporting occurs infrequently, just as in the 
case of insider trading, when it does occur, its detrimental effects are serious and wide ranging.
Victims of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Public investors in the company’s equity or debt securities are, of course, victims of fraudulent 
financial reporting. But they are not the only ones who suffer immediate and direct harm. The 
victims also include others who rely on the company’s reported financial information:
•  Banks and other financial institutions that lend funds to the company
• Depositors and shareholders of such institutions whose assets and investments, respectively, 
are jeopardized
•  Suppliers who extend credit
•  Customers who look to the company to perform on its contracts
•  Merger partners who may enter into agreements based on inflated values
•  Underwriters who distribute securities
•  Financial analysts who give investment advice about the issuer and its securities
•  The company’s independent public accountants, who may find themselves named defendants 
or the subject of an investigation
•  Attorneys for the issuer, and perhaps for the underwriters
•  Insurance companies that write directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and then experience 
large claims.
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Some of these victims, particularly independent public accountants, underwriters, and attorneys, 
not only may suffer losses themselves and damage to their reputations, but also may be named as 
defendants in private litigation because they represent “ deep pockets.”  When shareholders and 
others seek to recover their losses, the company, whose top management actually perpetrates the 
fraudulent financial reporting, is often insolvent, leading the victims to look to the accountants, 
underwriters, and attorneys for damages.
When the wrongdoing comes to light, people within the company who reported fraudulent financial 
information are injured as well. These employees and other insiders include:
•  The company’s management and directors, who may suffer loss of money as well as of 
reputation and standing
• Holders of large blocks of company stock, such as estates or family trusts, the value of whose 
holdings may drop dramatically
•  Employee stockholders, who may have purchased the issuer’s securities directly or through 
employee benefit plans
•  Employees, frequently at middle and lower levels, who become scapegoats for “ toeing the 
company line”
• Honest employees and managers, whose careers may suffer from guilt by association.
Even if fraudulent financial reporting does not actually come to light, or even take place, the 
company with weak internal controls and other deficiencies does its employees a disservice by 
exposing them unduly to temptation.
Fraudulent financial reporting also has a more remote, potentially more damaging impact: loss of 
public confidence. Widespread media attention to even a single instance of fraudulent financial 
reporting can shake public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting by a whole industry 
or, worse, by all public companies. Public confidence in the fairness of financial reporting is 
critical to the effective functioning of the securities markets. The U.S. securities markets rely on 
full and fair disclosure, and financial information is an essential element of this disclosure. Also, 
loss of public confidence can increase the costs of capital for companies that have not been 
involved in fraudulent financial reporting. Consumers ultimately may bear these increased costs.
V. Evolutionary Nature of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The forces and opportunities that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting evolve as society 
changes, as do the methods by which fraudulent financial reporting occurs. The Commission’s 
recommendations therefore cannot stand for all time as the most appropriate responses to the 
problem. Continued studies of fraudulent financial reporting and its prevention and detection will 
be necessary.
Two examples of societal changes that can affect fraudulent financial reporting are the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 and developments in computers and information systems.
Tax Reform Act of 1986
The corporate alternative minimum tax provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduces new 
pressures that illustrate the evolutionary nature of fraudulent financial reporting. In the past, 
companies could report earnings to the SEC and their shareholders that did not necessarily relate
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to earnings reported for tax purposes. The new tax law requires corporations to compute a 
minimum tax liability based on their financial statement income. This change may affect financial 
reporting to shareholders by introducing tax issues into the setting of Generally Accepted Ac­
counting Principles (GAAP) and by giving corporations tax incentives to consider in connection 
with their publicly reported earnings.
Computers and Information Systems
The increasing power and sophistication of computers and computer-based information systems 
may contribute even more to the changing nature of fraudulent financial reporting. The last decade 
has seen the decentralization and the proliferation of computers and information systems into 
almost every part of the company. This development has enabled management to make decisions 
more quickly and on the basis of more accurate information. Yet by doing what they do best— 
placing vast quantities of data within easy reach—computers multiply the potential for misusing 
or manipulating information, increasing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting.
On the other hand, advances in computers and information systems can improve the means of 
preventing and detecting fraudulent financial reporting. Auditors can use the computer’s speed and 
power to test more transactions or calculations than otherwise possible. Management and internal 
auditors can identify unauthorized access attempts, unusual transactions, or deviations from 
normal processing more easily.
Using computer technology effectively to prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting 
is a challenge that requires foresight, judgment, and cooperation among computer specialists, 
management, and internal auditors. For example, companies now can monitor financial transac­
tions continuously by using auditing software modules embedded in the system. When an infor­
mation system is developed, the company should build in an audit trail. To ensure that controls 
are in place and to integrate fraud prevention and detection methods in the system itself, internal 
auditors should be involved when a company develops computerized accounting applications.
Developments in computers and information systems have a fundamental and pervasive impact on 
all the participants in the financial reporting process. The Commission’s conclusion that all 
participants in the financial reporting process need to understand computer-based information 
systems is fundamental to many of the recommendations in this report. Management needs to 
understand current computer technology to be able, for example, to make informed decisions about 
the required level of security. Internal auditors and independent public accountants need this 
knowledge to be able to review and evaluate the adequacy of internal controls for computerized 
accounting systems. Also, with a knowledge of information systems, they will be better equipped 
to audit using the computer rather than relying on user departments’ manual controls and direct 
tests of ending balances. The audit committee needs sufficient understanding of computers and 
information systems to exercise its oversight responsibilities.
VI. Need for Cost-Effective Responses
The need for cost-effective responses has been paramount in the Commission’s deliberations. 
Accordingly, the Commission has limited its responses to recommendations that are reasonable in 
the circumstances and that companies can implement realistically, with costs and burdens justified 
by the benefits to be achieved. This approach is particularly important because, although the
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known number of fraudulent financial reporting cases is small, the number of companies that these 
recommendations may affect is large.
At the same time, the Commission agrees with a position the SEC noted in the cost-benefit analysis 
of a recent rulemaking action:
It is fundamental to the capital formation process that investors who fund new enterprises be treated 
fairly and be given reasonable information concerning the businesses in which they invest. Moreover, 
requiring small businesses to live with appropriate regulations as a quid pro quo for access to public 
markets will doubtless have the salutary side effect of accustoming their managers to an ordered 
approach to the conduct of their businesses, thus facilitating their future access to the capital markets. 
(From comment letter of American Bar Association, quoted in SEC Release No. 34 -23789, November 
10, 1986.)
Many of the Commission’s recommendations are not new. In fact, many public companies and 
public accounting firms already have implemented most of them as a matter of good business 
practice. To the extent that the recommendations would require change, the long-term benefits of 
these recommendations—enhanced corporate control and ethical business conduct—outweigh the 
costs of implementing them.
The Spirit of the Recommendations
The Commission’s studies indicate that smaller, newly public companies and smaller public 
accounting firms may experience significant short-term implementation costs. Yet, these entities 
may have a disproportionately greater risk of fraudulent financial reporting and thus may reap 
proportionately greater benefits. The Commission nonetheless recognizes that the resources to 
implement its recommendations in smaller public companies and smaller public accounting firms 
may not always be available.
The Commission urges all participants in the financial reporting process to implement both the 
letter and the spirit of its recommendations. In rare situations where implementation of the letter 
of a recommendation is not possible, however, the Commission urges companies and firms to 
introduce procedures that respond to its spirit.
The next four chapters present the Commission’s recommendations for the participants in the 
financial reporting process— the public company, the independent public accountant, and the SEC 
and other regulatory and legal bodies— as well as for educators of present and future participants.
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Chapter Two
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
PUBLIC COMPANY
I. The Responsibility of the Public Company for Financial Reporting
The federal securities laws require public companies to disclose complete and accurate financial 
information regularly. The law imposes this obligation when a company begins the process of 
becoming a public company, and the obligation continues in effect as long as the company 
maintains public status. Implicit in this obligation is the requirement that the company’s financial 
statements be complete and not misleading in any material respect.
Congress itself identified financial statements as an essential component of the disclosure system 
on which the U.S. securities markets are based. So important is financial statement disclosure, in 
fact, that Congress in enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 imposed direct 
regulation designed to ensure that public companies can meet their financial disclosure obligations. 
This added statutory obligation requires public companies to keep books and records that reflect 
their transactions and assets accurately and fairly and to maintain a system of internal accounting 
control that enables them to prepare financial statements in conformity with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).
The public company has the initial and the final responsibility for its financial statements. Within 
the company lies the greatest potential for reducing fraudulent financial reporting. Thus the 
Commission first looked to the public company when developing its recommendations, beginning 
by exploring the forces and opportunities that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting.
The Commission found that no company, regardless of size or line of business, is immune from 
the possibility that fraudulent financial reporting will occur; that possibility is inherent in doing 
business. The forces and opportunities that appeared in numerous SEC enforcement cases are 
present to some extent in all companies. The Commission also found that companies have a 
number of practices already in place to help them deal with these forces and opportunities. All 
companies would benefit from adopting similar practices to reduce the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Addressing the Problem at Two Levels
The Commission’s recommendations will reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting by 
addressing the problem at two levels:
Level 1. Improve the tone set by top management, the overall environment in which 
financial reporting occurs
Level 2. Maximize the effectiveness o f the functions within the company that are critical 
to the integrity o f financial reporting: the accounting function, the internal audit 
function, and the audit committee o f the board o f  directors.
The first three recommendations in this chapter are aimed at the first level, improving the tone set 
by top management. All the recommendations that follow depend on these recommendations; top
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management first must establish the proper environment, one in which fraudulent financial re­
porting is less likely to occur and, if it does occur, is more likely to be detected.
The section of the chapter that addresses the tone at the top suggests a framework for improving 
the corporate environment or culture. The framework includes three steps: identifying and un­
derstanding the factors that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting, assessing the risk of this type 
of fraud, and designing and implementing internal controls. The Commission then recommends 
that every public company develop and enforce a written code of corporate conduct as a tangible 
embodiment of the tone at the top.
The chapter next turns to the second level, maximizing the effectiveness of the functions within 
the company that are critical to the integrity of financial reporting. The Commission first addresses 
two key functions within the company— the accounting function and the internal audit function. 
Next, the Commission’s recommendations concern the role of another critical component in the 
financial reporting process: the audit committee of the board of directors. This section discusses 
ways the audit committee can be more effective in preventing and detecting fraudulent financial 
reporting.
The chapter then concentrates on the need for top management and the audit committee to 
communicate their respective responsibilities to financial statement users. The Commission 
presents recommendations for a management report and an audit committee chairman’s letter, both 
as part of the annual report to stockholders. The chapter then looks at two specific areas for 
improvement: seeking a second opinion from another public accounting firm, and the role of the 
audit committee in quarterly reporting. The focus of the final section of the chapter is the 
Commission’s recommendation for an interdisciplinary body to set standards for internal control.
II. Tone at the Top
The tone set by top management—the corporate environment or culture within which financial 
reporting occurs— is the most important factor contributing to the integrity of the financial re­
porting process. Notwithstanding an impressive set of written rules and procedures, if the tone set 
by management is in fact lax, fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur.
The measures a company can take to establish the right tone at the top include a wide range of 
options. But, to be effective, each option must include certain steps. The Commission suggests the 
following framework to help public companies incorporate these steps into their efforts to prevent 
and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
Framework
The Commission’s recommended framework includes three steps:
Step 1. Identify and understand the factors that can lead to fraudulent financial report­
ing, including factors unique to the company
Step 2. Assess the risk o f  fraudulent financial reporting that these factors create within 
the company
Step 3. Design and implement internal controls that will provide reasonable assurance 
that fraudulent financial reporting will be prevented or detected.
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Steps 1 and 2. Identifying, Understanding, and Assessing the Risk o f  Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting
Recommendation: For the top management o f a public company to discharge its obli­
gation to oversee the financial reporting process, it must identify, understand, and assess 
the factors that may cause the company’s financial statements to be fraudulently misstated.
The process of identifying, understanding, and assessing the factors that may create a risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting in a company is vital. This assessment enables a company to design 
and implement internal controls to minimize the risks it identifies.
The process of assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting, which is generally part of an 
ongoing operating procedure rather than a separate management project, requires judgment and 
creativity. Top management’s judgment dictates the extent and the nature of the assessment 
appropriate to a particular company. Accordingly, individuals at all levels of the company, 
including operating management, financial managers, and internal auditors, perform parts of the 
assessment, but top-level corporate management, such as the CEO and the CFO, must supervise 
the process. In addition, the audit committee of the board of directors should review annually the 
company’s risk assessment process and management’s responses to significant identified risks.
The Good Practice Guidelines for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, presented 
in Appendix H, illustrate some of the factors that can influence fraudulent financial reporting and 
can serve as a frame of reference for understanding and assessing the risk of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Step 3. Designing and Implementing Internal Controls
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal controls that are adequate 
to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
The role of internal control in preventing and detecting fraud, well recognized in practice for many 
years, was recognized in federal legislation in 1977. The FCPA requires each SEC registrant to 
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting control sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurance that (1) transactions are authorized by management, (2) transactions are recorded as 
necessary to permit preparation of the financial statements and to maintain accountability for 
assets, (3) access to assets is permitted only with management’s authorization, and (4) existing 
assets are compared with recorded accountability, and appropriate action is taken with respect to 
any differences.
Internal accounting controls are generally interpreted to include the company’s accounting system 
and specific control procedures. The accounting system consists of the methods and the records 
that the company uses to identify, assemble, classify, and record its transactions. The company’s 
specific control procedures are its individual policies for processing transactions such as clerical 
checks, document comparisons, reconciliations, and independent assets counts. Internal account­
ing controls are directed primarily at systematically recorded transactions that lower-level em­
ployees generally perform.
Fraudulent financial reporting continues to occur despite the FCPA’s statutory requirement that 
companies maintain adequate internal accounting controls. A Commission study of 119 fraudulent 
financial reporting actions brought by the SEC since July 1, 1981, found that management in those 
companies repeatedly had been able to override systems of internal accounting control. Other 
instances of fraudulent financial reporting involved transactions under management’s direct control 
and not part of the system of internal accounting controls, such as those requiring significant
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estimates and judgments. Therefore, internal controls broader than the internal accounting controls 
contemplated under the FCPA are necessary to reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
The broad term internal control is often used to describe both controls over operational tasks like 
product quality assurance, production, and plant maintenance and controls over the financial 
reporting process. Although operational or administrative controls are an essential element of 
managing a company’s affairs, some do not affect financial reporting directly and therefore are 
beyond the scope of this report.
Controls that affect financial reporting directly include more than internal accounting controls. 
They also include elements not generally considered part of internal accounting controls, such as 
the internal audit function and the audit committee of the board of directors. These control elements 
and all other components of the overall corporate control environment, together with the internal 
accounting controls, comprise the internal controls that can prevent and detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
The corporate control environment is the atmosphere in which the internal accounting controls are 
applied and the financial statements are prepared. A company’s control environment includes 
management philosophy and operating style, organizational structure, methods of communicating 
and enforcing the assignment of authority and responsibility, and personnel management methods. 
The control environment has a pervasive impact on the entire process by which a company’s 
financial reports are prepared.
Well-run public companies have effective systems of internal control not just because internal 
control is the first line of defense against fraud, but because a strong system of internal control 
makes good business sense and is cost-effective.
Each company must design its internal controls according to its own unique circumstances, 
weighing the benefits of each control in relation to its cost. Every public company, however, 
should have a written code of corporate conduct as a prerequisite to an effective system of internal 
control, and to establish the appropriate tone at the top and throughout the company.
Code of Corporate Conduct
Recommendation: Public companies should develop and enforce written codes o f  cor­
porate conduct. Codes o f  conduct should foster a strong ethical climate and open channels 
o f communication to help protect against fraudulent financial reporting. A company’s 
audit committee should review compliance with the code annually, including compliance 
by top management, and report thereon to the board o f  directors.
A strong corporate ethical climate at all levels is vital to the well-being of the corporation, all its 
constituencies, and the public at large. Such a climate contributes importantly to the effectiveness 
of company policies and control systems and helps influence behavior that is not subject to even 
the most elaborate system of controls. Consequently, a strong corporate ethical climate empha­
sizing accountability protects a company against fraudulent financial reporting.
A written code of corporate conduct strengthens the corporate ethical climate by signaling to all 
employees standards for conducting the company’s affairs. Well-defined ethical standards and 
guidelines for acceptable behavior promote ethical decision-making at all levels of the organization 
and help resolve ethical dilemmas that arise.
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To succeed, a code of corporate conduct must have the full support of management and the board 
of directors. The most influential factors in determining the code’s effectiveness are the attitude 
and the behavior of the top officers and directors, who set the example for the entire company. The 
CEO, in particular, has a special role; his attitude, behavior, and expectations of others strongly 
influence the actions of other upper-level managers.
The development of a corporate code is not an overnight task. A company must invest the 
necessary time, energy, and resources to ensure that the code is tailored to its circumstances. Since 
those circumstances will evolve to meet changing demands, the company must update the code 
periodically.
Finally, the full support of management and the board is needed to ensure that the code receives 
widespread understanding and support. Employees representing all levels of the corporation should 
be encouraged to participate in the code’s development and evolution in an appropriate fashion. 
Such collaboration can minimize cases of noncompliance, due to lack of understanding, and can 
promote acceptance and adherence. In addition, the code and any amendments must be publicized 
throughout the corporation.
A code of corporate conduct also can help establish an environment where open communication 
is expected, accepted, and protected. Management needs a free flow of information to assist it in 
directing the company’s operations, especially in a large, decentralized business. This need is 
critical in assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. An atmosphere of open communi­
cation allows an employee, when confronted with suspected fraud, to bring the problem to the 
attention of those high enough in the corporation to solve it without fear of reprisal.
The code also must provide an accessible internal complaint and appeal mechanism. This mech­
anism should be designed to facilitate internal disclosures, particularly those involving allegations 
of fraudulent financial reporting or other misconduct. The mechanism could take a variety of 
forms, such as the use of an ombudsman.
Such internal procedures would offer a number of advantages. They would allow management to 
correct inadvertent mistakes and mistakes that may result from bad judgment or failure to recognize 
a problem. They also would encourage employees to act in good faith and would tend to ensure 
the validity of any complaint. In addition, effective internal action may make external disclosures 
to government authorities or other third parties unnecessary.
The code of corporate conduct should protect employees who use these internal procedures against 
reprisal. Failure to adopt guarantees against reprisal as well as to provide an effective internal 
complaint procedure could undermine the vitality of codes of conduct, and encourage a call for 
antiretaliatory legislation, for which there is ample precedent at the state and the federal level.
The Commission has observed a great deal of diversity in written codes of corporate conduct. Some 
are general, others specific in their content and direction. Corporate management and the board 
should develop a code that fits the particular circumstances of their business. Nearly all codes of 
conduct, however, should include a conflict-of-interest policy, to prevent actual or apparent 
improprieties in connection with business transactions; a corporate policy of compliance with 
domestic and foreign laws affecting its business, including those laws relating to financial dis­
closures; and a policy of confidentiality relating to the company’s proprietary information.
Yet another element is indispensable to the success of a code of conduct: adequate monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. The board of directors should be responsible through its audit com­
mittee for monitoring compliance with the code of conduct, including compliance by top man­
agement. Employees at all levels should understand that violation of the law or compromise of the
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company’s code of conduct can result in serious disciplinary actions (including dismissal and 
criminal or civil proceedings where appropriate) and that no employee is exempt from the code.
Written codes of corporate conduct have further advantages. Such codes foster a strong ethical 
climate, helping to create a work environment that appeals to company personnel at all levels. With 
an effective code, a company’s employees may be more highly motivated, and the company may 
be able to attract and retain better employees. In an era when loyalty between organizations and 
their customers seems less enduring, a company’s concern for a strong ethical climate also may 
generate a positive image outside the organization, which can lead to increased business 
opportunities.
III. Two Key Functions: Accounting and Internal Audit
As the company acts to set an environment that is a strong deterrent to fraudulent financial 
reporting, it also must address fraudulent financial reporting at a second level by maximizing the 
effectiveness of two critical functions within the company: the accounting function and the internal 
audit function.
A. Accounting Function and Chief Accounting Officer
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain accounting functions that can 
effectively meet their financial reporting obligations.
A public company’s accounting function is an important control in preventing and detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting. The accounting function must be adequate to allow the company and 
its officers to fulfill their statutory financial disclosure obligations.
The chief accounting officer is a member of top management who sets the tone of the 
organization’s ethical conduct and thus is part of the control environment. Moreover, the chief 
accounting officer is directly responsible for the financial statements, can take authoritative action 
to correct them, and should be held responsible for fraudulent financial reporting. He generally has 
the primary responsibility for designing, implementing, and monitoring the company’s financial 
reporting system and internal accounting controls. Depending on the size and the nature of the 
company, a chief financial officer or a controller may perform this function.
The chief accounting officer’s actions especially influence employees who perform the accounting 
function. By establishing high standards for the company’s financial disclosures, the chief ac­
counting officer guides others in the company toward legitimate financial reporting.
Moreover, the chief accounting officer is in a unique position. In numerous cases, other members 
of top management, such as the chief executive officer, pressure the chief accounting officer into 
fraudulently manipulating the financial statements. An effective chief accounting officer is familiar 
with the company’s financial position and operations and thus frequently is able to identify unusual 
situations caused by fraudulent financial reporting perpetrated at the divisional level. The chief 
accounting officer must take actions necessary to prevent the fraudulent financial reporting.
The Financial Executives Institute (FEI) and the National Association of Accountants (NAA) play 
active roles in enhancing the financial reporting process by sponsoring research, technical pro­
fessional guidance, and continuing professional education and by participating in the shaping of 
standards. Both organizations also have promulgated codes of conduct that strongly encourage
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reliable financial reporting. Public companies should encourage their accounting employees to 
support these organizations and adhere to their codes of conduct.
B. Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain an effective internal audit function 
staffed with an adequate number o f qualified personnel appropriate to the size and the 
nature o f the company.
Properly organized and effectively operated, internal auditing gives management and the audit 
committee a way to monitor the reliability and the integrity of financial and operating information. 
The internal audit function thus is an important element in preventing and detecting fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Support of Top Management
To be effective, internal auditors must have the acknowledged support of top management and the 
board of directors through its audit committee. The company should set forth in writing the scope 
of responsibilities for the internal audit function, and the audit committee should adopt this 
document formally. The optimal size of the internal audit function and the composition of its staff 
depend on the company’s size and nature and the scope of responsibilities assigned to the function.
The education, experience, and professionalism of the internal auditors help determine the effec­
tiveness of the internal audit function. The company should encourage the development of its 
internal auditors by providing continuing professional education programs and offering attractive 
career paths.
IIA Standards
The professionalism of internal auditors has been enhanced in recent years by the efforts of the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the professional organization for internal auditors. Standards 
of the IIA offer excellent guidance for effective internal auditing and reflect some of the most 
advanced thinking on fraud prevention and detection. The Commission encourages public com­
panies who have not done so to consider adopting the IIA standards. These standards appear in 
Appendix I.
The IIA’s Quality Assurance Standard calls for periodic external (peer) reviews of the internal 
audit function. The Commission endorses this concept as a way to enhance the effectiveness of the 
internal audit function.
Objectivity of the Internal Audit Function
Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their internal audit functions are 
objective.
The effectiveness of a company’s internal audit function depends a great deal on the objectivity 
of the chief internal auditor and his staff. Public companies should ensure that their internal 
auditors are free to perform their functions in an objective manner, without interference and able 
to report findings to the appropriate parties for corrective action. Three principal factors contribute 
to independence and objectivity: the organizational positioning of the function, the corporate
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stature of the chief internal auditor, and the reporting relationship of the chief internal auditor to 
the audit committee.
For day-to-day operational purposes, the chief internal auditor should report administratively to a 
senior officer who is not directly responsible for preparing the company’s financial statements. The 
Commission encourages an administrative reporting relationship in which the chief internal auditor 
reports directly to the CEO, but acknowledges that this organizational structure may be impractical 
in larger corporations. At a minimum, however, the chief internal auditor should have direct and 
unrestricted access to the CEO. The Commission encourages the CEO to conduct regularly 
scheduled meetings with the chief internal auditor, no less frequently than every quarter.
The chief internal auditor should be an experienced audit professional, trained either in internal 
auditing or in public accounting, and he should have the necessary business acumen to work 
effectively with fellow senior officers. The chief internal auditor should occupy a position of high 
stature within the organization.
In addition, the chief internal auditor should have direct and unrestricted access to the audit 
committee and he should meet privately with the committee on a regular basis. He also should 
attend all audit committee meetings, reporting to the committee at regular intervals on the activities 
of the internal audit function.
The internal audit function can be an important resource for the audit committee— a valuable 
in-house source of information and staff. The importance of the internal audit function to the audit 
committee leads the Commission to believe that the audit committee should review the appoint­
ment and the dismissal of the chief internal auditor.
Impact of Nonfinancial Audit Findings
Recommendation: Internal auditors should consider the implications o f their 
nonfinancial audit findings fo r  the company’s financial statements.
Internal auditors also provide services to the organization broader than those relating to financial 
auditing. Operational auditing, acquisition reviews, and special investigations are a few examples. 
These services benefit the company substantially and give the internal auditor in-depth knowledge 
of many different aspects of the company’s operations. This unique perspective enables internal 
auditors to be highly effective in detecting fraudulent financial reporting, particularly if internal 
auditors systematically consider the results and potential impact of the nonfinancial audits on the 
financial statements.
Involvement at the Corporate Level
Recommendation: Management and the audit committee should ensure that the internal 
auditors’ involvement in the audit o f the entire financial reporting process is appropriate 
and properly coordinated with the independent public accountant.
With their knowledge of the organization and its controls, internal auditors have considerable 
potential for preventing and detecting fraudulent financial reporting. But the full potential often is 
not realized, in part because the role the internal auditors have in the audit of financial statements 
at the consolidated level is often limited.
A Commission-sponsored study found that internal auditors often concentrate on the review of 
controls at the division, subsidiary, or other business component level, rather than at the corporate
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level. Independent public accountants, on the other hand, generally are responsible for the audit 
examination at the corporate level. Appropriate involvement by the internal auditors at the cor­
porate level, effectively coordinated to avoid duplication of the independent public accountants’ 
efforts, can help prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
IV. Audit Committee of the Board of Directors
The audit committee of a company’s board of directors can play a crucial role in preventing and 
detecting fraudulent financial reporting. The Commission highlights important aspects of the audit 
committee’s function throughout this chapter in the course of its discussions of other recommen­
dations. In addition, the Commission offers six specific recommendations.
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee
Recommendation: The board o f directors o f all public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to establish audit committees comprised solely o f  independent directors.
An audit committee consisting of independent directors is the primary vehicle a board of directors 
uses to discharge its responsibility with respect to the company’s financial reporting. An informed 
and vigilant audit committee represents one of the most effective influences for minimizing 
fraudulent financial reporting. Boards of directors of all public companies should have an inde­
pendent audit committee vigilantly overseeing the financial reporting process.
Most of the Commission’s research studies emphasized the potentially positive influence of an 
effective audit committee. One study found that, for example, while 85 percent of all public 
companies have audit committees, a significantly smaller percentage (69 percent) of the public 
companies involved in the fraudulent financial reporting cases brought by the SEC in the last 5 
years had audit committees. [In fact, the 69 percent figure is high because, in 39 of 119 cases 
studied, the presence of an audit committee was unlikely but these cases were excluded because 
that fact could not be verified from available public sources. None of the 39 companies was listed 
on the NYSE (which requires audit committees) or filed proxy material with the SEC and many 
were involved in an initial public offering.]
To implement the Commission’s recommendation that all public companies have independent 
audit committees, an SEC rule is necessary. The SEC has long recognized the importance of 
independent audit committees to the integrity of financial reporting. But the SEC has deferred to 
the policies and practices of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and other Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (SROs). While all the SROs have considered the issue, only the NYSE requires that 
all its listed companies have audit committees comprised solely of independent directors. The 
Commission commends the SEC for not wishing to impose any unnecessary direct government 
regulation, but experience with independent audit committee requirements demonstrates that it is 
now time for direct action by the SEC.
The ultimate determination as to the SEC’s authority to require independent audit committees 
under existing statutes is beyond the charge of this Commission. Several potential sources of 
authority, however, lie within the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
In particular, the SEC might predicate its rule on provisions of those Acts which (1) impose 
requirements for financial information certified by “ independent”  public accountants, (2) grant the 
SEC the express power to define terms used in the Acts, including “ accounting”  terms, (3) require 
public companies to devise and maintain systems of internal accounting controls, and (4) grant the
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SEC broad rulemaking authority to adopt rules and regulations necessary and appropriate to 
effectuate the purposes of the statutes.
With respect to the SEC’s broad rulemaking authority, the Commission’s study of fraudulent 
financial reporting cases may provide a factual predicate that a rule mandating audit committees 
is necessary and appropriate to implement the disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws. 
In this regard, the Commission believes that the audit committee’s role is crucial to the financial 
reporting process. The audit committee’s assessment of the independence of the public accountant 
and its review of the adequacy of, and compliance with, internal accounting controls contribute 
significantly, as does its role in the company’s overall control environment.
Mandating audit committees is necessary but does not go far enough. The audit committee must 
be composed of independent directors to provide truly effective oversight of the company’s 
financial reporting process. In considering ‘ ‘independence,’’ the Commission noted that the NYSE 
audit committee policy defines an independent director, for the purpose of audit committee 
membership, as independent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of 
the board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee 
member. Directors who are affiliates of the company or officers or employees of the company or 
its subsidiaries are not “ independent.”  A director who was formerly an officer of the company or 
any of its subsidiaries may qualify for membership if, in the opinion of the board of directors, such 
person will exercise independent judgment and will assist materially the functions of the com­
mittee. A majority of the members, however, must be directors who are not former officers.
The Commission agrees with the concept underlying the NYSE definition of independent director. 
The NYSE developed this definition, including the supplementary material offering guidance on 
particular types of relationships, with the benefit of extensive public commentary, and the defi­
nition has been in place for almost a decade. The Commission believes that the NYSE definition 
and guidance are appropriate for inclusion in the SEC rule applicable to all public companies. (See 
Appendix J for the complete NYSE audit committee policy.) Members of senior management, 
particularly those with financial and legal responsibilities, would meet with the audit committee 
to provide the benefit of their expertise, whether or not they happen also to be directors of the 
company.
The Commission recognizes the difficulties today in encouraging a sufficient number of qualified 
persons to serve as independent directors, particularly in small, newly public companies. Ac­
cordingly, the SEC should be able to grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis, but the basic 
requirement should apply to all companies regardless of size. The SEC rules should provide an 
exception for companies unable to meet the requirement, if they can demonstrate that they have 
(1) attempted diligently to attract the necessary independent directors to comprise an audit com­
mittee and (2) instituted various procedures and controls that are functionally equivalent to an audit 
committee. Such exceptions should be granted only in the most unusual cases, and should be 
reconsidered at appropriate intervals rather than granted on a permanent basis.
Informed, Vigilant, and Effective Audit Committees
Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective overseers 
o f the financial reporting process and the company’s internal controls.
The mere existence of an audit committee is not enough. The audit committee must be vigilant, 
informed, diligent, and probing in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities. The audit committee 
must, of course, avoid unnecessary or inappropriate interventions with the prerogatives of cor­
porate management; but the oversight must be effective. As mentioned previously, 69 percent of
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the companies involved in SEC enforcement cases for fraudulent financial reporting had audit 
committees. That statistic raises doubts as to whether audit committees are meeting their potential 
for reducing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. The Commission’s review showed 
great disparities in the probable effectiveness of audit committees, the functions they perform, and 
the manner in which they carry out their functions— all adding to the doubts.
The Commission therefore reinforces its general recommendation by delineating certain duties and 
responsibilities that it believes are essential for audit committee effectiveness. The recommenda­
tions in this section of the chapter reflect some of these specific recommendations. In addition, the 
Commission highlights other important audit committee functions throughout this chapter. These 
audit committee functions relate to the company’s assessment of, and response to, the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting, compliance with the code of corporate conduct and open lines of 
communication with the chief accounting officer and the chief internal auditor. In fact, the chief 
internal auditor’s direct and unrestricted access to the audit committee is vital to his objective 
actions. Subsequent parts of this chapter outline the audit committee’s role when management 
seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue and with respect to oversight of the 
quarterly reporting process. Finally, the Commission recommends that the chairman of the audit 
committee write a letter describing the committee’s activities and responsibilities for inclusion in 
the annual report to stockholders.
The Commission developed this set of recommended audit committee duties and responsibilities 
after reviewing and considering the practices many well-managed companies follow today, the 
extensive guidance the public accounting and legal professions have published on the subject, and 
practices suggested by the results of the Commission’s research projects and by presentations made 
to the Commission.
More detailed delineation and description of responsibilities is best left to the discretion of 
management and the board of directors to tailor to the needs and circumstances of each company. 
However, the Commission has identified additional, more specific practices and procedures that 
can help audit committees perform their oversight role effectively. The Commission is not pre­
scribing these additional measures, and therefore has not included them as recommendations, but 
offers them instead in the form of the Audit Committee Good Practice Guidelines in Appendix K. 
Companies can consider these guidelines within the exercise of their judgment. To companies that 
already have audit committees, the guidelines will serve as a standard for review and assessment. 
Other companies— those just establishing audit committees or those seeking to improve their 
committees’ effectiveness— may find the guidelines of assistance in suggesting practical ways for 
audit committees to discharge their responsibilities.
The Commission is well aware of current difficulties in recruiting directors because of director 
liability and inadequate or unavailable insurance coverage. The Commission hopes that its rec­
ommendations, particularly those calling for an effective, independent audit committee, will 
ameliorate these concerns. The formal charter of the audit committee clarifies its duties and 
responsibilities, and the guidelines in Appendix K can assist audit committee members in meeting 
these responsibilities. Both can be helpful in the event of litigation and may offer insurers the 
degree of comfort they need to issue more favorable insurance coverage to directors.
Written Charter
Recommendation: A ll public companies should develop a written charter setting forth the 
duties and responsibilities o f the audit committee. The board o f directors should approve 
the charter, review it at least annually, and modify it as necessary.
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To enhance their effectiveness, audit committees should have formal written charters that set forth 
their duties and responsibilities. The charter can take the form of a board resolution or whatever 
other formal, written document the board of directors chooses. The Commission’s Good Practice 
Guidelines (Appendix K) can help in developing the charter, but each board of directors should 
see that the charter responds to the particular needs of the company. As those needs change, the 
audit committee’s charter should change.
Resources and Authority
Recommendation: Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority to 
discharge their responsibilities.
Audit committees must have resources commensurate with the duties and responsibilities assigned 
to them by the board of directors. Public companies should give audit committees these necessary 
resources, including in-house staff and administrative support. Generally, support for the audit 
committee should come from existing employees. Only in the most unusual circumstances would 
audit committees need separate staff and then not on a continuing basis.
The audit committee should have the discretion to institute investigations of improprieties or 
suspected improprieties, including standing authority to retain special counsel or experts.
Review of the Public Accountant’s Independence
Recommendation: The audit committee should review management’s evaluation o f fac­
tors related to the independence o f  the company’s public accountant. Both the audit 
committee and management should assist the public accountant in preserving his inde­
pendence.
The financial reporting process depends on the credibility of the independent audit function. 
Accordingly, SEC rules require public companies to have their financial statements audited 
annually by an independent public accountant.
Both the public company and the public accountant are responsible for ensuring that an indepen­
dent audit has been performed. Independence is a cornerstone of the public accounting profession, 
and the public accountant must maintain his independence at all times. Management and the audit 
committee should carry out their responsibility by specifically asking the public accountant about 
factors affecting his independence and asking for his affirmation that he is in fact independent of 
the company.
Issue Related to Public Accountant’s Independence
Recommendation: The audit committee should approve in advance the types and the 
extent o f management advisory services that management plans to engage the company’s 
independent public accountant to perform.
One issue concerning public accountants’ independence—the possible adverse effect of manage­
ment advisory services performed for audit clients— has been debated continually over the past 
decade. Strong opinions have been expressed on both sides of the issue.
Some argue that the independent public accountant’s performance of management advisory ser­
vices improves the quality of audits. They claim that in the process of advising management the 
independent public accountant acquires a deeper understanding of the client’s business. Many in
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the public accounting profession also maintain that benefits accrue when the independent public 
accountant is already familiar with the company’s operations.
Others believe that some management advisory services place independent public accountants in 
the role of management, add commercial pressures to the audit examination and, as a result, impair 
independence. These individuals also argue that, at the very least, the public accountant’s per­
formance of management advisory services raises the perception of impaired independence.
The Commission reviewed previous studies of this issue and sponsored its own research study. 
None of the studies indicated any actual case where independence was compromised. This finding 
is reassuring. Nevertheless, two recent studies, a Harris survey sponsored by the AICPA and a 
research report prepared for the AICPA’s Public Oversight Board (POB), showed that a substantial 
percentage of members of the key public groups involved in the financial reporting process believe 
that performing certain management advisory services can impair a public auditor’s objectivity and 
independence. The existence of this perception must not be ignored.
The Commission concluded that the audit committee should oversee management judgments 
relating to the independence of the public accountant. The Commission therefore recommends that 
the audit committee review in advance the proposed use of the independent public accountant for 
management advisory services, weighing carefully the possible advantages of such use against the 
possible effects it may have on the independence—or even the perceived independence— of the 
public accountant. In making this decision, the audit committee should consider among other 
factors: the type of service to be performed, helpful knowledge of the company that the indepen­
dent public accountant may bring to the task because of its audit services, the extent to which audit 
and management advisory services staffs are positioned to take advantage of each other’s knowl­
edge, and the amount of the management advisory services fee relative to the audit fee.
Also important for the audit committee to consider is the relationship of total fees paid to the 
independent public accountant compared with the gross revenue of both the public accounting firm 
and the local office responsible for the audit engagement.
V. Reporting to the Public on Management and Audit Committee 
Responsibilities
Top management and the audit committee should communicate explicitly their respective respon­
sibilities for the company’s financial reporting to those who use that information.
Management Report
Recommendation: A ll public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in 
their annual reports to stockholders management reports signed by the chief executive 
officer and chief accounting officer. The management report should acknowledge 
management’s responsibilities fo r  the financial statements and internal control, discuss 
how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide management’s assessment o f  the 
effectiveness o f the company’s internal controls.
The investing public has a legitimate interest in the extent of management’s responsibilities for the 
company’s financial statements and internal control and the means by which management dis­
charges its responsibilities. Yet these responsibilities are not always communicated to the investing 
public.
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Some public companies presently communicate such information in their annual reports to stock­
holders. A number of organizations concerned with financial reporting publicly embraced the 
concept of a management report in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The FEI and the AICPA concluded that a management report can improve public understanding 
of the respective roles of management and the independent public accountant. Both of these groups 
issued guidelines on the content of management reports, including suggestions that management 
reports discuss management’s responsibilities for the financial statements and assess the effec­
tiveness of the company’s internal controls.
In 1979, the SEC proposed requiring a management report that includes management’s assessment 
of internal control. The SEC’s proposed rule on management reports was criticized because of the 
close correlation of management’s opinion on internal control with the internal accounting control 
provisions of the FCPA. Many commentators viewed the proposal essentially as a requirement for 
a statement of compliance with the law. They suggested that the proposal was apparently intended 
not to give stockholders useful information, but rather to establish the existence of violations of 
the FCPA for enforcement purposes. These commentators questioned whether the proposal vio­
lated constitutional protections against self-incrimination.
The SEC withdrew its proposed release in 1980, acknowledging the criticisms but indicating that 
it continued to believe that management reports would give investors useful information and that 
private-sector initiatives in this area should continue.
Widespread implementation of management reports, tailored to fit individual company circum­
stances, would improve communication to financial statement users about the nature of financial 
information and the processes that surround its preparation and presentation. Management’s 
opinion on internal control is important because the internal control system provides the basis for 
the preparation of financial statements and, more broadly, the overall system of accountability. The 
CEO’s signature on the management report would heighten his awareness of his responsibilities 
for the financial statements and internal control. Similarly, the chief accounting officer’s signature 
would underscore his role in and responsibility for the financial reporting process.
Despite the support of several influential private-sector organizations, after seven years a signif­
icant number of public companies still do not include management reports in their annual reports 
to stockholders. The time for voluntary compliance is past; the SEC again should take action to 
require management reports.
Criticisms of the SEC’s earlier proposal are not relevant to this recommendation. First, the 
provisions of the FCPA are not limited by a standard of materiality. For the purposes of the 
management report, however, management’s assessment should be limited to material matters 
about which stockholders reasonably should be informed; this aspect will limit the cost of the 
disclosure. Furthermore, the Commission is not suggesting that management compare its controls 
to some exact standard or express an opinion as to whether its internal controls are perfect or “ fail 
safe.”  Management’s assessment should recognize that the cost of controls should not exceed the 
expected benefits. Second, management’s opinion on internal control would be included in a 
comprehensive management report. Many commentators on the SEC’s proposal indicated that 
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control would be more informative in 
that broader context. Finally, management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls 
should not parallel the definition of internal accounting control included in the FCPA.
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Management’s opinion should encompass the entire system of internal control, a broader concept 
than the FCPA’s internal accounting control.
Management, of course, should have a sound and adequate basis for expressing its opinion. Many 
CEOs will be able to rely to some extent on the establishment and communication of written 
policies and procedures and the selection and training of qualified personnel. Most CEOs also will 
review the company’s assessment of the risk of fraudulent financial reporting and internal control 
evaluation with the CFO and the controller. Since the internal audit function evaluates the 
company’s internal controls, the CEO normally also will discuss the effectiveness of the 
company’s internal controls with his chief internal auditor. The CEO should perform whatever 
additional procedures he considers necessary in the circumstances.
The independent public accountant discusses with management material weaknesses in the 
company’s internal accounting controls noted during the audit. The independent public accountant 
can vary the scope of the internal accounting control evaluation, however, on the basis of 
cost-efficiency factors as well as the quality of the company’s internal accounting controls. A CEO 
therefore normally will want to gain an understanding of those controls the independent public 
accountant plans to rely on and his basis for not relying on certain controls. The CEO then will 
be able to decide whether he should request the independent public accountant to evaluate internal 
accounting control more extensively as part of the audit. In some cases, the additional internal 
accounting control evaluation may be limited to specific accounts or groups of transactions. In 
other cases, a broader evaluation may be desirable.
Professional auditing standards allow independent public accountants to opine publicly on a 
company’s system of internal accounting control, after completing a separate engagement directed 
to that purpose. This opinion provides substantially more assurance than any evaluations provided 
during the examination of the company’s financial statements. Depending on the sophistication of 
the system of internal control and past experience, a CEO may want periodically to engage the 
company’s independent public accountant to complete such an examination.
Good Practice Guidelines for Management’s Report, including a sample management report, 
appear in Appendix L.
Audit Committee Chairman’s Letter
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in 
their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
describing the committee’s responsibilities and activities during the year.
The role of the audit committee is largely hidden from the investing public; it should be more 
visible and more effectively communicated. To reinforce the audit committee members’ awareness 
and acceptance of the importance of their responsibilities, the Commission recommends that the 
SEC require the annual report to include a letter signed by the audit committee chairman discussing 
the audit committee’s role, responsibilities, and activities during the year.
Appendix M includes suggestions for the contents of the audit committee chairman’s letter and a 
sample letter. Certain contents of the suggested audit committee letter duplicate existing proxy 
statement disclosures. Nonetheless, this recommendation should lead to more flexible and illu­
minating disclosure than most proxy statements presently provide. The Commission does not 
believe that simply expanding the proxy statement disclosure would accomplish the same purpose.
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VI. Two Additional Recommendations
The Commission is offering recommendations in connection with two additional practices: seeking 
second opinions from public accounting firms and quarterly reporting. Both offer opportunities for 
strengthening the integrity of the financial reporting process.
Seeking a Second Opinion
Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee when it seeks a second 
opinion on a significant accounting issue.
A difference of opinion over a significant financial reporting issue between a company and its 
independent public accountant may prompt management to seek an opinion from a second public 
accounting firm. On the one hand, the decision to do so may be management’s legitimate attempt 
to obtain a technically correct opinion. On the other hand, it may be an attempt to obtain an opinion 
that coincides with management’s interest in presenting the results in the most favorable light.
Bona fide differences of opinion arise in financial reporting, especially if complex or novel 
transactions are involved. Generally accepted accounting principles may not always be clear on the 
appropriate accounting treatment and the independent public accountant must use judgment in 
making a decision. Under those circumstances, the company may wish another opinion. But when 
a company decides to seek an opinion from other than its existing firm, commercial pressures are 
introduced into the process of resolving the financial reporting issue. Recent cases have shown that 
these commercial pressures sometimes lead to fraudulent financial reporting.
Management has, and should have, the prerogative to seek second opinions. When such an opinion 
has been sought on a significant accounting issue, management should discuss the issue with the 
audit committee and explain why the particular accounting treatment was chosen.
Recommendation: When a public company changes independent public accountants, it 
should be required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature o f any material accounting 
or auditing issues discussed with its old and new auditors during the three-year period 
preceding the change.
As a further deterrent to possible fraudulent financial reporting, when a change in independent 
public accountants occurs, public companies should be required to disclose promptly in an SEC 
filing the nature of any material accounting or auditing issue they discussed with their old and new 
independent public accountants during the three-year period preceding the change. These require­
ments should apply with equal force to newly public companies.
Quarterly Reporting
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight o f the quarterly re­
porting process. This oversight should include approving financial results prior to public 
release.
Financial statement users rely heavily on quarterly financial statements. Quarterly reporting, 
however, is subject to fewer controls than annual reporting. The independent public accountant 
does not audit quarterly data. He is required to perform a limited review of the quarterly results 
discussed in the annual report to stockholders, but he sometimes conducts this review after
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year-end. Most audit committees play a limited role in the quarterly reporting process, even though 
quarterly information is an integral component of the financial reporting they oversee.
The Commission recommends that audit committees exercise the oversight responsibilities they 
undertake on behalf of the board of directors in the quarterly reporting process. The audit com­
mittee should satisfy itself that controls within the company are adequate to protect the integrity 
of quarterly reporting. The Commission further recommends that the audit committee should 
approve, in advance, the release of quarterly financial results to the public.
Management should ensure that the audit committee is kept informed of significant matters 
affecting the company’s quarterly financial statements. For example, it should inform the audit 
committee on a timely basis of any changes in accounting or financial reporting practices that may 
have a significant financial statement impact. The audit committee’s oversight role within the 
financial reporting process should be ongoing and visible throughout the company.
In Chapter Three, which focuses on the independent public accountant’s role, the Commission 
recommends that the independent public accountant perform a timely review of the quarterly 
financial statements. The independent public accountant should communicate the results of this 
quarterly review to the audit committee. This recommendation works with the recommendation for 
increased audit committee oversight to improve the integrity of quarterly reporting.
VII. Setting Standards for Internal Control
Recommendation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations should establish a body 
to guide public companies on internal controls.
Internal control is a complex, dynamic, constantly evolving concept, and one that many diverse 
organizations have studied. The Auditing Standards Board and the Institute of Internal Auditors 
have issued authoritative pronouncements on internal control. The AICPA Special Advisory 
Committee on Internal Accounting Control and the Research Foundation of the Financial Exec­
utives Institute also have studied the topic.
These groups have improved the overall understanding of internal control. Yet their studies also 
have resulted in varying interpretations and philosophies. As a result, independent public accoun­
tants, management, and internal auditors sometimes disagree about the adequacy of a given 
internal control system.
The Commission recommends that the organizations sponsoring the Commission set up an inter­
disciplinary body to integrate the various internal control concepts and definitions and to develop 
a common reference point. That body’s guidance would build on the Commission’s recommen­
dations, move to develop a standard against which public companies can judge the effectiveness 
of their internal controls, and thus help public companies improve their internal control systems.
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Chapter Three
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
I. The Independent Public Accountant’s Role in Detecting 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The financial statements are first and foremost the responsibility of the management of the 
reporting entity. But the independent public accountant plays a crucial role in the financial 
reporting process.
Users of financial statements expect auditors to bring to the reporting process technical compe­
tence, integrity, independence, and objectivity. Users also expect auditors to search for and detect 
material misstatements, whether intentional or unintentional, and to prevent the issuance of 
misleading financial statements.
The Commission has identified a number of steps to improve the auditor’s ability to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting and serve users of the auditor’s report. First, the public accounting 
profession must recognize its responsibility to design the audit scope to consider the potential for 
fraudulent financial reporting and to design audit procedures to detect such reporting. The first step 
should be a restatement of the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
Second, independent public accountants can and should do more to improve their detection 
capabilities. The Commission offers recommendations that would require greater use of analytical 
review procedures and timely review of quarterly financial data.
Third, the Commission makes three recommendations designed to improve audit quality. Two are 
designed to strengthen aspects of the profession’s quality assurance program; the third highlights 
the need for public accounting firms to identify, assess, and manage pressures that may affect audit 
quality.
Fourth, because of the heavy reliance placed on the auditor’s work and his opinion, users should 
clearly understand the nature, the scope, and the limitations of an audit. The Commission offers 
recommendations to strengthen communication with users of the independent public accountant’s 
report.
Finally, the Commission considered the process of setting auditing standards. The work of the 
independent public accountant impacts a broad range of parties, both preparers and users. The 
Commission therefore is recommending that the auditing standard-setting process provide for more 
direct involvement of these constituencies. Specifically, the Commission recommends that the 
Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA be reorganized to include equal representation and 
participation by knowledgeable representatives of the constituencies that have a significant interest 
in the financial reporting process.
The ASB recently exposed for comment a series of proposed auditing standards that address many 
issues the Commission has considered. The Commission commends the ASB for its efforts, some 
of which are responsive to Commission concerns, and looks forward to studying the comments the 
ASB receives in response to its proposals. The Commission will consider the ASB’s proposals and 
the comments they elicit in developing its final report.
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II. Recognizing Responsibility for Detecting Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise standards to restate the 
independent public accountant’s responsibility fo r  detection o f fraudulent financial re­
porting, requiring the independent public accountant to (1) take affirmative steps in each 
audit to assess the potential fo r  such reporting and (2) design tests to provide reasonable 
assurance o f  detection. Revised standards should include guidance fo r  assessing risks and 
pursuing detection when risks are identified.
The independent public accountant has accepted the responsibility to design his audit to detect 
material errors in financial statements. The degree of responsibility for designing the audit to detect 
fraudulent financial reporting, however, has been a source of continuing debate.
A review of past and current auditing literature illustrates the debate. Early auditing texts set forth 
three objectives for the audit: the detection of fraud, the detection of technical errors, and the 
detection of errors of principle. As the market for auditing services grew in the early 1900s and 
auditors increasingly experienced difficulty in detecting carefully concealed frauds, pressure built 
within the profession to modify auditing standards relating to the responsibility for detecting fraud. 
Auditing literature was subsequently rewritten, and auditors began to view the detection of fraud 
and similar irregularities as beyond the realm of their responsibilities.
By the 1960s the disavowal of responsibility on the part of many auditors became unacceptable 
to both financial statement users and the profession itself. Once again, auditing literature was 
modified, this time to acknowledge that, in performing the audit examination, the auditor must be 
aware of the possibility that fraud may exist. Even with this acknowledgment, the auditing 
literature made it clear that the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection was quite limited and 
that financial statement users should not rely on the audit for assurance of detection.
The next attempt to struggle with the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud came in 1975. An 
AICPA committee was formed to determine whether the failure on the part of the auditors to detect 
massive fraud in the widely publicized Equity Funding case pointed to a need for revised standards. 
The committee concluded that no substantive change in the degree of responsibility was necessary, 
but that guidance describing the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud should be improved.
This recommendation as well as Congressional pressure and the work of the Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities (widely known as the Cohen Commission, after its chairman, Manuel 
F. Cohen) led the AICPA in 1977 to issue Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 16, The 
Independent Auditor’s Responsibility fo r  the Detection o f Errors or Irregularities. That statement, 
which remains in effect today, contains the following description of the responsibility the auditor 
assumes:
Under generally accepted auditing standards the independent auditor has the responsibility, within the 
inherent limitations of the auditing process..., to plan his examination... to search for errors or 
irregularities that would have a material effect on the financial statements, and to exercise due skill and 
care in the conduct of that examination. The auditor’s search for material errors or irregularities 
ordinarily is accomplished by the performance of those auditing procedures that in his judgment are 
appropriate in the circumstances to form an opinion on the financial statements; extended auditing 
procedures are required if the auditor’s examination indicates that material errors or irregularities may 
exist.... An independent auditor’s standard report implicitly indicates his belief that the financial 
statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated as a result of errors or irregularities.
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Notwithstanding its specific requirement that the auditor has the obligation to plan his examination 
to search for irregularities, SAS No. 16 does not specify how such a search is to be conducted. 
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the independent public accountant’s responsibility 
for the detection of fraudulent financial reporting be restated. The auditing standards should 
include requirements to (1) assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting and (2) design tests to 
provide reasonable assurance of detection.
The Commission appreciates the limitations inherent in the audit process. The auditor cannot and 
should not be held responsible for detecting all material frauds, particularly those involving careful 
concealment through forgery or collusion by members of management or management and third 
parties. Auditors nonetheless should be responsible for actively considering the potential for 
fraudulent financial reporting in a given audit engagement and for designing specific audit tests to 
recognize these risks.
Existing literature emphasizes the auditor’s responsibility to assess the risk of error or irregularity 
at the specific account level. The existing literature does not require auditors to evaluate the control 
environment, and it allows the auditor to assume management integrity unless his examination 
reveals evidence to the contrary. The auditor’s procedures thus do not focus at a sufficiently high 
level. Moreover, because the Commission has found that the majority of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases involve top management, the auditor should not assume management integrity but 
should apply professional skepticism to this determination.
As noted in Chapter Two, a strong control environment is essential. Without a strong corporate 
ethical climate, the risk of fraudulent financial reporting increases. The standards should require 
the auditor to assess the company’s control environment, including its management, in planning 
the audit. The assumption of management integrity is one of the key areas where guidance should 
be changed.
Auditing guidance the profession develops should identify specific factors that may increase the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. To aid auditors in designing audit tests, the guidance 
should present illustrative audit objectives for factors identified, along with examples of audit tests 
that may achieve those audit objectives. Guidance also should recognize the difficulties in as­
sessing risks, designing tests, and evaluating audit evidence and it should require substantial 
involvement by seasoned audit professionals.
The Commission has observed that fraudulent financial reporting usually follows a predictable 
path, normally in response to the presence of certain environmental, institutional, and individual 
pressures. This pattern differs from that of unintentional errors, which may occur randomly in the 
reporting process. Most SEC fraudulent financial reporting cases, for example, not only showed 
significant management involvement but also involved improper revenue recognition, overstate­
ment of assets, or improper deferral of expenses. Frequently, these improprieties were accom­
plished through unusual transactions near the end of a reporting period or through accounting 
estimates and occurred most frequently in industries characterized by rapid change. In developing 
additional guidance, the profession should consider carefully the internal and external pressures 
that increase the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. The profession may find it helpful to 
consider the Good Practice Guidelines for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 
included as Appendix H.
The restated responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting and the additional guidance 
described would recognize a responsibility that many in Congress and the courts already say exists. 
Moreover, the recognition would be in a positive vein, promote consistency in auditing practice,
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enhance detection of fraudulent financial reporting, and reduce confusion among independent 
public accountants and the public as to the auditor’s role.
III. Improving Detection Capabilities
The Commission does not wish to understate the significant role that audits presently play in 
detecting fraudulent financial reporting: audits can and very often do detect instances of fraudulent 
financial reporting. The audit process encompasses a wide range of procedures designed to detect 
material misstatements in the financial statements. Thus audits have a decidedly preventive and 
deterrent effect.
But independent public accountants can do more and the Commission is recommending two 
specific steps. The first, greater use of analytical review procedures, will, among other things, 
enhance the independent public accountant’s ability to identify areas of high risk of fraudulent 
financial reporting. The second, timely review of quarterly financial data by independent public 
accountants, prior to public release, will improve the likelihood of early detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Analytical Review Procedures
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards to require 
independent public accountants to perform analytical review procedures in all audit 
engagements and should provide improved guidance on the appropriate use o f these 
procedures.
The public accounting profession widely recognizes the usefulness of analytical review proce­
dures, and auditors perform such procedures in many audits today. Analytical review procedures 
can encompass a broad range of audit steps. Usually involving comparisons of relationships among 
data, they range from relatively simple comparisons of ratios and trends to sophisticated statistical 
modeling techniques. Regardless of specific form, they focus on the overall reasonableness of a 
reported amount in relation to the surrounding circumstances.
The potential of analytical review procedures for detecting fraudulent financial reporting has not 
been realized fully. Unusual year-end transactions, deliberate manipulations of estimates or re­
serves, and misstatements of revenues and assets often introduce aberrations in otherwise pre­
dictable amounts, ratios, or trends that will stand out to a skeptical auditor. The Commission 
observed a number of cases where performing analytical review procedures would have increased 
the likelihood of the auditor’s detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
Existing auditing standards allow, but do not require, analytical review procedures. The Com­
mission recommends that auditing standards be revised to require the use of analytical review 
procedures on all audit engagements. The revised standards should require auditors to use ana­
lytical review procedures throughout the audit including at the planning phase. Further, the 
Commission recommends that the public accounting profession provide greater guidance on the 
application of analytical review procedures. Executive-level auditors should be required to par­
ticipate in selecting the analytical review procedures to be performed and evaluating the results. 
Meaningful audit evidence from these procedures depends on the seasoned judgment of executive- 
level professionals who should have a greater understanding of the company’s industry as well as 
the environmental, institutional, and individual factors that increase the risk of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
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Timely Review of Quarterly Financial Data
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public accountants to review 
quarterly financial data o f public companies before release to the public.
Investors and other financial statement users rely heavily on, and react quickly to, quarterly results. 
Yet under existing SEC disclosure rules, quarterly financial information is unaudited and does not 
require the independent auditor’s review prior to its public release.
Existing rules require certain public companies to include summarized quarterly data in the annual 
reports to shareholders. The independent public accountant must review such data, but he may 
review them on a timely basis, prior to public release, or on a retrospective basis in connection 
with year-end audit work.
Current auditing standards provide guidance on the nature and extent of procedures that the auditor 
should apply when engaged to review interim financial information. These procedures, while not 
as comprehensive as an audit, nevertheless enhance the reliability of quarterly data. The proce­
dures include, among other things, (1) applying analytical review procedures to identify unusual 
items, (2) making inquiries of management on a broad range of issues and events that may impact 
the quarterly data, and (3) obtaining written representations from management regarding events 
and transactions underlying the quarterly results and any other representations that the auditor 
deems appropriate.
The timely involvement of the independent public accountant with quarterly financial data can 
improve the reliability of quarterly reporting and serve to increase the likelihood that the auditor 
will detect fraudulent financial reporting. The review of quarterly financial data before public 
release assures the public of more frequent review of reporting practices of public companies by 
an independent and objective party. This in turn should improve the financial reporting discipline 
in many public companies.
The increased discipline that review by the independent public accountant contributes is partic­
ularly important in light of a study conducted for the Commission. A sample of 1,088 public 
companies revealed that nearly two-thirds of the dollar amount of writeoffs over the last 5 years 
were concentrated in the fourth quarter. The study also found that fourth-quarter writeoffs have 
been increasing, both in frequency and in dollar value, and noted that one possible contributing 
factor to the increasing level of writeoffs may be the ambiguity of accounting standards.
The Commission understands that various individuals and groups, including the Emerging Issues 
Task Force and the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA, have raised the 
issue as to when to recognize the impairment of long-lived assets and that the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board is currently studying it. The Commission applauds these efforts and anticipates 
that more clearly defined accounting standards will contribute significantly to recording writeoffs 
on a timely basis and otherwise improving the reliability of quarterly financial information.
IV. Improving Audit Quality
The ability of the independent public accountant to detect fraudulent financial reporting is related 
directly to the quality of the audit. Thus efforts to improve overall audit quality are important 
elements of the financial reporting process.
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In Chapter Four, the Commission examines the regulation of the public accounting profession, 
including the profession’s quality assurance program, and presents conclusions and recommen­
dations for improving regulation. One recommendation would close an existing regulatory gap by 
requiring all firms that audit SEC public companies to belong to a professional organization that 
has peer review and independent oversight and is approved by the SEC. The AICPA has such a 
program, the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of its Division for CPA Firms. Another recommen­
dation would add meaningful sanctions to the profession’s quality assurance program through SEC 
enforcement action. As Chapter Four details, the Commission sees no need for separate or greater 
regulation, subject to adoption of these improvements to the existing framework.
The Commission has identified several steps that the profession can take to enhance audit quality 
within the existing framework. The first two steps, relating to peer review and second partner 
review, pertain to the profession’s quality assurance program. The third step urges greater sen­
sitivity in recognizing and controlling pressures within public accounting firms that may impact 
audit quality.
Peer Review
Recommendation: The AICPA’s SEC Practice Section should strengthen its peer review 
program by increasing review o f  audit engagements involving public company clients new 
to a firm . For each office selected fo r  peer review, the first audit o f  all such new clients 
should be reviewed.
A public accounting firm’s procedures for accepting new clients, reviewing a client’s new ac­
counting policies, and resolving disagreements with clients are important parts of its quality 
assurance program. The Commission’s review of fraud-related cases revealed that a significant 
number involved companies that had recently changed their independent public accountants, often 
because of disagreements over accounting policies. Accordingly, the profession’s quality assur­
ance program would be strengthened if all audits of new engagements involving public company 
clients were reviewed in each office selected for peer review.
Concurring, or Second Partner, Review
Recommendation: The AICPA’s SEC Practice Section requirement fo r  a concurring, or 
second partner, review o f the audit report should be revised as part o f  an ongoing process 
o f  review o f  this requirement. Standards fo r  the concurring review should, among other 
things, (1) require concurring review partner involvement in the planning stage o f the audit 
in addition to the final review stage, (2) specify qualifications o f the concurring review 
partner to require prior experience with audits o f  SEC registrants and familiarity with the 
client’s industry, and (3) require the concurring review partner to consider himself a peer 
o f  the engagement partner fo r  purposes o f  the review.
The SECPS requires a concurring, or second partner, review in all audits of SEC registrants. A 
concurring review of the audit report and the financial statements, prior to issuance, is required by 
a partner other than the audit partner-in-charge of the engagement. The SECPS requires all member 
firms to establish policies and procedures that meet certain minimum standards as to the nature, 
the extent and the timing of the review, the qualifications of the concurring review partner, and 
the documentation of the review.
In considering the SECPS’s standards, the Commission noted the absence of a requirement to 
involve the concurring review partner in the planning stage of the audit. Audits must be carefully
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designed to address the risk of fraud and provide reasonable assurance of detection. An early 
concurring review of the audit plan would provide added assurance that the audit scope is 
appropriate for the detection of fraudulent financial reporting. Second partner review of the audit 
scope is consistent with the fundamental reasoning of quality assurance underlying the existing 
requirement for a second partner review. The same concurring review partner generally would be 
involved at both the planning and the final review stage, but if circumstances such as a partner 
transfer make that impractical, two different partners could conduct the recurring review.
The Commission examined the stated policies many of the largest public accounting firms have to 
ensure that the concurring review partner has sufficient technical expertise and experience. The 
Commission found a broad range of guidance offered, particularly with regard to qualifications 
required for the concurring review partner. While some of the policies require SEC and/or industry 
experience, more than one-third of them do not require any specific qualifications for the con­
curring review partner. A number of firms may, as a matter of practice, insist that concurring 
review partners have SEC and industry experience. Nevertheless, SECPS requirements should be 
explicit in requiring such background and experience.
The concurring review partner generally is, and considers himself to be, a peer of the engagement 
partner by virtue of his partnership in the firm. It is important, however, that the concurring review 
partner be free from any influence that could adversely affect his objectivity and independence. In 
practice, circumstances may cause one partner not to consider himself a peer of another partner, 
such as the partner in charge of the office to which he reports. Subordinate stature within a practice 
office, for example, could influence work as the concurring review partner. A different partner in 
similar circumstances, however, may feel free of any influence that could affect the objectivity of 
his review. Standards should explicitly require that the concurring review partner consider himself 
a peer of the partner whose engagement he is assigned to review.
In addition to these recommendations, the Commission notes and supports the present efforts of 
the Public Oversight Board (POB) to study the policies and practices of public accounting firms 
relating to concurring reviews. The objective of the POB’s study is to determine whether the 
SECPS should make any further changes to clarify and enhance its membership requirements with 
regard to this important quality control measure.
Firm Pressures
Recommendation: Public accounting firms should recognize and control the organiza­
tional and individual pressures that potentially reduce audit quality.
Many public accounting firms are large organizations in which personnel face institutional and 
individual pressures not unlike those that personnel of public companies face. In public companies 
such pressures have the potential to contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. In both large and 
small public accounting firms, these pressures have the potential to compromise the skepticism and 
professional judgment that are critical to audit quality and the detection of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Some of these organizational and situational pressures include:
•  Tight reporting deadlines. Tight reporting deadlines imposed by companies and agreed to by 
the auditor can pressure auditors to stop pursuing identified problems prematurely. This 
pressure is particularly troublesome because, as the Commission’s studies indicate, activities 
that result in fraudulent financial reporting typically occur near the end of a reporting period.
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• Fee and budget pressures. Intense competition among accounting firms contributes to sig­
nificant pressure on audit fees, often with corresponding pressure to reduce staff, time budgets, 
and partner involvement in audit engagements. Such pressures may not be conducive to the 
thorough investigation of red flags indicating the potential for fraudulent financial reporting or 
to the thorough exercise of professional judgment and skepticism.
•  Broad accounting principles. Accounting principles in some areas allow a broad range of 
acceptable practices. The Commission did not consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
broad-versus-specific accounting principles to be an issue within its scope, but nonetheless it 
noted that broad or vague accounting standards frequently allow auditors to accept overly 
aggressive accounting practices. Pressure to agree to the outer limit of acceptability of a number 
of accounting issues has an aggregating and undesirable impact on the financial statements that 
may make them unacceptable taken as a whole.
Public accounting firms must design their systems of quality control to recognize the organizational 
and individual pressures in today’s audit environment and control them through such procedures 
as concurring, or second partner, reviews.
V. Communicating the Auditor’s Role
Auditors can and should do a better job of communicating their role and responsibilities to those 
who rely on their work. Users of audited financial statements need to understand better the nature 
and the scope of an audit and the limitations of the audit process.
Communications With Users: Degree of Reliance
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s standard 
report to state that the audit provides reasonable but not absolute assurance that the audited 
financial statements are free from  material misstatements as a result o f  fraud or error.
Users of financial statements need clarification of the role and responsibilities of the auditor, as 
outlined in this chapter. Since the independent public accountant’s standard report is his primary 
communication with those who rely on his work, the report should be revised to communicate 
better the responsibilities the auditor assumes.
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the standard report clearly explain the degree to 
which users can rely on the audit to ensure that audited financial statements are free from material 
misstatements. The report also should describe the limitations of the audit process: that an audit 
cannot and does not guarantee or provide absolute assurance that the financial statements are 
reliable or accurate. These clarifications will help to confirm to all concerned that management has 
primary responsibility for the financial statements and to prevent users of financial statements from 
placing more reliance on the audit process than is reasonable.
Communications With Users: Review of Internal Accounting Controls
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s standard 
report to describe the extent to which the independent public accountant has reviewed and 
evaluated the system o f internal accounting control. The Auditing Standards Board also 
should provide explicit guidance to address the situation where, as a result o f  his knowledge
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o f  the company’s internal accounting controls, the independent public accountant dis­
agrees with management’s assessment as stated in the proposed management’s report.
Generally accepted auditing standards require the independent public accountant to perform a 
preliminary review of the system of internal accounting control. This review is designed for the 
independent public accountant to gain sufficient understanding of the system to determine the 
degree of reliance he will place on it in determining the nature, the extent, and the timing of audit 
tests.
The extent of the independent public accountant’s involvement with the system of internal ac­
counting control subsequent to this preliminary review may vary widely. After completing his 
preliminary review, the independent public accountant may decide not to rely on the company’s 
internal accounting controls, and therefore he may not spend time to gain an in-depth understand­
ing of the system or to test the system. On the other hand, the independent public accountant may 
choose to evaluate, test, and rely extensively on the system for purposes of the audit.
The independent public accountant decides whether he will test internal accounting controls on the 
basis of his preliminary review. This review assesses (1) whether the nature and the strength of 
the controls are likely to justify any restriction in audit tests and (2) whether the effort required to 
study and evaluate the controls is likely to exceed the reduction in audit effort that could be 
assumed by reliance on them. Thus in some circumstances adequately designed internal accounting 
controls may not be tested and evaluated because reliance on such controls is not cost justified. 
Further, the independent public accountant may decide to test and evaluate only those internal 
accounting controls on which he plans to rely; he need not evaluate or test other internal accounting 
controls in depth.
In the first recommendation in this chapter, the Commission proposed that the independent public 
accountant’s study and evaluation of the control environment be among the affirmative steps 
required in each audit to assess the potential of fraudulent financial reporting. An in-depth study 
and evaluation of the system of internal accounting control, however, is not necessary on all audits. 
One of the primary functions of the internal auditor is to evaluate internal accounting controls and 
report thereon to management. The Commission defers to the public accounting profession on the 
determination of the appropriate extent of the independent public accountant’s review of the system 
of internal accounting control.
Existing auditing literature allows the independent public accountant to render an affirmative 
opinion on internal accounting controls if the company so requests, and it provides guidance for 
that work. Some company managements may wish to request such an opinion to serve as part of 
their support for the assessment of internal controls they express in the management report in the 
annual report to stockholders.
The Commission is concerned, however, that users of the company’s financial statements may not 
be aware of the extent of the independent public accountant’s review of the system of internal 
accounting control because this review can vary so greatly. The independent public accountant’s 
standard report should be revised to avoid possible misunderstanding of the report and mistaken 
reliance on it by describing the review of the system of internal accounting control that is required 
by auditing standards. Such standard language would make clear the degree to which the user can 
rely on the auditor having assessed the adequacy of the system of control. Further, the standard 
report should indicate that auditing standards require the independent public accountant to com­
municate to management and the board of directors, or to the audit committee, any significant 
material weaknesses that come to his attention during the course of his audit.
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In this regard, it is important that auditing standards explicitly address the situation that could arise 
as a result of the Commission’s recommendation calling for management to assess internal controls 
in a management’s report in the annual report to stockholders. Specifically, standards should 
provide explicit guidance for the independent public accountant if the knowledge he has gained 
about the company’s internal accounting controls leads him to disagree with management’s 
assessment of controls in its report.
Communication With Others Regarding Material Irregularities
The Commission also considered possible changes in the independent public accountant’s current 
obligation to communicate to others outside the client any material irregularities and illegal acts 
he discovers in the course of an audit. Current requirements obligate the auditor to report such 
events to parties other than the client’s management and board of directors when the impact is so 
material as to affect his opinion on the financial statements. In such circumstances the auditor is 
required to modify his opinion, thus providing public disclosure of the impropriety, or to consider 
withdrawing from the audit engagement. The practical effect of this requirement is a withdrawal 
or termination of the relationship, which in turn triggers a public disclosure obligation under the 
provisions of Form 8-K, which public companies must file with the SEC in connection with 
changes in public accounting firms. Also, current auditing standards require that the auditor discuss 
his audit findings with the auditor who succeeds him. The Commission believes that these existing 
requirements promote the appropriate reporting of material improprieties that might otherwise 
result in fraudulent financial reporting.
VI. The Auditing Standards Board
The Commission’s study of the independent public accountant’s role encompassed not only certain 
specific auditing standards but also the process by which standards are set. Among other things, 
auditing standards establish the independent public accountant’s responsibility for detecting fraud­
ulent financial reporting and guide him in fulfilling this responsibility. Auditing standards thus are 
a critical component of the financial reporting system.
Study of the independent public accountant’s role in detecting fraudulent financial reporting must 
not limit itself to specific auditing standards existing at a point in time. It must recognize the 
constantly evolving nature of auditing and of the business and economic environment in which 
financial reporting takes place, and it must consider the standard-setting process itself.
Old and New Proposals for Change
Previous efforts to study and evaluate the role of the independent public accountant reached a 
similar conclusion. In the late 1970s the Cohen Commission, several Congressional studies, and 
a special AICPA committee considered the subject and recommended a number of changes. More 
recently, the heads of 7 major public accounting firms presented recommendations to the AICPA 
(“ The Future Relevance, Reliability, and Credibility of Financial Information,”  April 1986) that 
included calls for enhancing the capacity of the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) to develop 
auditing standards.
The Commission reviewed the profession’s responses to past suggestions for change and recent 
changes in the ASB’s composition. The Cohen Commission believed the responsibility for setting 
standards should stay with the public accounting profession, but it recommended replacing the
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existing committee structure with a smaller, full-time, sufficiently compensated body. The Cohen 
Commission went on to suggest steps to support that body, such as improving the quality of 
supporting staff. The SEC reported to Congress in July 1978 that, while it did not necessarily agree 
with the profession’s rejection of the Cohen Commission’s recommendation of a small, full-time 
board, it believed that the newly adopted ASB would enhance the objectivity of the process and 
was an appropriate response at that time. The SEC observed that there was no need to go further 
at that time because, among other reasons, there was no backlog of urgent problems. The more 
recent recommendations by the seven major firms, however, reflected a conclusion within the 
profession that the structure and the organization devised in 1978 may no longer strike the optimal 
balance.
After considering both old and new proposals for change, the Commission concluded that the 
process of setting auditing standards involves highly technical aspects but, further, that it also 
involves substantial policy aspects. The conduct of the audit impacts a broad range of parties, 
within both preparer and user groups. Consequently, the auditing standard-setting process should 
incorporate more direct involvement of all interested parties.
The ASB’s recent publication of 10 exposure drafts of recommendations for change represents 
tremendous effort, with the potential for an important improvement in the independent public 
accountant’s ability to detect fraudulent financial reporting. The publication of these drafts as a 
group during a time of political pressure on the profession demonstrates that policy issues are 
within the ASB’s charter and that the ASB can enhance its capacity to develop standards.
Reorganization of the Board
Recommendation: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing Standards Board to afford 
a fu ll participatory role in the standard-setting process to knowledgeable persons who are 
affected by and interested in auditing standards but who either are not CPAs or are CPAs 
no longer in public practice.
Meaningful participation on the ASB by persons knowledgeable about auditing, but not engaged 
in public accounting practice, is necessary to assist the ASB to fulfill the public policy aspects of 
its role. Equal participation by such persons will enhance the ASB’s ability to establish forward- 
looking auditing standards and provide guidance on a timely basis.
The Commission recognizes that implementing this recommendation will necessitate major 
changes in the existing organization of the ASB. Accordingly, the Commission offers the fol­
lowing suggestions for implementing its recommendation:
1. The ASB should continue to be under the auspices of, and to be supported by, the AICPA.
The Commission sees no need to remove auditing standard-setting from the domain of the 
accounting profession. The Commission agrees with the conclusion of the Cohen Commission that 
the auditing standard-setting process has worked reasonably well and notes the profession’s 
positive record of responsiveness to proposals for change. Moreover, as the Cohen Commission 
observed, removing standard-setting from the profession could have an adverse effect on profes­
sionalism and on auditors’ motivation to accept and support auditing pronouncements. Establish­
ing an independent body would involve substantial costs; these costs do not appear to be justified. 
The existing ASB, reorganized as recommended in this report, should be fully capable of setting 
standards as needed in the future.
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2. The ASB should have 8 to 12 members (an even number). Half should be practicing public 
accountants; half should be persons who are not engaged in public accounting practice but are 
qualified and knowledgeable about auditing.
Outside participation, to be meaningful and to attract highly qualified outside members, must be 
equal to the participation of the practicing profession. The Commission recognizes that the ASB 
currently receives the benefit of input from many sectors but believes actual participation on the 
ASB will enhance the value and the effectiveness of this input.
Nineteen of the 21 members of the ASB as currently organized are from the practicing public 
accounting profession. Thus, reaching 50 percent outside participation within the existing orga­
nizational structure would increase the board to an unwieldy size. The smaller size the Commission 
recommends— 8 to 12 members— will better enable the ASB to focus on policy aspects.
The 4 to 6 outside members should come from sectors affected by or otherwise interested in 
auditing standards, such as companies, which are purchasers of audit services, and investors, 
financial analysts, and creditors, who use audited financial statements. Examples of qualified 
individuals are business persons, academicians, internal auditors, government auditors, and former 
independent public accountants who have since gained experience in management or other fields. 
Experience as a member of an audit committee would be particularly beneficial. In any event, the 
outside, or public, members must be able to appreciate and balance issues of concern to the public 
accounting profession, such as liability, issues of concern to public companies, such as cost, and 
issues of concern to users, namely, the reliability of reported financial information.
3. The AICPA Board of Directors should select the ASB members. Selection should be based 
on personal expertise and qualifications, not on the basis of constituencies other than those 
discussed above for the outside members.
4. The chairman and vice chairman of the ASB should both serve full time. One should be from 
current professional auditing practice; the other should be from the ranks of knowledgeable 
persons not engaged in that practice. To attract qualified members, the ASB should suffi­
ciently compensate all members, both full- and part-time.
Although the recent recommendations of the 7 major firms went further, including all full-time 
ASB members among the possible enhancements recommended, it may be more appropriate to 
start with a full-time chairman and vice chairman. Full-time service of at least those members is 
important to ensure the ASB’s capacity to focus on the broad policy level and to provide timely 
guidance.
5. The reorganized ASB, in setting auditing standards, should perform a management role: (1) 
setting the agenda, priorities, and policy direction and (2) considering, approving, disap­
proving or changing technical auditing standards.
The ASB itself would not perform technical standards drafting but would look to its staff and other 
sources for this support.
6. The AICPA should ensure that the ASB has an adequate, technically qualified senior staff.
With the reduction in the size of the ASB, additional highly qualified staff may be necessary. To 
attract qualified individuals, the AICPA should consider asking partners, senior managers, or 
similar individuals from the public accounting firms to serve as practice fellows. The AICPA and 
the accounting firms need to ensure that these positions have an enhanced career path, similar to 
that provided to practice fellows of the SEC and the FASB.
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7. In addition to using the services of AICPA staff and rotating practice fellows, the ASB also 
should be able to continue to draw on the technical expertise of partners currently engaged in 
auditing practice, who now serve the ASB on a part-time basis, for difficult, technical matters 
that demand the partner’s level of experience and judgment.
Reorganizing the ASB as outlined should ensure its technical capacity and at the same time broaden 
its policy-level capacity. With the addition of knowledgeable outside members and the other 
suggested organizational changes, the ASB will be in a better position to balance the needs and 
the interests of the profession, the public company, and the users of financial information.
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Chapter Four
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEC AND 
OTHERS TO IMPROVE THE REGULATORY 
AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
I. Effectiveness of Regulatory and Law Enforcement Agencies and 
the Legal Environment Generally
A strong and effective regulatory and legal environment plays a critical role in preventing, 
detecting, and deterring fraudulent financial reporting. In Chapters Two and Three the Commis­
sion recommended several specific regulatory agency actions aimed at preventing and detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting. In addition, the regulatory and law enforcement environment can 
and should become a stronger deterrent.
The Commission recognizes the effectiveness of today’s ongoing efforts, and those of the past, to 
strengthen the regulatory and legal environment. Indeed, the Commission congratulates the SEC 
for its financial fraud enforcement program and for its many contributions to improving the 
financial reporting process.
The SEC’s recent enforcement program highlighted the existence and the seriousness of fraudulent 
financial reporting. The program is particularly commendable in view of the SEC’s limited 
resources and the fact that financial disclosure cases usually are complex, often requiring more 
resources than other cases that involve violations of the federal securities laws.
The SEC has imposed many of the Commission’s recommendations on a case-by-case basis, in the 
form of ancillary relief (additional remedies to support those allowed by statute) obtained when 
settling enforcement actions. These recommendations include requirements that public companies 
form audit committees and appoint independent directors and that public accounting firms become 
members of the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section (SECPS).
Notwithstanding the SEC’s positive actions, the Commission has concluded that a strengthened 
regulatory and legal environment is needed. Prosecution of, and sanctions imposed on, those who 
violate the law by their involvement in fraudulent financial reporting should be increased. The 
public accounting profession’s quality assurance program, which generally functions well, should 
be extended to the independent public accountants of all SEC public companies and reinforced by 
meaningful sanctions. The effectiveness of the legal environment generally in deterring fraudulent 
financial reporting should be enhanced.
The Commission specifically recommends improvements in the following areas:
•  Additional SEC enforcement remedies to provide more severe penalties and better tailoring of 
the sanctions to the case
•  Increased criminal prosecution
•  Improved regulation of the public accounting profession to include ( 1) mandatory membership 
in a quality assurance program with peer review and independent oversight functions approved 
and monitored by the SEC and (2) SEC enforcement to ensure adherence to that program
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•  SEC resources available to perform the functions recommended in addition to all traditional 
functions
•  Financial institution regulatory action to (1) correspond to the Commission’s recommendations 
relating to financial reporting that are directed to the SEC and (2) remove any impediments to 
a free exchange of information between staff examiners of the federal regulators and inde­
pendent public accountants
•  Enhanced enforcement by state boards of accountancy to monitor the quality of auditing 
services
•  Acknowledgment of the relationship of the national liability crisis to fraudulent financial 
reporting.
II. Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
The Commission applauds the SEC for seeking and obtaining enhanced enforcement authority 
from Congress in the context of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA). At that time, 
Congress authorized the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against individuals who ‘‘cause’’ 
a company’s violation of the continuous reporting, proxy and tender offer sections of the Exchange 
Act. Prior to that time, while the SEC could bring either an injunctive action in court or an 
administrative agency proceeding against the company, it could only bring an injunctive action 
against the individuals.
This change closed a large gap in the SEC’s enforcement authority. In the Commission’s view 
several additional remedies are necessary to round out the SEC’s enforcement options. The ability 
to tailor enforcement actions more precisely to particular facts will enable the SEC to maximize 
its enforcement effectiveness. The SEC would no longer be persuaded to drop an action because 
the available remedy is arguably too harsh. At the same time the SEC could impose harsher 
penalties than it now can or does.
A. Fines
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to impose civil money penalties in 
administrative proceedings [including Rule 2(e) proceedings] and to seek civil money 
penalties from  a court directly in an injunctive proceeding.
The SEC lacks the ability to seek or impose civil money penalties on violators of the securities 
laws, except in one narrow area: insider trading. Not until 1984, with the passage of ITSA, did 
the SEC obtain the authority to seek a court-imposed civil money penalty. Under ITSA, the SEC 
can seek a penalty of up to three times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided because of the 
insider trading.
Even with this recent expansion of authority, the SEC does not have the flexibility or the breadth 
of response in seeking or imposing civil money damages that a fellow regulator, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), does. By statute, the CFTC can assess a penalty of up to 
$100,000 for each violation in a broad range of violative conduct, including the filing of false or 
misleading reports with the agency.
In a similar vein, the SEC appears to be disadvantaged in its limited fining capacity in comparison 
with several of the Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) that it oversees. The New York Stock 
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers all
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have the authority to tailor fines to fit a host of objectionable activities, whether after formal or 
summary disciplinary proceedings or in the context of a negotiated settlement. The continued 
absence of express fining authority for the SEC is an impediment that ought to be rectified.
The SEC on occasion has settled enforcement actions involving ancillary relief that impose, in 
effect, a fine. This relief has come in the form of disgorgement of the value of compensation 
received based on fraudulently reported earnings or profits. Yet the propriety and the extent of the 
ancillary relief a court can impose in injunctive actions remains a topic of continuing debate. 
Ancillary relief theoretically has been limited to remedial sanctions and has not extended to 
punitive sanctions such as fines. To remove any doubt as to its capacity to seek or impose fines 
in enforcement actions, the SEC should ask Congress to amend the securities laws to provide 
express fining authority.
Express fining authority also would enable the SEC to distinguish better among perpetrators of 
fraudulent financial reporting, imposing heavy fines, in addition to other sanctions, at one end of 
the spectrum, and imposing smaller fines in lieu of excessively harsh sanctions at the other end of 
the spectrum. Depriving perpetrators of fraudulent financial reporting of any ill-gotten gains would 
help to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting process and the 
securities markets, to the same extent as do civil monetary penalties imposed on inside traders.
B. Cease and Desist Orders
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to issue a cease and desist order 
when a securities law violation or an unsound financial reporting practice is found.
Cease and desist authority would permit the SEC to issue an administrative order, once a securities 
law violation or unsound financial reporting practice is found. By issuing the order, the SEC could 
direct a person to refrain, or cease and desist, from engaging in such conduct or practice. The 
power to impose a cease and desist remedy would increase the SEC’s flexibility in tailoring 
remedies to the circumstances of a case. Cease and desist authority also would give the agency a 
viable enforcement tool against certain conduct and practices relating to financial reporting that 
might otherwise escape redress.
In most cases, a cease and desist proceeding would afford a milder remedy than a civil injunctive 
action, avoiding the harsh side-effects of an injunction, such as the statutory disqualification from 
serving as an officer or director of an investment company. Although a more measured response 
than civil injunction, the cease and desist remedy nonetheless would provide increased deterrence 
in at least two kinds of financial reporting cases: (1) cases in which the SEC lacks sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of future violations and (2) those in which the SEC 
might hesitate to pursue injunctive relief because the side-effects may seem too harsh and therefore 
inappropriate. Among the latter cases, the Commission specifically refers to instances of “ cute 
accounting,”  in which an ambiguity or gap in professional standards is used to justify accounting 
policies that fail to reflect the economic substance of the transactions. As a further benefit, 
the cease and desist remedy would improve the ability of the public to distinguish degrees of 
culpability.
For the cease and desist remedy to be the effective sanction the Commission envisions, the SEC 
must ask Congress not merely for the power to exercise the remedy, but also for the authority to 
make the remedy truly meaningful. If a cease and desist order is violated, the SEC should have 
the right (1) to seek an order in federal district court commanding compliance and (2) to assess and 
collect an adequate civil money penalty for each day during which the violation or any action 
contributing to the violation continues.
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Some have argued that cease and desist authority could encourage the SEC, on the one hand, to 
settle cases for too light a sanction or, on the other hand, to bring cases that have not been 
thoroughly considered because of the ease of obtaining a cease and desist order. SEC procedures 
and practice as well as continuing Congressional oversight make both fears unjustified. These 
internal and external safeguards ensure that the SEC would not use cease and desist authority in 
cases that otherwise would merit a civil injunctive action, but would instead use the authority to 
provide a strong sanction in cases that otherwise might not be brought. The creation of this remedy 
would thus add to, not detract from, the SEC’s repertoire of enforcement remedies.
C. Bars or Suspensions From Serving as Corporate Officer or Director
Recommendation: The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to bar or suspend 
corporate officers and directors involved in fraudulent financial reporting from  future 
service in that capacity in a public company.
In considering enforcement proceedings against individual corporate officers or directors who aid 
and abet, cause, or participate in fraudulent financial reporting, the SEC should consider whether 
to bar those individuals from future service in that capacity in a public company. The bar, which 
the SEC could tailor as appropriate to the case, could be either temporary, like a suspension, or 
permanent. The permanent bar would be appropriate if the violation were particularly egregious 
or the violator were a repeat offender. The authority to bar or suspend would give the SEC a 
sanction to use when the five-year proxy statement disclosure of SEC enforcement action and the 
side-effects of a civil injunction would not be sufficient deterrents to possible involvement in future 
fraudulent financial reporting.
Before imposing a bar or suspension, the SEC, of course, would afford all due process protections 
that are available in its other enforcement proceedings. Naturally, once SEC administrative 
remedies have been exhausted and final agency action has been taken, parties who are adversely 
affected would be allowed to petition the appropriate federal appellate court for review of the 
SEC’s final order. Equally important to those who are barred or suspended would be review 
procedures within the SEC to allow these disciplinary sanctions to be removed or modified after 
a reasonable interval, when the barred or suspended officer or director may petition to serve again 
with a public company.
The Commission is fully aware that this recommendation would stiffen sanctions against indi­
vidual offenders. A study of the SEC’s role in combatting fraudulent financial reporting performed 
for the Commission found that stiffer penalties for members of management involved in fraudulent 
financial reporting would be an effective deterrent, and that stiffer sanctions are widely supported.
Moreover, the use of bars or suspensions is by no means uncharted or extreme. Other individuals 
who participate in the financial reporting process, notably independent public accountants, are 
subject to bars or suspensions. The SEC has already barred or suspended individual corporate 
officers in a number of settled cases involving repeat violators. The SEC also has become familiar 
with bars or suspensions by hearing appeals from proceedings in which these sanctions have been 
imposed by SROs under its supervision.
Furthermore, in a number of litigated cases the SEC has obtained many forms of ancillary relief 
that amounted to a de facto  partial bar without using the actual term bar. Whether involving the 
judicial appointment of a “ special agent,”  a “ limited receiver,”  or the like, this ancillary relief 
barred directors and officers from performing functions and exercising powers contemplated by 
state law (including some related to financial reporting and the disclosure process) as effectively 
as if the court decree were labelled a partial bar.
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In addition, the British Insolvency Act, recently enacted by Her Majesty’s Government, provides 
for the disqualification of directors of insolvent companies who have been determined by a court 
to be unfit. Among the many grounds supporting a determination of unfitness are any misfeasance 
or breach of any fiduciary or other duty by the director in relation to the company. Once issued, 
the disqualification order would prohibit the disqualified director from direct or indirect involve­
ment in the promotion, formation, or management of any company for a period of not less than 
two years. Under certain circumstances a person who violates a disqualification order could even 
be held personally liable for the debts of the insolvent company.
The SEC’s limited use of the bar nonetheless has taken place in the context of settled, rather than 
litigated, cases. And the issue of the SEC’s statutory authority to impose bars or suspensions has 
been the subject of extensive legal debate. In view of (1) the absence of express statutory authority 
or judicial approval and (2) the need for legislative action to give the SEC cease and desist authority 
and the power to impose fines, the Commission believes that the SEC should seek explicit statutory 
authority to bar or suspend corporate officers and directors.
As a further advantage, the Commission believes that these additional remedies of bar and 
suspension provide some assurance of a lessened likelihood of repeat violators. They may avoid 
the difficult and uncertain task of legally proving that those who violate court orders of injunction 
did so intentionally. And they may help the SEC maximize the use of its resources— no insig­
nificant factor in a time of budgetary restraint.
III. Increased Criminal Prosecution
Recommendation: Criminal prosecution o f fraudulent financial reporting cases should 
become a higher priority. The SEC should conduct an affirmative program to promote 
increased criminal prosecution o f fraudulent financial reporting cases by educating and 
assisting government officials with criminal prosecution powers.
Criminal prosecution in appropriate cases of fraudulent financial reporting should become a higher 
priority. Underlying this recommendation is the premise, basic to the Commission’s entire report, 
that fraudulent financial reporting is a significant problem that requires more attention from many 
constituencies, including regulatory and law enforcement agencies. The majority of respondents 
in an informal Commission survey among the members of the White Collar Crime Committee of 
the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section share this point of view.
Furthermore, although the SEC should increase the number of administrative and civil proceedings 
it brings and the severity of the sanctions it seeks in cases involving fraudulent financial reporting, 
these measures alone cannot provide the degree of deterrence that is needed to protect against 
fraudulent financial reporting. The SEC has the primary responsibility for enforcing the federal 
securities laws, but it does not have the authority to bring criminal actions. The Department of 
Justice is the only body authorized to do so. The SEC is authorized, however, to transmit evidence 
to the United States Attorney General, who has the discretion to institute criminal proceedings. The 
SEC can and does assist the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorneys by discussing with them 
cases that may be of interest, providing access to investigative files, and providing SEC personnel 
familiar with the case to assist in presenting it to a grand jury or at trial. The overwhelming majority 
of respondents in a study performed for the Commission found criminal referrals to the Justice 
Department or state prosecutors’ offices to be an effective enforcement activity.
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To increase criminal proceedings for fraudulent financial reporting, the SEC should undertake an 
organized, affirmative program to educate government officials who have criminal prosecution 
powers about the seriousness of the crime of fraudulent financial reporting, thus encouraging them 
to take a greater interest in fraudulent financial reporting cases. This program also should ensure 
coordination, cooperation, and whatever other assistance the SEC believes necessary to promote 
increased criminal prosecution.
IV. Improved Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
Since the effectiveness of an audit in detecting fraudulent financial reporting is related directly to 
the quality of that audit, the importance of audit quality to the financial reporting process cannot 
be overstated. For this reason, the accounting profession is subject to extensive regulation to ensure 
that independent public accountants provide reliable accounting and auditing services. An impor­
tant aspect of the Commission’s deliberations has been to assess whether this regulation is 
sufficient or whether additional regulation, particularly in the form of a separate statutory SRO, 
is needed to ensure audit quality.
To answer these questions, the Commission applied a functional analysis to the issue of regulation 
and oversight of the public accounting profession. The Commission’s conclusion after performing 
this analysis is that the existing framework of regulation and oversight is preferable to the 
establishment of a separate statutory SRO. This position is premised on the assumption that the 
Commission’s recommendations for improvements in the existing framework—mandatory quality 
assurance and peer review and meaningful sanctions through SEC enforcement—will be imple­
mented or that these necessary elements will otherwise be added to the present system.
The SEC decided on March 26, 1987, to seek public comment on a mandatory peer review 
requirement. The Commission looks forward to considering the SEC’s proposal and the comments 
it elicits in formulating final recommendations.
To set the context for the Commission’s recommendations and analysis, a brief but more detailed 
overview of the existing framework than appeared earlier in Chapter One is in order.
A. Overview of Existing Regulatory Framework
The existing regulation of the accounting profession is complex. It is a process directed to 
independent public accountants as well as to the public accounting firms to which they may belong. 
Further, different parties carry the regulation out at different levels.
1. Regulation of Independent Public Accountants
Independent public accountants are licensed as individuals by state boards of accountancy and must 
meet minimum educational requirements and pass a rigorous qualifying examination developed by 
the AICPA to be eligible to practice. Applicants for the CPA license also are generally required 
to (1) have experience in the practice of accounting, (2) show evidence of moral character, and 
(3) undertake continuing professional education.
In addition, all 50 states and 4 other jurisdictions have accountancy laws governing the practice 
of independent public accountants in their jurisdictions. Among other requirements, these laws 
require adherence during the course of an audit engagement with Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS) as developed by the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board (ASB). State boards
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of accountancy established pursuant to these laws generally have authority to discipline indepen­
dent public accountants who deviate from GAAS or otherwise fail to meet the legal requirements 
of practice. The sanctions imposed may include the suspension or revocation of a license to 
practice.
Over and above regulation by their respective states, independent public accountants face other 
government action addressed to audit quality. At the federal level the SEC is responsible for 
overseeing and then enforcing regulations that affect the independent public accountants of public 
companies. In addition, civil or criminal suits in federal and state courts help to ensure audit 
quality. Depending on the judicial forum and the factual context, independent public accountants 
who fail to comply with GAAS can face liability for damages, fines, or other civil or criminal 
sanctions. Court decisions also affect the duty of care independent public accountants owe to 
clients or third-party users of audited financial statements.
Furthermore, independent public accountants are subject as individuals to additional oversight 
outside of government. While the AICPA is a totally voluntary organization, most independent 
public accountants are members and, as such, must abide by its code of professional ethics, which 
imposes requirements relating to independence, integrity, and objectivity as well as to compliance 
with GAAS. The AICPA monitors and promotes adherence to the code and publicly identifies its 
members who violate the code.
Finally, many independent public accountants are subject to internal quality controls and other 
programs established by public accounting firms. These firms often are the first line of defense against 
unsatisfactory audit practice. Their internal systems of quality control ensure compliance with 
professional standards, SEC rules, and other legal requirements. As part of their quality control 
efforts, the firms conduct periodic inspections to monitor compliance with performance standards. 
They also may take disciplinary and remedial steps against partners and staff members who are 
found to perform substandard work.
2. Regulation of Public Accounting Firms
A system of regulation and oversight also exists at the firm level. A significant component in this 
system is the AICPA’s Division for CPA Firms, which was created in 1977 in response to concerns 
by Congress and the SEC about regulation and oversight of the accounting profession. The 
Division consists of two sections, an SEC Practice Section (SECPS) and a Private Companies 
Practice Section. Membership in the Division and either, or both, of these two sections is 
voluntary. Firms that join commit themselves to the requirements set by each section, including 
peer review and continuing professional education, and to the quality control standards enunciated 
by the AICPA covering accounting and auditing practice.
In addition to the general quality control standards imposed by membership in the Division for 
CPA Firms, firms who join the SECPS agree to (1) perform concurring, or second partner, reviews 
of the audits of SEC registrants, (2) rotate partners in charge of such audits every 7 years, (3) file 
reports of key firm data annually with the AICPA, (4) report to the SECPS’s Special Investigations 
Committee (SIC) any litigation (including criminal indictments) against the firm or its personnel 
or any proceeding or investigation publicly announced by a regulatory agency alleging audit failure 
with respect to a public company, (5) report serious disagreements with a client’s management to 
the board of directors of the client, and (6) accept penalties imposed by the executive committee 
for noncompliance with membership requirements.
The thrust of the regulation and oversight by the AICPA’s Division for CPA Firms is preventive 
and remedial rather than punitive. It focuses on strengthening systems of quality control and
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improving the performance of member firms through peer reviews that evaluate compliance with 
membership requirements.
The Public Oversight Board (POB) closely oversees all the activities of the SECPS, including the 
SIC process and peer review. Composed primarily of nonaccountants, the POB is a fully inde­
pendent body that nominates its own successors, selects its own chairman, and sets its own 
compensation. Because it also has its own staff, the POB can systematically monitor all phases of 
the peer review program through observation of fieldwork, review of peer review workpapers, and 
attendance at exit conferences. This combination of independence and “ hands on’’ oversight 
enables the POB to uphold the public interest and to make meaningful recommendations for 
improvements in the SECPS’s operations.
The SEC, in turn, maintains liaisons with and monitors the POB. Moreover, the SEC indepen­
dently evaluates the Division’s peer review process as it affects the independent public accountants 
who audit SEC registrants. The SEC also receives certain information from the SIC concerning its 
closed investigations. The extent of access to the SIC’s working papers and files, however, remains 
an open issue between the Division and the SEC.
In addition to the regulation provided by the Division, the government also directly oversees public 
accounting firms. The SEC and many state boards of accountancy have the authority to impose 
fines or other sanctions against firms when audit failure results from a systemic breakdown in 
quality control. Courts also impose significant damages against public accounting firms found 
negligent in professional liability lawsuits.
B. The Commission’s Observations
To be effective, regulation of the public accounting profession must consist of four major com­
ponents: (1) it must have the ability to set professional standards; (2) it must monitor compliance 
with those standards; (3) it must be applicable to all independent public accountants or all public 
accounting firms that audit public companies; and (4) it must have the capacity to enforce its 
standards in a meaningful fashion.
The Commission finds that most of these components exist within the present regulatory frame­
work and that they are functioning well and as intended. The Commission applauds, for example, 
the role the ASB plays in establishing professional standards. In addition, the Commission believes 
the role the Division for CPA Firms plays through its peer review process is directly responsible 
for a significant increase in the quality of audits. A recent example of the continuing effort to 
improve audit quality is the new SECPS membership requirement that significantly expanded 
required communications with a client’s audit committee or board of directors. The Commission’s 
recommendations in Chapter Three relating to the ASB and the SECPS simply are designed to 
make them more effective. The contributions of the SEC through its oversight of existing regu­
latory efforts by the private sector and its own standard-setting and enforcement activities have 
already been noted.
Nonetheless, the Commission’s functional analysis reveals that several necessary components for 
effective regulation are missing under the existing system. To provide these missing components, 
the Commission considered but dismissed the possibility of replacing the existing private-sector 
regulation with direct government regulation of independent public accountants.
Because most of the necessary components for effective regulation already exist and are func­
tioning well, a proposal for deeper, across-the-board involvement by government in the public 
accounting profession seems of doubtful merit. The efforts by the ASB and the AICPA’s Division
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for CPA Firms demonstrate that the public accounting profession can work to protect the public 
interest and still be sensitive to the needs of independent public accountants and their firms. 
Taxpayers would bear the cost of any scheme of direct government regulation. Moreover, direct 
government regulation of the independent public accountants of public companies would not 
necessarily result in increased public protection or improved audit quality.
The Commission studied whether a statutory SRO should be established or whether the existing 
regulatory framework could be adjusted to achieve all the necessary components of effective 
regulation. The Commission found that in many areas an SRO would only duplicate functions that 
the present system performs quite well and that such duplication would not be cost-effective. 
Alternatively, the present system could be dismantled to provide for an SRO that executes all 
necessary regulatory functions. Against this alternative, however, is the risk that an SRO might 
not perform its regulatory functions as effectively.
The Commission believes that the present framework is flexible enough to accommodate all the 
components necessary for effective regulation, if the two recommendations that follow are im­
plemented. The present framework, as modified by these recommendations, would be preferable 
to both direct governmental regulation and a statutory SRO. The Commission concluded that 
improving the existing framework offers the best alternative for effective regulation, because, 
among the three options considered, it is by far the least intrusive and least costly, without 
sacrificing audit quality assurance or protection of the public interest.
Professional Organization Membership
Recommendation: The SEC should require all public accounting firm s that audit public 
companies to be members o f  a professional organization that has peer review and inde­
pendent oversight functions and is approved by the SEC, such as that specified by the 
SECPS o f the AICPA’s Division fo r  CPA Firms.
With respect to the first component needed for effective regulation— setting standards— the Com­
mission has noted that both the ASB and the public accounting profession’s existing quality 
assurance program are executing this function effectively and should continue their activities in this 
area. Similarly, with respect to the second regulatory component—monitoring compliance with 
standards— the Commission has mentioned the effectiveness of the SECPS of the AICPA’s 
Division for CPA Firms, which is overseen by the POB and includes the SIC. The Commission 
concurs with the POB that the quality assurance program of the SECPS continues to be an 
important force in improving the quality of audit practice.
A significant deficiency exists, however, under the current regulatory framework with respect to 
the third component—applicability to all public accounting firms that audit public companies. 
Firms that do not want to comply with the public accounting profession’s quality assurance 
program are free to avoid it simply by not joining the SECPS. Accordingly, an SEC rule to 
mandate membership in a professional quality assurance program is required to achieve this 
missing component.
In addition, such a rule is necessary to implement the provisions of the federal securities laws. The 
quality of audit practice is related directly to the prevention, detection, and deterrence of fraudulent 
financial reporting. The Commission’s research demonstrated an unacceptably higher incidence of 
failure to detect fraudulent financial reporting by independent public accountants whose firms were 
not members of the SECPS. In view of the public trust placed in the independent public accountant, 
mandatory membership is essential to ensure that the independent public accountant has the
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requisite professional qualifications to represent a public company by auditing its financial state­
ments and opining thereon in public disclosure documents.
The Commission’s study of a professional quality assurance program focused on the program 
sponsored by the AICPA’s Division for CPA Firms because it is the only established program with 
a substantial track record and experience. The Commission’s recommendation in support of 
mandatory membership in a quality assurance program nonetheless is not intended to preclude the 
development of other programs. As long as the functions vital to ensure audit quality are performed 
(that is, that the program has peer review and independent oversight functions and is approved by 
the SEC), the objective of the Commission’s recommendation would be met.
Enforcement
Recommendation: The SEC should take enforcement action when a public accounting 
firm fails to remedy deficiencies cited by the public accounting professions quality assur­
ance program.
The fourth vital regulatory ingredient—enforcement with meaningful sanctions— exists under the 
current framework, but it should be broadened to include the threat of public sanctions. Under the 
current regulatory system, the AICPA’s Division for CPA Firms is geared toward remedial rather 
than punitive action. Members who fail to comply with membership requirements or to respond 
satisfactorily to peer review comments generally incur no substantive punitive measures for even 
the most egregious violations. The Division’s major punitive measure or threat of punishment, 
expulsion or threat of expulsion from a voluntary program, would no longer be available if 
membership is mandatory. Accordingly, if the public accounting profession’s quality assurance 
efforts are to work, credible enforcement must occur. The SEC can and should provide this 
function. SEC enforcement actions to reinforce the public accounting profession’s quality assur­
ance program could take place within existing procedures. Implicit in the notion of an SEC rule 
requiring membership in a professional quality assurance program is compliance with that 
program’s standards and requirements. Thus failure to remedy cited deficiencies would constitute 
violation of an SEC rule.
The SEC’s long-standing rule for disciplining professionals who practice before the agency, Rule 
2(e), includes as a basis for disciplinary action finding a person “ not to possess the requisite 
qualifications to represent others.”  A finding of noncompliance with the requirements of the public 
accounting profession’s quality assurance program, after the Rule’s standard notice and oppor­
tunity for hearing, would mean a lack of “ the requisite qualification to represent others”  within 
the meaning of Rule 2(e).
The Rule 2(e) proceeding then would allow the SEC to impose a meaningful sanction: temporary 
or permanent denial of the privilege of performing audits of public companies for the inclusion of 
an audit report in public disclosure documents. Within this general sanction, the SEC has the 
ability to fashion appropriate sanctions not unlike those which the securities industry’s independent 
SROs impose on broker-dealers.
For SEC enforcement of the public accounting profession’s quality assurance program to take place 
within existing procedures, the SEC would have to be aware of any slippage in the quality of the 
peer review process. Accordingly, the SEC should continue to monitor and maintain liaisons with 
the public accounting profession’s quality assurance program. In addition, the SECPS should 
inform the SEC of firms that fail to remedy deficiencies cited in a peer review pursuant to the 
quality assurance program.
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V. SEC Resources
Recommendation: The SEC must be given adequate resources to perform existing and 
additional functions that help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting.
The SEC’s resources should be adequate to enable the SEC to perform effectively the further 
functions the Commission recommends, in addition to its existing functions. In particular, the SEC 
should have adequate resources to enforce the public accounting profession’s quality assurance 
standards, an additional function that would obviate the need for a separate, ultimately more 
costly, SRO.
The SEC’s existing functions include not only enforcement, but also oversight and surveillance of 
financial reporting through the interpretation of standards and rules and the review of filings. The 
sheer volume of new issues and other pressures has inevitably led to a reduction in the review 
function.
Adequate resources should extend beyond funding to salary and grade-level mechanisms that 
would enable the SEC to attract and retain highly qualified personnel. The Commission is en­
couraged that the SEC has requested a budget increase of approximately $30 million, a rise in 
excess of 26 percent.
VI. Financial Institution Regulatory Agencies
Recommendation: The Office o f  the Comptroller o f the Currency, the Federal Reserve 
Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (including the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) should adopt 
measures patterned on the Commission’s recommendations directed to the SEC to carry out 
their own regulatory responsibility relating to financial reporting under the federal secu­
rities laws.
The primary focus of the Commission’s recommendations for federal regulatory agency action is 
the SEC. That agency has primary responsibility for administering and enforcing the federal 
securities laws. Where the public entity is a bank, savings and loan, or other financial institution, 
this responsibility belongs to, or may be divided among, a number of other federal agencies.
Because fraudulent financial reporting has occurred in public companies that report to regulators 
other than the SEC, all regulatory agencies with responsibility for the federal securities laws should 
adopt regulatory measures patterned on the Commission’s recommendations calling for SEC 
action. Thus the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (including the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) should:
•  Adopt rules, or if necessary seek legislation, to implement the recommendations for public 
companies that appear in Chapter Two.
• Enhance enforcement efforts to provide a stronger deterrent to fraudulent financial reporting, 
including, if necessary, seeking additional sanctions and powers from Congress.
•  Join the SEC and the Department of Justice in their program to increase criminal prosecutions 
for fraudulent financial reporting.
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The Commission concludes that the financial institution regulatory agencies need not duplicate its 
recommendations to the SEC regarding regulation of the public accounting profession, namely 
required membership in a professional quality assurance program and SEC enforcement of the 
program’s quality assurance standards. This part of the regulatory system would be missing only 
in the case of a public accounting firm whose public company audit clients are exclusively financial 
institutions that do not report to the SEC. Accordingly, the other regulatory agencies and the 
accounting profession should monitor this area and make adjustments in the future if this gap 
begins to become serious.
Exchange of Information
Recommendation: The financial institution regulatory agencies should provide fo r  the 
exchange o f  information between the regulatory examiner and the independent public 
accountant.
The exchange of information between regulatory examiners of financial institutions and indepen­
dent public accountants is needed to improve the ability of both parties to perform their duties, thus 
helping to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting. A financial institution, for example, 
should give its independent public accountant access to the regulatory examiner’s report; the 
independent public accountant should give bank examiners access to his letter to management and 
management’s response.
The concept of sharing information should be applied throughout government, wherever there are 
regulated industries and the regulatory examiners normally conduct examinations of financial 
information.
VII. Enhanced Enforcement by State Boards of Accountancy
Recommendation: State boards o f  accountancy should implement positive enforcement 
programs that periodically would review the quality o f  services that the independent public 
accountants they license render.
To a significant degree, as this chapter noted earlier, state laws and state government agencies 
govern the regulation of public accountancy. State boards of accountancy (or equivalent govern­
ment agencies) have been established by statute in all 50 states (as well as in four other jurisdic­
tions) to administer state laws governing various aspects of the public accounting profession, such 
as certification, licensing, professional conduct, and continuing professional education. State 
boards are in fact the only entities that, taken together, have jurisdiction over all who are licensed 
to practice public accountancy in the United States. Because of this unique jurisdictional mandate 
and the ultimate sanctioning authority that goes with it, state boards can play a critical role in 
assuring the public that the independent public accountants whom they have licensed are con­
tinuing to provide competent service.
Some states have taken genuine strides to meet this challenge. A growing number of states are 
experimenting with positive enforcement programs, in addition to maintaining the complaint-based 
system of enforcement and discipline under which state boards traditionally have operated. Pos­
itive enforcement programs require state boards to adopt a regulatory approach that is proactive. 
These programs periodically monitor the work of all licensees on a uniform or random basis, and
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a concerted effort is made to uncover substandard practice that has not been the subject of formal 
complaint. The aim of positive enforcement programs appears to be primarily preventive and 
rehabilitative, but a broad range of disciplinary measures also must be available and imposed, if 
warranted.
By contrast, in the jurisdictions that still adhere exclusively to a complaint-based system, state 
boards of accountancy remain reactive bodies; their disciplinary and enforcement machinery can 
be set into motion only through formal complaints about audit quality. Relatively few complaints 
about substandard work ever surface, and cases involving substandard work tend not to draw the 
strongest sanctions.
Because a majority of all state boards have not adopted positive enforcement programs, much more 
remains to be done to promote and develop these programs. The commendable campaign by the 
National Association of the State Boards of Accountancy, a voluntary federation of state boards, 
is in the right direction. In the final analysis, however, the creation and the support of such 
programs require a state-by-state commitment by governors, legislatures, and boards of accoun­
tancy in jurisdictions that lack positive enforcement programs.
Jurisdictions that have successfully implemented positive enforcement programs demonstrate that 
state regulatory systems can work if they receive the appropriate levels of authority and direction 
from government and support from the public accounting profession and the public at large. 
Effective state regulation would give added assurance that all independent public accountants are 
fulfilling their public trust to render accounting and auditing services that are truly professional. 
That assurance could in turn go a long way toward deterring fraudulent financial reporting.
VIII. Current Legal Climate
The national crisis of liability and insurance, and the various tort reform initiatives to address this 
perceived crisis, go beyond the mandate and the ability of this Commission to resolve. At the same 
time, however, the Commission is aware of the legal climate in which the participants in the 
financial reporting process operate today. The liability to which individuals, particularly officers 
and directors and independent public accountants, are subject is related to fraudulent financial 
reporting, and this relationship may need to be reexamined.
Traditionally, individual liability for violations of the disclosure provisions of the federal securities 
laws has been viewed as being a discipline that is necessary to the integrity of the disclosure 
process which those laws mandate. In fact, potential legal liability for negligence to private parties 
who suffer damages has long been considered the most effective mechanism for assuring that 
independent public accountants perform their public responsibilities competently and diligently. 
By supplementing the government’s limited law enforcement resources, private parties who bring 
lawsuits as “ private attomeys-general”  provide an incentive for independent public accountants 
and corporate officers and directors to serve responsibly.
In recent years, however, concerns have been expressed that potential private liability under the 
current tort system has become excessive. While this argument has been made in the past, it may 
bear heeding now. The Commission is concerned that private liability may have reached a level 
at which it no longer adds to the quality of financial reporting and corporate disclosure generally.
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Considering the Implications of Liability on Audit Quality
Recommendation: Parties charged with responding to various tort reform initiatives 
should consider the implications that the perceived liability crisis holds fo r  long-term audit 
quality and the independent public accountant’s detection o f fraudulent financial 
reporting.
The expansion of the independent public accountant’s liability in recent years has promoted a 
dramatic increase in the number and the size of legal claims, which in turn have contributed to an 
increasingly unstable insurance market. These developments are jeopardizing the public account­
ing profession’s ability to attract and retain high-caliber professionals and its future economic 
viability. To the extent that the perceived liability and insurance crisis makes recruiting and 
retaining professionals more difficult, it may have a long-term detrimental effect on audit quality. 
In addition, liability concerns have a direct relationship with the public accounting profession’s 
willingness to assume greater responsibility for detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
Accordingly, while the Commission would be concerned if shareholders’ rights were unduly 
restricted and takes no position on any of the public accounting profession’s specific proposals for 
legislative reform of the tort system, it urges those who do so to consider the implications for 
long-term audit quality and the detection by the independent public accountant of fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Reconsidering Corporate Indemnification
Recommendation: The SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that the corpo­
rate indemnification o f  directors fo r  liabilities that arise under the Securities Act o f  1933 
is against public policy and therefore unenforceable.
The perceived crisis of liability and the difficulties in obtaining directors’ and officers’ (“ D&O” ) 
insurance have been widely reported from the perspective of corporate management and well- 
documented in the press. This aspect of the perceived liability crisis also could affect financial 
reporting adversely.
The implications of the liability crisis for recruiting qualified independent directors, particularly 
those who are to serve on audit committees of public companies, concern the Commission greatly. 
As the Commission stressed in Chapter Two, independent directors are necessary components of 
an effective audit committee, which in turn is a key to preventing fraudulent financial reporting. 
Since the factors are interrelated, balance is essential. If concerns about personal liability exceed 
their traditional role as a necessary discipline and begin to jeopardize the essential contribution of 
independent directors, the SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that the corporate 
indemnification of directors for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 is against public 
policy and therefore unenforceable. If certain limited indemnification, particularly of independent 
directors, helps companies recruit and retain highly qualified directors, its benefits may well 
outweigh the public policy issue underlying the SEC’s traditional stand.
More than a half-dozen states have responded with legislation to reduce the pressures corporations 
face as a result of the D&O liability crisis. The legislative initiatives include measures, for 
example, to limit the liability of directors and to broaden the indemnification that a corporation may 
offer its directors and officers.
One state, Delaware, now permits companies to limit or even eliminate their directors’ financial 
liability for a breach of the duty of care but leaves director liability intact in cases of disloyalty,
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bad faith, or misconduct. In derivative actions (a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause 
of action), Delaware has chosen to limit indemnification to expenses, taking a somewhat more 
conservative approach than that of many recent initiatives. On the other hand, in the nonderivative 
area, most of the new legislation mirrors Delaware’s recent statute that allows a corporation to 
indemnify its directors and officers for expenses, judgments, fines and settlement, if certain criteria 
are met. States that have not acted face pressures similar to those faced by states that have acted, 
and so the Commission expects the initiatives mentioned here to be part of a continuing trend.
To help address both the liability that exists and the difficulties in obtaining D&O insurance, the 
Commission offers Audit Committee Good Practice Guidelines, which appear in Appendix K.
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Chapter Five
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION
I. The Role of Education in Preparing Participants in the Financial 
Reporting System
Participants in the financial reporting system must first understand the multidimensional nature of 
fraudulent financial reporting to be able to address it with appropriate responses. Their knowledge, 
skills, and ethical values— gained through education—must be commensurate with this challenge.
The process of educating present and future participants in the financial reporting system can take 
place in the undergraduate and graduate business school classroom, in continuing education 
programs, or through on-the-job training or experience. In all these settings the participants should 
be exposed to the knowledge, the skills, and the ethical values that potentially may help them 
prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting. Through this process, education and 
educators can have an especially important positive influence on the financial reporting system.
This chapter presents the Commission’s recommendations that are designed to help make present 
and future participants in the financial reporting process better informed about fraudulent financial 
reporting and better prepared to prevent, detect, and deter it. The next section presents recom­
mendations for improving today’s business and accounting curricula. Because the American 
Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), which accredits these academic programs, 
is one of the most important influences on the content and the structure of business and accounting 
curricula, it should consider how best to reflect these recommendations in its accreditation stan­
dards. Although the recommendations presented here are targeted to the undergraduate and grad­
uate school curricula, educators can and should adapt them to appropriate aspects of the law school 
curriculum.
The Commission then offers its observations about recent calls for expanding the accounting 
curriculum. The following section presents the Commission’s recommendations for professional 
certification examinations for accountants. In the subsequent section the Commission recommends 
improvements in continuing professional education for accountants. Finally, the last section 
discusses opportunities within the public company for educating management and other employees 
about the risk of fraudulent financial reporting and measures required to reduce its incidence.
II. Business and Accounting Curricula
The Commission endorses recent calls for additional liberal arts requirements in the business and 
accounting curricula, to serve as a strong foundation on which to build additional knowledge, 
skills, and values. The National Institute of Education, the Association of American Colleges, and 
the American Accounting Association each have recommended increasing the curricula’s emphasis 
on analytical and problem-solving skills, ethical values, and historical and cultural awareness—  
all benefits of liberal arts studies and useful groundwork for future participants in the financial 
reporting process.
As tomorrow’s top corporate managers and partners of public accounting firms, today’s business 
and accounting students will be responsible and accountable for the financial reporting process on
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which the capital and credit markets depend. The Commission’s recommendations in this chapter 
are designed to reinforce and supplement the foundation of liberal arts studies and thereby help 
students deal with the forces and the opportunities they will encounter in business that may 
contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. Rigorous and thorough academic preparation will not 
only help today’s students advance to leadership positions in companies and public accounting 
firms, it also will help them face the challenge of preventing, detecting, and deterring fraudulent 
financial reporting more successfully.
Accordingly, the business and accounting curricula should examine fraudulent financial reporting 
in depth, highlighting ethical, analytical, and judgmental considerations. Because of the complex 
nature of this type of fraud and of every strategy aimed at its reduction, faculty should teach its 
nature and possible solutions throughout such curricula. Limiting students’ exposure to the prob­
lem of fraudulent financial reporting to a single course on ethics is simply not enough.
Curriculum-wide Exposure to Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Recommendation: Throughout the business and accounting curricula, educators should 
foster knowledge and understanding o f  the factors that may cause fraudulent financial 
reporting and the strategies that can lead to a reduction in its incidence.
When a Commission-sponsored survey sampled accounting and auditing textbooks, it found little 
to no discussion of fraudulent financial reporting. The fact that students lack an adequate under­
standing of this fraudulent activity and a sensitivity to the forces and opportunities that may 
contribute to it is therefore not surprising. The serious nature of fraudulent financial reporting 
warrants a change in this situation.
Throughout their studies, business and accounting students should receive sufficient exposure to 
the problem of fraudulent financial reporting, including its causes, its widespread impact, and the 
practical, cost-effective responses that participants in the financial reporting system can and should 
undertake. In addition, these students should examine the complex management and professional 
issues that surround fraudulent financial reporting.
Many opportunities for discussing the topic of fraudulent financial reporting occur throughout the 
entire curricula. Management courses, for example, are a natural setting for examining the 
oversight functions of the audit committee and the critical importance of the ethical tone set by top 
management. Finance classes should stress the ethical and the economic underpinnings of full and 
fair disclosure that govern access to public funds through capital and credit markets. The risks of 
fraud that management by objectives, decentralized operations, incentive compensation plans, and 
top-down profit planning may pose are appropriate topics for cost and managerial accounting 
classes to discuss. Systems classes should address risks of fraudulent financial reporting introduced 
by complex information systems. Auditing classes should emphasize the use of analytical review 
techniques and the need for healthy skepticism. In addition, behavioral courses should analyze how 
forces and opportunities at various levels of the organization encourage misleading financial 
reporting and how the corporation can help individuals cope with them.
Their academic training should give business and accounting students a solid understanding of 
fraudulent financial reporting and the awareness that the problem has no quick, simple, or final 
solution. Since the complex nature of fraudulent financial reporting will continue to evolve, the 
problem will require periodic, if not continual, reexamination. Educators should encourage stu­
dents to make this reexamination part of their continuing education.
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Better Understanding of Internal Controls
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should promote a better un­
derstanding o f  the function and the importance o f  internal controls, including the control 
environment, in preventing, detecting, and deterring fraudulent financial reporting.
In Chapter Two and throughout this report, the Commission has stressed the importance of strong 
internal controls, broader than internal accounting controls. In addition to providing a first line of 
defense against fraudulent financial reporting, internal controls make good business sense. Nev­
ertheless, many business and accounting curricula do not highlight internal controls. In particular, 
they pass lightly over the broad controls that constitute the control environment, such as the code 
of corporate conduct, the internal audit function, and the audit committee. Coverage of the 
powerful influence that top management exerts on the control environment has been especially 
inadequate.
Furthermore, advances in computer technology, systems development, and data processing have 
heightened the need for teaching students about internal controls, including the control environ­
ment. These advances rapidly have transformed the financial reporting process. Accordingly, 
students majoring in accounting or business, who will graduate with a greater understanding of 
data processing concepts than that of their predecessors, also require an understanding of the 
heightened internal controls and security required in computer-based environments. Curricula that 
emphasize the importance of internal controls will help students become better prepared partici­
pants in the financial reporting process.
Knowledge of Regulation and Law Enforcement
Recommendation: Business and accounting students should be well-informed about the 
regulation and enforcement activities by which government and private bodies safeguard 
the financial reporting system and thereby protect the public interest.
The business and accounting curricula should inform students about the regulatory and law 
enforcement framework so that students develop a clear understanding of the responsibilities and 
the functions of federal and state agencies, courts, Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs), other 
private bodies, and professional organizations and of how they interact. Students also should 
develop an appreciation of how the public trust is invoked when a company solicits and operates 
with funds from public investors or when an independent public accountant audits a public 
company. They must understand their own legal and professional obligations to maintain this 
public trust as well as the consequences for failing to do so.
Developing the Necessary Skills
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should help students develop 
stronger analytical, problem solving, and judgment skills to help prevent, detect, and deter 
fraudulent financial reporting when they become participants in the financial reporting 
process.
Managing a corporation well and serving as a chief financial officer, internal auditor, or inde­
pendent public accountant requires good judgment, the ability to reason analytically, and the 
ability to solve problems. Preventing, detecting, and deterring fraudulent financial reporting 
require similar skills. The lack of these skills can contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. In 
fact, many instances of fraudulent financial reporting that the Commission reviewed went unde­
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tected for some time because of faulty judgment or inadequate analytical reasoning on the part of 
the participants in the financial reporting process.
Also, fraudulent financial reporting and its cover-up generally involve an unusual set of circum­
stances: a unique combination of forces and opportunities conducive to such fraud, whether the 
fraudulent scheme involves inappropriate revenue recognition, overstatement of assets, override 
of controls, or collusion. Frequently, those who are in a position to prevent, detect, or deter the 
fraudulent action do not contemplate or foresee the risks of the specific set of circumstances.
Overemphasizing course content and exposing students only to simple factual case histories, which 
can prevent them from developing the ability to use analytical and problem-solving skills and to 
make sound judgments in unusual, demanding circumstances, are some of the pitfalls to which 
educators are prone in their attempts to improve students’ thinking and judgment skills. Educators 
should recognize these obstacles and attempt to redress the imbalance by stressing analysis and 
judgment as well as problem solving. The business and accounting curricula should help students 
develop good judgment and analytical thinking skills and the ability to confront novel situations 
in a company’s financial reporting process, especially if those situations involve warning signs or 
“ red flags.’’
Emphasizing Ethics
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should emphasize ethical val­
ues by integrating their development with the acquisition o f knowledge and skills to help 
prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting.
The business and accounting curricula have given too little attention to the ethics of financial 
reporting. Restricting coverage of ethics issues to an elective course near the end of the formal 
education process is too little and too late. The Commission recommends that the curricula 
emphasize ethics issues, integrating them with the coverage of technical information and the 
development of skills to help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting.
This goal is difficult to accomplish. It requires the interest and involvement of business school 
faculty from all areas of concentration. Attention to ethics studies must permeate the curricula, 
with ethical inquiry an expected part of any analysis of a business or accounting case study. Current 
business events also can offer opportunities for classroom discussions of ethics issues.
In the typical accounting curriculum, however, the only ethics study takes place in the auditing 
course, where it usually amounts to no more than a procedure-based, one-class discussion of the 
AICPA’s Rules of Conduct. Because the AICPA’s Rules form the basis for disciplinary action, 
discussions of them tend to be narrowly focused. Unfortunately, the level of ethical inquiry is also 
minimal in the business curriculum and again frequently limited to a single course. Such inade­
quate coverage of ethics issues can send an unintended message to students that ethics is of 
secondary importance.
The independent public accountant’s responsibility and accountability to the public requires a 
much broader exposure to ethics. Business schools should include ethics discussions in every 
accounting course. Students should study codes of corporate conduct and other ethics codes such 
as those promulgated by the National Association of Accountants, the Institute of Internal Au­
ditors, and the Financial Executives Institute, in addition to the AICPA’s Rules of Conduct. At a 
minimum, because all business majors are required to take some accounting, treatment of ethics 
issues throughout the accounting curriculum would expose every business graduate to at least some
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ethical inquiry concerning the financial reporting process. Yet ethics ideally should be a part of all 
business courses.
Faculty Development and Classroom Materials
Recommendation: Business schools should encourage business and accounting faculty to 
develop their own personal competence as well as classroom materials fo r  conveying 
information, skills, and ethical values that can help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent 
financial reporting.
The most serious deficiency in attempts to improve the business curriculum along the lines the 
Commission recommends is the lack of relevant classroom discussions of real situations and of 
challenging classroom materials. The Commission recommends that business schools encourage 
faculty members to develop their own competence and to produce classroom materials that help 
students understand fraudulent financial reporting.
There is no substitute for business and professional experience in contributing insight and infor­
mation to classroom analyses and discussions of cases of fraudulent financial reporting. Business 
faculty members should therefore—with the business schools’ support—gain actual work expe­
rience in a corporate setting directly relating to their area of academic expertise. Furthermore, 
business schools should bring executives and professional accountants into the classroom through 
guest lectures, part-time residence programs, and part- and full-time faculty appointments on a 
permanent or temporary basis. Interaction between academia and the marketplace would bridge the 
gap between the academic and commercial worlds and add more reality to case studies of fraud­
ulent financial reporting.
Support for developing materials based on actual incidents of fraudulent financial reporting can 
come in several forms. Case-writing workshops, such as those the Decision Sciences Institute 
sponsors, and a central registry or clearinghouse for existing case studies would foster support 
within academia for writing cases. Financial support from companies, private institutions and 
foundations, professional organizations, and public accounting firms would enable faculty to 
develop new materials.
Educators need access to information on actual incidents of fraudulent financial reporting to be able 
to help their students understand why and how this type of fraud occurs. Corporate executives, 
internal auditors, independent public accountants, and regulatory and law enforcement officials 
therefore should make every effort to grant this access and support the dissemination of infor­
mation about these incidents.
Appendix G presents, as examples of the kinds of cases that business school faculty should 
develop, two cases developed as part of the Commission’s research effort. Each case is based on 
knowledge of actual situations involving public companies, although the facts have been altered 
and any resemblance to real people or events is unintentional. These cases have been tested 
successfully with mixed groups of corporate executives and other professionals, including inde­
pendent public accountants, attorneys, and securities analysts as well as students.
Developing materials like these would have many benefits. Students respond favorably to learning 
situations that reflect real life. Their enthusiasm in turn would inspire the faculty to increase their 
efforts to help students understand fraudulent financial reporting and the appropriate responses to 
it. In sum, business schools should create a learning environment in which the importance of 
effective controls, high ethical standards, good judgment and analytical skills, and a concern for 
the public interest are communicated effectively.
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III. Five-Year Accounting Programs
The need to expand undergraduate accounting curricula from 4 to 5 years has been a frequent topic 
of discussion in recent years. The American Accounting Association (AAA) and the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) have supported this expansion, and some 
universities now require 5 years of study for accounting majors. While discussion about this 
proposed curriculum change is best left to these and other professional groups, such as the 
Financial Executives Institute (FEI), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the National 
Association of Accountants (NAA), the Commission offers the following observations based on 
its research and deliberations:
• Since liberal arts courses offer a strong framework for evaluating and adjusting to rapid changes 
in business during a time of continuing economic and technological development and evolution 
of the accounting profession, expanding accounting curricula to deal with fraudulent financial 
reporting, as the Commission recommends, should not be at the expense of the liberal arts 
component of business and accounting education.
• A significant explosion of information related to accounting, systems, and related fields has 
been taking place, and studying this information may require more time in course work.
•  Entry-level positions for corporate accountants, internal auditors, and independent public 
accountants require increasing levels of competence and therefore more educational prepara­
tion.
• Developing ethical inquiry, analytical reasoning, sound judgment, and problem-solving skills 
requires more time than developing simpler cognitive skills such as memorization requires.
•  Just as the Masters of Business Administration degree has become increasingly important for 
corporate advancement in areas like management, marketing, finance, and internal audit, a 
comparable accounting degree may become more necessary for advancement as a corporate 
accountant and as an independent public accountant.
IV. Professional Certification Examinations
Recommendation: Professional certification examinations should test students on the 
information, skills, and ethical values that further the understanding o f fraudulent finan­
cial reporting and that promote its reduction.
Professional certification examinations influence accounting education. Accounting and auditing 
textbooks and course syllabi quickly reflect changes in the subject matter that these examinations 
cover.
The AICPA examination for accountants (the CPA examination) has an especially strong influence 
on accounting curricula. Accordingly, the AICPA’s Board of Examiners as well as the Boards of 
Examiners of the IIA and the NAA should modify future professional certification examinations 
in light of the recommendations in this report, testing students on the information, skills, and 
ethical values that will determine their responses to the problem of fraudulent financial reporting.
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V. Continuing Professional Education
Recommendation: As part o f  their continuing professional education, independent public 
accountants, internal auditors, and corporate accountants should study the forces and 
opportunities that contribute to fraudulent financial reporting, the risk factors that may 
indicate its occurrence, and the relevant ethical and technical standards.
Continuing professional education influences the quality of work performed by independent public 
accountants, internal auditors, or corporate accountants. Continuing professional education is 
available to these professionals in a variety of forms, such as in-house training programs, education 
programs of professional organizations, correspondence courses, and business school courses, and 
helps them adjust to change and keep current on new developments.
Most of the recommendations in this chapter for the business and accounting curricula generally 
apply to continuing professional education as well. The professional education process that con­
tinues throughout these professionals’ careers should further their knowledge of fraudulent finan­
cial reporting, refine the skills required to combat such fraud, and sensitize these professionals to 
the related ethics issues.
VI. Educational Initiatives by Public Companies
A public company has many opportunities to educate its directors, management, and employees 
about fraudulent financial reporting. The audit committee of the board of directors has an important 
responsibility to be alert to the risk of such fraud and to educate its members and the rest of the 
board members about the forces and the opportunities within the company’s financial reporting 
system that could lead to its occurrence. Chapter Two and the Audit Committee Good Practice 
Guidelines in Appendix K suggest some of the educational resources that are available to assist the 
audit committee in this task.
In addition, continuing managerial education, whether performed in-house or by outside consult­
ants, should focus on the information, the skills, and the ethical values required to safeguard 
against fraudulent financial reporting. Familiarity with the Good Practice Guidelines for Assessing 
the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting in Appendix H, for example, could help raise 
management’s awareness about the possibility of fraudulent financial reporting occurring in its 
own company.
Finally, the process of developing and publicizing a code of corporate conduct is an opportunity 
to let employees at all levels of the company know what they can do if they encounter actual or 
suspected instances of fraudulent financial reporting. Training in the meaning and the application 
of the code is one means of alerting employees about such fraud and enlisting their support as part 
of the company’s system of internal control.
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Appendix A
COMPLETE SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter One: Overview of the Financial Reporting System and Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting
No recommendations
Chapter Two: Recommendations for the Public Company
The Tone at the Top
Recommendation: For the top management o f a public company to discharge its obligation to oversee 
the financial reporting process, it must identify, understand, and assess the factors that may cause the 
company’s financial statements to be fraudulently misstated.
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal controls that are adequate to prevent and 
detect fraudulent financial reporting.
Recommendation: Public companies should develop and enforce written codes o f corporate conduct. 
Codes o f conduct should foster a strong ethical climate and open channels of communication to help 
protect against fraudulent financial reporting. A company’s audit committee should review compliance 
with the code annually, including compliance by top management, and report thereon to the board of 
directors.
Accounting Function and Chief Accounting Officer
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain accounting functions that can effectively meet 
their financial reporting obligations.
Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain an effective internal audit function staffed with 
an adequate number o f qualified personnel appropriate to the size and the nature o f the company. 
Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their internal audit functions are objective.
Recommendation: Internal auditors should consider the implications o f their nonfinancial audit find­
ings fo r  the company’s financial statements.
Recommendation: Management and the audit committee should ensure that the internal auditors’ 
involvement in the audit o f the entire financial reporting process is appropriate and properly coordinated 
with the independent public accountant.
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee
Recommendation: The board o f directors o f all public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
establish audit committees comprised solely o f independent directors.
Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective overseers o f the finan­
cial reporting process and the company’s internal controls.
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Recommendation: All public companies should develop a written charter setting forth the duties and 
responsibilities o f the audit committee. The board o f directors should approve the charter, review it at least 
annually, and modify it as necessary.
Recommendation: Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority to discharge their 
responsibilities.
Recommendation: The audit committee should review management’s evaluation o f factors related to the 
independence o f the company’s public accountant. Both the audit committee and management should 
assist the public accountant in preserving his independence.
Recommendation: The audit committee should approve in advance the types and the extent o f man­
agement advisory services that management plans to engage the company’s independent public accoun­
tant to perform.
Reporting on Responsibilities in the Annual Report to Stockholders
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in their annual 
reports to stockholders management reports signed by the chief executive officer and chief accounting 
officer. The management report should acknowledge management’s responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control, discuss how these responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide 
management’s assessment o f the effectiveness o f the company’s internal controls.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to include in their annual 
reports to stockholders a letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee describing the committee’s 
responsibilities and activities during the year.
Seeking a Second Opinion
Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee when it seeks a second opinion on 
a significant accounting issue.
Recommendation: When a public company changes independent public accountants, it should be 
required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature o f any material accounting or auditing issues 
discussed with its old and new auditors during the three-year period preceding the change.
Quarterly Reporting
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight o f the quarterly reporting process. 
This oversight should include approving financial results prior to public release.
Setting Standards for Internal Control
Recommendation: The Commission’s sponsoring organizations should establish a body to guide public 
companies on internal controls.
Chapter Three: Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant
Recognizing Responsibility for Detecting Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise standards to restate the independent 
public accountant’s responsibility fo r detection of fraudulent financial reporting, requiring the indepen­
dent public accountant to (1) take affirmative steps in each audit to assess the potential for such reporting 
and (2) design tests to provide reasonable assurance o f detection. Revised standards should include 
guidance for assessing risks and pursuing detection when risks are identified.
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Improving Detection Capabilities
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards to require independent 
public accountants to perform analytical review procedures in all audit engagements and should provide 
improved guidance on the appropriate use o f these procedures.
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public accountants to review quarterly finan­
cial data o f public companies before release to the public.
Improving Audit Quality
Recommendation: The AICPA’s SEC Practice Section should strengthen its peer review program by 
increasing review of audit engagements involving public company clients new to a firm. For each office 
selected for peer review, the first audit o f all such new clients should be reviewed.
Recommendation: The AICPA’s SEC Practice Section requirement for a concurring, or second part­
ner, review of the audit report should be revised as part o f an ongoing process o f review o f this 
requirement. Standards for the concurring review should, among other things, (1) require concurring 
review partner involvement in the planning stage o f the audit in addition to the final review stage, (2) 
specify qualifications o f the concurring review partner to require prior experience with audits o f SEC 
registrants and familiarity with the client’s industry, and (3) require the concurring review partner to 
consider himself a peer o f the engagement partner for purposes o f the review.
Recommendation: Public accounting firms should recognize and control the organizational and indi­
vidual pressures that potentially reduce audit quality.
Communicating the Auditor’s Role
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s standard report to state 
that the audit provides reasonable but not absolute assurance that the audited financial statements are free 
from material misstatements as a result o f fraud or error.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s standard report to describe 
the extent to which the independent public accountant has reviewed and evaluated the system o f internal 
accounting control. The Auditing Standards Board also should provide explicit guidance to address the 
situation where, as a result o f his knowledge o f the company’s internal accounting controls, the inde­
pendent public accountant disagrees with management’s assessment as stated in the proposed 
management’s report.
Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board
Recommendation: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing Standards Board to afford a fu ll par­
ticipatory role in the standard-setting process to knowledgeable persons who are affected by and interested 
in auditing standards but who either are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public practice.
Chapter Four: Recommendations for the SEC and Others to Improve the 
Regulatory and Legal Environment
Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to impose civil money penalties in administrative 
proceedings [including Rule 2(e) proceedings] and to seek civil money penalties from a court directly in 
an injunctive proceeding.
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Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to issue a cease and desist order when a securities 
law violation or an unsound financial reporting practice is found.
Recommendation: The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to bar or suspend corporate officers 
and directors involved in fraudulent financial reporting from future service in that capacity in a public 
company.
Increased Criminal Prosecution
Recommendation: Criminal prosecution o f fraudulent financial reporting cases should be made a 
higher priority. The SEC should conduct an affirmative program to promote increased criminal prose­
cution o f fraudulent financial reporting cases by educating and assisting government officials with 
criminal prosecution powers.
Improved Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
Recommendation: The SEC should require all public accounting firms that audit public companies to 
be members o f a professional organization that has peer review and independent oversight functions and 
is approved by the SEC, such as that specified by the SECPS o f the AlCPA’s Division for CPA Firms.
Recommendation: The SEC should take enforcement action when a public accounting firm fails to 
remedy deficiencies cited in the public accounting profession’s quality assurance program.
SEC Resources
Recommendation: The SEC must be given adequate resources to perform existing and additional 
functions that help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting.
Financial Institution Regulatory Agencies
Recommendation: The Office o f the Comptroller o f the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (including the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) should adopt measures patterned on the Commission’s rec­
ommendations directed to the SEC to carry out their own regulatory responsibility relating to financial 
reporting under the federal securities laws.
Recommendation: The financial institution regulatory agencies should provide fo r  the exchange of 
information between the regulatory examiner and the independent public accountant.
Enhanced Enforcement by State Boards of Accountancy
Recommendation: State boards o f accountancy should implement positive enforcement programs that 
periodically would review the quality o f services that the independent public accountants they license 
render.
Considering the Implications of Liability on Audit Quality
Recommendation: Parties charged with responding to various tort reform initiatives should consider the 
implications that the perceived liability crisis holds for long-term audit quality and the independent public 
accountant’s detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
Reconsidering Corporate Indemnification
Recommendation: The SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that the corporate indemni­
fication o f directors fo r liabilities that arise under the Securities Act o f1933 is against public policy and 
therefore unenforceable.
90
Chapter Five: Recommendations for Education
Business and Accounting Curricula
Recommendation: Throughout the business and accounting curricula, educators should foster knowl­
edge and understanding o f the factors that may cause fraudulent financial reporting and the strategies 
that can lead to a reduction in its incidence.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should promote a better understanding o f the 
function and the importance o f internal controls, including the control environment, in preventing, 
detecting, and deterring fraudulent financial reporting.
Recommendation: Business and accounting students should be well-informed about the regulation and 
enforcement activities by which government and private bodies safeguard the financial reporting system 
and thereby protect the public interest.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should help students develop stronger ana­
lytical, problem solving, and judgment skills to help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial 
reporting when they become participants in the financial reporting process.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should emphasize ethical values by integrat­
ing their development with the acquisition o f knowledge and skills to help prevent, detect, and deter 
fraudulent financial reporting.
Recommendation: Business schools should encourage business and accounting faculty to develop their 
own personal competence as well as classroom materials fo r conveying information, skills, and ethical 
values that can help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial reporting.
Professional Certification Examinations
Recommendation: Professional certification examinations should test students on the information, 
skills, and ethical values that further the understanding o f fraudulent financial reporting and that 
promote its reduction.
Continuing Professional Education
Recommendation: As part of their continuing professional education, independent public accountants, 
internal auditors, and corporate accountants should study the forces and opportunities that contribute to 
fraudulent financial reporting, the risk factors that may indicate its occurrence, and the relevant ethical 
and technical standards.
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Appendix B
BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMISSIONERS
WILLIAM M. BATTEN
William Milfred Batten was elected Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the New York Stock Exchange 
in May 1976 and retired from that position in May 1984. He first became associated with the Exchange in 
1972 as a public member of the Board of Directors. He came to the New York Stock Exchange from J.C. 
Penney Co., from which he retired as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer in October 1974.
Mr. Batten currently serves as a Director of the American Productivity Center and as a member of the Board 
Advisory Council, Washington, D.C., and on the Boards of AT&T, Boeing, Citibank, J.C. Penney, and 
Texas Instruments. He is a Fellow of the faculty of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University.
Active in civic and governmental affairs, Mr. Batten is currently a member of the White House Preservation 
Fund and the President’s Commission on Executive Exchange. He was President of the Economic Club of 
New York in 1967-68, and in 1973 served as the National Chairman of the U.S. Industrial Payroll Savings 
Committee.
Mr. Batten received a B.S. degree in economics from Ohio State University, Columbus, in 1932, and did 
graduate work at the University of Chicago. He served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945, where he 
attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
WILLIAM S. KANAGA
William S. Kanaga is Chairman of the Advisory Board of Arthur Young & Company, an international 
accounting, tax, and consulting firm. He served as Chairman of that firm from 1977 through 1985 and was 
Managing Partner from 1972 through 1977.
Long active in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Mr. Kanaga served as Chairman of 
its Board of Directors for the 1980-81 term and is currently serving as the Chairman of the profession’s 
centennial celebration in 1987.
In addition to his professional activities, he is a member of the Boards of Trustees or Advisory Councils to 
the Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York, Babson College, U.C.L.A. Graduate School of 
Management, Stanford University Graduate School of Business, and the Consortium of Christian Colleges. 
He also serves on the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Business 
Council for the United Nations, Value Line, Inc., and McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
Mr. Kanaga received his B.S. degree in metallurgical engineering in 1947 from the University of Kansas 
and was elected to Tau Beta Pi and Sigma Tau. He did postgraduate work at Babson College and Columbia 
University and in 1968 completed the Advanced Management Program of the Harvard Business School. 
Mr. Kanaga is married and has three children.
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HUGH L. MARSH
Hugh L. Marsh is Director-Internal Audit for Aluminum Company of America and is responsible for its 
worldwide audit activities. He served as 1984-85 Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Internal Auditors.
Previously, Mr. Marsh held various financial positions with Aluminum Company of America and its 
subsidiaries, including an assignment in Australia. He has served in several international positions with the 
Institute of Internal Auditors, including International Treasurer and Chairman of the Budget and Finance 
Committee. In 1983-84 he was Senior Vice Chairman of the Board.
Mr. Marsh has been a frequent lecturer and conference chairman on accounting and auditing subjects. A 
former National Director for the National Association of Accountants, he is also a member of the Financial 
Executives Institute, the Institute of Certified Management Accountants, the American Accounting Asso­
ciation, and the Stuart Cameron McLeod Society. He has served on the Advisory Council for the Paton 
Accounting Center at the University of Michigan and presently serves on the National Advisory Forum of 
Beta Alpha Psi, the national accounting fraternity, and the Executive Committee of the Institute of Internal 
Auditors.
In 1984, the government of the People’s Republic of China invited Mr. Marsh to consult on the establishment 
of, and training programs for, their new audit agency, which is expected to have 60,000 member auditors 
within 5 years.
Mr. Marsh, a Certified Management Accountant and a Certified Internal Auditor, is a graduate of the 
University of Tennessee, with a B.S. degree in industrial management. He has also attended special courses 
in accounting and finance at the University of Alabama, Evansville University, and Geelong Technical 
College in Australia.
Mr. Marsh was bom in Nashville, Tennessee, and he and his wife, the former Katherine Margery Allen of 
Nashville, presently reside in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
THOMAS I. STORRS
Thomas I. Storrs is a member of the Board of Directors of NCNB Corporation. He retired as Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of NCNB Corporation and its subsidiary banks in August 1983.
Born in 1918 in Nashville, Tennessee, he began his banking career in 1934 at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond, Virginia. He graduated from the University of Virginia in 1940, and later received M.A. and 
Ph.D. degrees in economics from Harvard University.
In 1960, he joined NCNB National Bank as Executive Vice President. He was named President in 1969 and 
Chief Executive Officer in January 1973. He was named Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of NCNB 
Corporation in January 1974.
Mr. Storrs served as President of the Association of Reserve City Bankers in 1980-81. He was President of 
the Federal Advisory Council of the Federal Reserve System in 1975 and 1976. He is a Director of Black 
and Decker Manufacturing Company and Royal Insurance Group. Mr. Storrs also serves as Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and as a Trustee of Davidson College.
He served on active duty as a Naval Officer from 1941 through 1945 and from 1951 through 1952, retiring 
as a Commander USNR.
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DONALD H. TRAUTLEIN
Donald H. Trautlein retired in 1986 as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Bethlehem Steel Corpo­
ration, a position he assumed in 1980.
Prior to joining Bethlehem in 1977, he was with the international accounting firm of Price Waterhouse in 
New York, where he was named a Partner in 1964. While with Price Waterhouse, his responsibilities 
included supervision of the annual independent audit of several major companies, including Bethlehem. 
After joining Bethlehem, he served successfully as Comptroller, Senior Vice President, Accounting and 
Director, and Executive Vice President.
Mr. Trautlein is a member of the Board of Directors of The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. and the Chase 
Manhattan Corporation. He served as Chairman of the American Iron and Steel Institute from 1984 through 
1986 and was a member of the Board of Directors and the Executive Committees of both the American Iron 
and Steel Institute and the International Iron and Steel Institute from 1980 through 1986. He is a member 
of the Business Council and a former member of the Policy Committee of The Business Roundtable and the 
Labor-Industry Coalition for International Trade.
A native of Sandusky, Ohio, Mr. Trautlein served in the U.S. Navy from 1945 through 1946. He graduated 
in 1950 from Miami University cum laude, with a B.S. degree and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, Beta 
Gamma Sigma, and Beta Alpha Psi. He is a Dean’s Associate of Miami University. In 1981 he received 
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Appendix D
SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL RESEARCH 
PROGRAM
This appendix presents descriptions of the Commission’s external research studies and brief summaries of 
the results. The Commission used these studies in developing its conclusions and recommendations. The 
views, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in the various research studies, however, are those of 
the researchers. The projects are as follows:
Research Study Page
Computer Fraud 100
Fraudulent and Questionable Financial Reporting: A Corporate Perspective 101
Control and Internal Auditing 103
The Role of the Internal Auditor in the Deterrence, Detection, and 
Reporting of Fraudulent Financial Reporting 104
Impact of Professionalism and Codes of Corporate Conduct on 
Financial Reporting 105
Expansion of Nonaudit Services and Auditor Independence 106
Surprise Writeoffs—Financial Reporting, Disclosure and Analysis 107
The Independent Public Accountant’s Responsibility for the Detection of 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 109
Reducing the Incidence of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: The Role of the SEC 110
Fraudulent Financial Reporting: The Potential for Educational Impact 112
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RESEARCH STUDY: Computer Fraud
PRIMARY RESEARCHER: Stephen M. Paroby, Partner 
Ernst & Whinney
STUDY SPONSOR: Ernst & Whinney
ABSTRACT
This study documents the growing exposure to fraud that computer systems are creating and explores the 
implications of these systems for the prevention and detection of fraudulent financial reporting. It points out 
that it is difficult to segregate frauds aimed at manipulation of financial statement information from those 
with other primary objectives, such as the misappropriation of assets, since, in many cases, the latter also 
will materially misstate the financial statements. Nevertheless, the study recognizes an increasing potential 
to use the computer to automate perpetration of fraudulent financial reporting.
The study concludes that computer fraud is likely to continue to increase in frequency and sophistication in 
the future unless (1) corporate managements, with oversight from boards of directors and audit committees, 
establish and maintain adequate systems of internal control over their computerized data processing envi­
ronment and (2) internal auditors and independent public accountants regularly review, monitor, and report 
on these systems. Other observations and conclusions include the following:
• Since audit trails in many sophisticated environments exist for only a short period of time, if at all, the 
audit process (both internal and external) must move closer to the accounting transaction at its entry point 
into the system.
• Internal auditors need to be involved in the systems development process to ensure that controls are 
considered and to integrate fraud prevention and detection measures into the system itself.
•  Since sophisticated systems create a need for increased reliance on internal controls, internal auditors or 
independent public accountants need periodically to perform comprehensive reviews of internal controls 
that extend beyond those normally performed during the course of an audit, including reviews of controls 
over computerized systems.
•  Professional auditing standards should clarify the minimum procedures independent public accountants 
should perform to evaluate the computerized portions of the accounting system in connection with the 
examination of an organization’s financial statements.
• Independent public accountants can no longer take a functional approach to audits (e.g., accounts 
receivable, inventory, accounts payable) because of the interdependence of data among various func­
tional areas created by computer systems. They should understand the overall business environment and 
how the various accounting systems relate to one another.
• In the not-so-distant future, organizations possibly will report their financial results by establishing a data 
base of information that can be accessed by interested parties.
•  Management, internal auditors, and independent public accountants all face an urgent need to become 
more computer literate, to be better able to make and evaluate decisions about the desired level of 
security, and to take measures to prevent, detect, and limit the potential for computer fraud.
•  Companies need to adopt formal codes of conduct that include policies related to computer resources.
• Internal auditors and independent public accountants need to make greater use of computer technology 
in performing audits.
•  Colleges and universities, as well as professional organizations such as the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, the Institute of Internal Auditors, the National Association of Accountants, 
the Financial Executives Institute, and the EDP Auditors Association, need to do all they can to increase 
the computer literacy of professionals. For example, a heavier emphasis needs to be given to EDP issues 
on professional certification examinations.
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RESEARCH STUDY: Fraudulent and Questionable Financial Reporting:
A Corporate Perspective
PRIMARY RESEARCHER: Dr. Kenneth A. Merchant, Associate Professor 
Harvard University
STUDY SPONSOR: Financial Executives Research Foundation
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of (1) fraudulent and questionable financial reporting 
practices that may occur in public corporations, (2) organizational and individual factors that may contribute 
to the occurrence of these practices, and (3) alternative solutions to help prevent or detect such practices. 
The findings of the study are based on a review of relevant literature; an analysis of recent cases of fraudulent 
financial reporting; interviews with over 100 general managers, controllers, and internal auditors; and 
discussions of two fictional, but realistic, cases by panels comprised of preparers of financial statements, 
audit committee members, internal auditors, independent public accountants, and financial statement users.
The study identifies a broad range of deceptive financial reporting practices. While some of these practices 
clearly are fraudulent, many, although deceptive, are considered acceptable by some proportion of interested 
parties. This acceptability-judgment problem creates difficulty in dealing with deceptive financial reporting. 
Nevertheless, the study cautions that allowing even slightly deceptive reporting practices creates an envi­
ronment that is conducive to more serious deceptions. The study concludes that in the vast majority of 
fraudulent financial reporting cases, the people involved were good people who got involved in small, 
nonmaterial manipulations, perhaps even with good intentions. Then, over time, the magnitude of the 
manipulations grew, and eventually laws were broken.
Some of the organizational factors that may contribute to the incidence of deceptive financial reporting 
practices include:
• Lack of leadership and moral guidance
• Complexity in rules, regulations, and policies
• Unrealistic budget targets, particularly when these emphasize short-term results
• High incentives for financial performance
• Inadequate internal controls, especially in the presence of organizational change
• High divisional autonomy
• Inadequate internal audit function
•  Ineffective board of directors and audit committee.
These organizational factors interact with individual factors in producing deceptive financial reporting 
practices. People within the organization are sensitive to its ethical culture, its incentives and punishments, 
and its social affirmation. Over time, an individual’s judgment of right and wrong can be greatly affected 
by the atmosphere in the work place. For example, individuals are frequently motivated to participate in 
deceptive financial reporting practices because they believe or rationalize that they are acting in the 
organization’s best interests or they have developed a corporate “ team spirit’’ of deception.
Sometimes individuals may get drawn into deceptive financial reporting practices through ignorance. 
Accounting and reporting rules and SEC requirements are technical, extensive, and subject to continuing 
change. Individuals in the marketing or sales areas of the organization, for example, simply may not know 
when they have been asked to violate generally accepted accounting principles in recording undelivered 
goods as a sale.
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Consideration of organizational and individual factors together points to the importance of establishing an 
ethical conscience, an effective audit committee, strong internal controls, clear financial reporting respon­
sibilities and practices, an effective internal audit function, meaningful organizational sanctions, and ap­
propriate budget targets and compensation schemes. Furthermore, open lines of communication between the 
audit committee and both the controller and the internal auditor are critical.
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RESEARCH STUDY: Control and Internal Auditing
PRIMARY RESEARCHERS: Dr. Michael J. Barrett, Professor 
University of Illinois at Chicago
Roger N. Carolus, Senior Vice President— 
Deputy General Auditor, NCNB Corporation
STUDY SPONSOR: Institute of Internal Auditors
ABSTRACT
This study builds on prior pronouncements of the Institute of Internal Auditors (ILA) in describing the 
concept of control and how the internal audit function can help a public company to achieve a positive control 
result through assessments of the control culture. The study describes the control culture as flowing from 
the following four interrelated components:
•  The attitudes and behavior of the board of directors and executive management set the tone of the 
organization and signal to all parties the way that business affairs will be conducted.
• The business plan, formulated by the board of directors and executive management, states what the 
company desires to be, identifies and ranks the business exposures expected to be encountered, and 
specifies the network of business fundamentals needed to address the business exposures identified.
• The network of business fundamentals establishes the elements and linkages needed to inform individuals 
about how to perform their work. This network includes policy statements, operating procedures, 
performance standards, budgets, and performance monitoring systems.
•  Controlling activates the network of business fundamentals through board, management, employee, 
customer, supplier, and regulator activities such as supervising, comparing, reconciling, monitoring, 
confirming, and reporting.
This characterization of control led to the following selected observations or conclusions:
• A relevant concept of control incorporates the activities and actions of the board of directors and 
executive management.
•  The single most important control component is the attitude and behavior of the chief executive officer, 
followed closely by that of the audit committee.
• Although achieving a positive control result begins with the chief executive officer and the board of 
directors, responsibility for its accomplishment rests with every employee as well as with entities closely 
related to the company such as suppliers, customers, and regulators.
•  Meaningful evaluation of control should extend to every level affected in the organization and to closely 
related external entities. A positive control result can be achieved at one or more levels in a company 
(e.g., headquarters, divisions, subsidiaries, departments) while a negative result is achieved at other 
levels.
• To expand assessment and reporting responsibilities in regard to the adequacy of the design and 
effectiveness of control, internal auditors need:
—  The support and encouragement of the board of directors and executive management to adopt and 
adhere to professional (HA) internal auditing standards and practices
— Organizational status and objectivity
— Enhanced internal auditing career incentives
—  The support of the public accounting profession.
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RESEARCH STUDY: The Role of the Internal Auditor in the Deterrence, 
Detection, and Reporting of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting
PRIMARY RESEARCHERS: William G. Bishop, III, Senior Vice President— 
Corporate Audit, Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.
Richard Allan White, Manager of Standards 
Institute of Internal Auditors
STUDY SPONSOR: Institute of Internal Auditors
ABSTRACT
This research study provides a comprehensive analysis of how the internal auditor can play an effective role 
in the deterrence, detection, and reporting of fraudulent financial reporting. The analysis draws on profes­
sional internal auditing standards, a number of other related research studies, current proposals of public 
accounting firms, proposed federal legislation, an informal survey of 20 leaders in the internal auditing 
profession, and interviews with members of the SEC Enforcement Division and the Auditing Standards 
Board. The following selected observations and conclusions result from the study:
• The audit committee has the potential for playing the most critical role in assuring that mechanisms are 
in place to deter, detect, and report fraudulent financial reporting.
• Internal audit coverage focuses primarily on the evaluation of controls at the division, subsidiary, or other 
operating unit level and allocates much less effort to auditing the financial reporting process and its 
controls at the corporate or seniormost level of consolidation.
• There is a trend toward increased reliance by independent public accountants on the work of the internal 
auditor, particularly in the areas of control evaluation and computer systems.
• There is a need for improved auditing coordination between internal auditors and independent public 
accountants.
• Internal auditors administratively report most frequently to the chief financial officer who also may have 
responsibility for financial statement preparation.
•  In most cases, internal auditors have a well-defined, formal reporting responsibility to the audit com­
mittee or the board of directors.
•  Internal auditing is viewed by many as a transient profession rather than a long-term career.
• Organizational status and independence are essential in insulating internal auditors from compromising 
organizational influence and pressure.
•  When the code of corporate conduct receives top management’s support, it is instrumental in establishing 
a positive ethical environment and is an important control.
Internal auditors are anxious to play an effective role in the deterrence, detection, and reporting of fraudulent 
financial reporting. To do this, they need the support of the audit committee and top management. They 
believe that their work should be carefully coordinated with the work of the independent public accountant 
and that they should be more involved with the financial reporting process and its controls at the corporate 
level of consolidation. Furthermore, there must be appropriate incentives to attract and retain competent 
career internal auditors, and organizational status and independence must insulate them from compromising 
organizational pressures.
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RESEARCH STUDY: Impact of Professionalism and Codes of Corporate 
Conduct on Financial Reporting
PRIMARY RESEARCHER: Stephen Landekich, Research Executive 
National Association of Accountants
STUDY SPONSOR: National Association of Accountants 
ABSTRACT
This study describes and analyzes two predominant ethical forces that come to bear on the financial reporting 
process—the corporate ethical climate and professional codes of ethics. With respect to the corporate ethical 
climate, in-house documentation of ethically related policies and procedures was requested from 103 chief 
executives of 48 industrial and 55 nonindustrial companies selected randomly from Fortune 500 listings. 
Fifty-one usable responses were received (19 industrial and 32 nonindustrial) from companies headquartered 
in 20 states and the District of Columbia. The 32 nonindustrial participants included banks (9), utilities (6), 
retail merchandising (6), transportation (5), insurance (3), and other services (3).
Responses to the request for documentation of ethically related policies and procedures indicated widespread 
awareness of the effective role that ethical guidance can play in corporate administration. Although the views 
and policies of the participants differed considerably, the ethical climate did not seem to be correlated with 
respective management styles. Rather, the basic aim of ethical guidance generally was to achieve a corporate 
ethical climate consistent with the professed corporate self-image. Areas specifically covered usually were 
those requiring extra diligence, those offering opportunities for undesirable behavior, those involving ethical 
dilemmas, or areas where any below-standard actions or attitudes might be especially harmful.
The study also examines professional codes of ethics of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants (AICPA), the Financial Executives Institute, the Institute of Internal Auditors, and the National 
Association of Accountants. Both standards of competence and integrity are incorporated into these codes 
as expressions of professionalism. However, due in part to the absence of strong enforcement clauses in these 
codes, organizational and situational forces tend to be dominant when on-the-job ethical dilemmas arise. 
This finding points once again to the critical role that a positive corporate ethical climate plays in enhancing 
the reliability of the financial reporting process.
The study also cautions that while improved accounting and auditing standards may help independent public 
accountants prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting, these are not substitutes for a willingness to 
place professional ethics above the pressures of the accounting marketplace. The AICPA’s code of ethics 
presently endorses several levels of independence to accommodate a variety of services performed by its 
members. The study suggests that the AICPA consider linking the ethical concept of independence more 
directly to the auditor’s public trust. This linkage may result in a different interpretation of what constitutes 
undesirable conflicts of interest in the independent public accountant’s unique role.
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RESEARCH STUDY: Expansion of Nonaudit Services and Auditor 
Independence
PRIMARY RESEARCHER: Dr. James B. Edwards, Professor 
University of South Carolina
STUDY SPONSOR: National Association of Accountants
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the concerns about the actual and potential impact of management advisory services on 
the quality of audits in general and on the effectiveness of the audit process in deterring and detecting 
fraudulent financial reporting in particular. The concept of independence is the pivotal link between 
management advisory services and the auditor’s ability to deter and detect fraudulent financial reporting. 
Independence has long been the cornerstone of the audit process, and any erosion of it may create potential 
dangers to audit quality and reduce the likelihood that the auditor will detect fraudulent financial reporting.
One objective of the study was to analyze and condense available information with relevance to this issue. 
Since much has been written on this topic, substantial effort was devoted to a review of publicly available 
information such as the 1979 Report of the Public Oversight Board and supporting files, the 1978 Report 
of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (Cohen Commission), transcripts and video tapes of 
Congressional hearings, SEC documents, published articles, and the book recently written by Dr. Gary John 
Previts entitled The Scope of CPA Services (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1985).
A second objective was to update the 1979 Report of the Public Oversight Board (POB) as called for by 
Arthur M. Wood, then Chairman of the POB. This portion of the study had two separate phases. One phase 
involved a review of firm literature that lists and describes the management advisory services offered by a 
sample of large public accounting firms. A second phase consisted of obtaining questionnaire responses and 
interviews from a sample comprised of management, financial executives, financial analysts, management 
consultants, regulators, and independent public accountants.
The study concludes that the nature and the scope of the services that many public accounting firms provide 
have expanded at an unprecedented rate over the past 10 years. However, as with the findings of the Cohen 
Commission in 1978 and the POB in 1979, this study found no established evidence that independence had 
been impaired or fraudulent financial reporting abetted where an audit firm also performed management 
advisory services. Nevertheless, the study cautions that the historical precepts of independence are giving 
way to modem vanguards of professionalism, namely concurrent “ savvy” and “ commitment” to quality 
service and the public interest.
The study classifies management advisory services into three groups: (1) services that have a direct impact 
on the financial statements, (2) services that have only an indirect impact on the financial statements, and 
(3) services that are not related to the financial statements. The study argues that services in the first group 
(e.g., actuarial determinations or appraisals upon which the allocation of acquisition cost is based) create 
an inherent conflict with independence because they result in the public accounting firm auditing its own 
work.
The second group of services (e.g., information systems design) generally does not impair independence and 
may actually contribute to the prevention and detection of fraudulent financial reporting. Moreover, these 
services and the audit may need to be coordinated to take full advantage of the separate efforts. Services in 
the third group are not related to fraudulent financial reporting except to the extent that they may place the 
audit in a subordinate role (e.g., as a loss-leader) or involve independent public accountants making 
decisions for their clients.
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RESEARCH STUDY: Surprise Writeoffs—Financial Reporting, Disclosure and
Analysis
PRIMARY RESEARCHERS: Dr. Dov Fried, Associate Professor 
Dr. Michael Schiff, Professor 
Dr. Ashwinpaul Sondhi, Assistant Professor
New York University
STUDY SPONSOR: National Association of Accountants 
ABSTRACT
The objective of this study was to provide accounting regulatory bodies and other interested parties with a 
descriptive and limited analytical report on the nature and characteristics of writeoffs that have occurred in 
business during the years 1980-1985. The data used in the study were developed from press reports of 
announcements by publicly traded companies, as compiled by the Dow Jones News Service. All announce­
ments relating to writeoffs, writedowns, restructurings, and plant closings over the period from January 1, 
1980 to March 31, 1986 were analyzed. After omitting irrelevant data, the study examines the final data­
base, consisting of 1,088 companies that reported a total of 1,354 writeoffs, and categorizes it into four 
different classifications:
• Asset impairments including writedowns and writeoffs
• Plant closings and restructurings
• Writedowns and writeoffs of investments
• Writedowns and writeoffs of goodwill.
The study reviews the current status of reporting and accounting standards for writeoffs and writedowns and 
then analyzes the data by classifying it along several dimensions: frequency, type, industry, timing, and 
dollar value. Finally, some preliminary analysis was performed to assess the financial impact of the writeoffs 
on a sample of the companies in the database. Some of the primary observations and conclusions include 
the following:
• The accounting standards address “ permanent” writedowns or writeoffs to a much greater extent than 
“ partial” writedowns.
• The frequency of reported writeoffs increased rapidly over the 6-year period (1980-85). Also, 10 
companies reported writeoffs in 4 of the 6 years while 41 companies reported writeoffs 3 times during 
the same 6-year period, indicating that writeoffs may not necessarily be nonrecurring in nature.
• The oil and gas industry reported the largest number of writeoffs, accounting for more than 16 percent 
of the total for the 6-year period.
• Forty-seven percent of the writeoffs related to asset impairments.
• Over the 6-year period, 52 percent of the writeoffs were reported in the fourth quarter and this pattern 
of reporting occurs in each of the years under study and across all industries.
• Some of the significant findings related to the dollar amount of the writeoffs were:
— The dollar amount of writeoffs increased significantly over the 6-year period.
— Asset impairments accounted for 51.3 percent of the dollar value over the 6 years, while plant 
closings accounted for 36 percent.
— In dollar value, 64 percent of the writeoffs were reported in the fourth quarter.
•  Writeoffs tend to be large relative to income reported and frequently occur in years when annual income 
is negative.
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In a sample of 109 companies from the original population, the study examines the behavior of financial 
ratios over time. Both turnover and profitability ratios indicated a deteriorating situation in the years prior 
to the writeoff, a stabilizing subsequent to the writeoff, and then a gradual improvement. Stock market 
reaction to the writeoffs was consistent; following the writeoffs, stock performance rebounded in antici­
pation, perhaps, of the reversal in the reported financial results of the companies during the next 2 to 3 years.
The study concludes that, in a climate of vague accounting standards, reported writeoffs have increased 
dramatically in frequency and in dollar value, the reporting of the writeoffs is concentrated heavily in the 
fourth quarter, and the writeoffs have significant impact on financial performance.
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RESEARCH STUDY: The Independent Public Accountant’s Responsibility for 
the Detection of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
PRIMARY RESEARCHER: Dr. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Assistant Professor 
University of California-Berkeley
STUDY SPONSORS: American Accounting Association and the 
University of California-Berkeley,
Professional Accounting Program
ABSTRACT
This study summarizes how the independent public accountant’s responsibility for the detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting has developed since the early 1900s and analyzes a sample of 472 cases of litigation 
against independent public accountants from 1960 through 1985 to determine the role of management fraud 
and business failures in litigation against external auditors.
Interpreting the historical literature is not easy because a clear distinction between types of irregularities or 
fraud has not been maintained. It is clear, however, that professional standards have always lacked a clear 
statement affirming auditors’ responsibility for detecting and reporting material irregularities when con­
ducting an audit. On the other hand, evidence exists that detection of intentional material misstatements by 
management has been a legitimate objective of audits at least since the late 1930s.
The analysis of litigation against independent public accountants confirms the historical summary. Current 
professional standards with their emphasis on the inherent limitations of the audit process have not prevented 
litigation against the independent public accountant or significant payments in settlement where fraudulent 
financial reporting is involved. Nearly one-half of the 472 cases involve fraudulent financial reporting by 
management. Furthermore, cases involving fraudulent financial reporting generally lead to larger damage 
settlements by the independent public accountant than do other types of cases.
The study also challenges the common notion that business failure automatically leads to allegations of audit 
failure. Although increases in litigation against independent public accountants do appear to be correlated 
with economic downturns, only about 20 percent of the sample of bankruptcies studied (458) led to litigation 
against auditors. Moreover, over one-half of the bankruptcies involving litigation against independent public 
accountants also involved fraudulent financial reporting. Accordingly, the study concludes that proposals to 
focus increased auditor attention on a company’s financial and business difficulties are useful primarily 
because they direct the auditor’s attention to conditions that may increase the likelihood of fraudulent 
financial statements.
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RESEARCH STUDY: Reducing the Incidence of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting: The Role of the SEC
PRIMARY RESEARCHERS: Dr. William W. Holder, Professor 
Dr. Theodore J. Mock, Professor 
Dr. Karen V. Pincus, Assistant Professor
SEC and Financial Reporting Institute, 
University of Southern California—School of 
Accounting
STUDY SPONSOR: National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
ABSTRACT
This study addresses the adequacy of existing and proposed SEC methods and rules for combatting fraud­
ulent financial reporting. The study provides a perspective on the historical role of the SEC in reducing the 
incidence of fraudulent financial reporting based on a comprehensive review of the literature, including 
books, periodicals, and Congressional and SEC documents. The review identified approximately 20 existing 
SEC activities and 25 proposed activities that have potential for being effective in the prevention or detection 
of fraudulent financial reporting. The results of the review provided the foundation for the mail survey and 
personal interviews conducted in connection with this project.
The researchers surveyed approximately 1,150 persons and received 515 replies (45 percent response rate). 
The survey dealt with questions regarding participants’ views on the magnitude of the problem of fraudulent 
financial reporting, the effectiveness of current SEC policies and activities, and the potential effectiveness 
of possible changes to the current system. The survey population included attendees at the 1986 University 
of Southern California SEC and Financial Reporting Institute Conference, a sample of members of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries which represents corporate officers and directors (65 percent 
NYSE companies, 19 percent AMEX companies, and 16 percent OTC companies), a sample of members 
of the Financial Executives Institute, and a sample of members of the Institute of Internal Auditors.
The researchers also conducted in-depth interviews with, 20 individuals who have a high degree of knowl­
edge about some aspects of the securities laws and the functioning of the SEC. These interviews addressed 
the same issues as the mail survey. The interviewees included two executives of publicly held companies, 
five independent public accountants, seven high-level employees of the SEC, four attorneys, a financial 
analyst, and a representative of users of financial information.
Approximately 50 percent of the 515 questionnaire respondents believed that fraudulent financial reporting 
is a problem of moderate to serious proportions. While the primary focus of the study was on the role and 
effectiveness of the SEC in addressing this problem, a number of closely related findings and conclusions 
also emerged. A few selected findings and conclusions where both survey respondents and interviewees 
generally agree follow.
• The SEC’s fraudulent financial reporting prevention and detection activities are somewhat effective.
•  Creation of “ red flag’’ profiles would be useful in identifying cases for SEC investigation.
• Stiffer sanctions for registrant companies and members of their management found to be involved in 
cases of fraudulent financial reporting would be an effective deterrent. Effective sanctions would include 
barring the individual from high office in a publicly held company, stiffer penalties, and longer prison 
terms.
•  There is a need for better clarification/definition of the independent public accountant’s fraud detection 
responsibilities.
• There should be a mandatory requirement that all publicly held companies have an audit committee. The 
audit committee was thought to be potentially effective for both fraud prevention and detection. The
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committee should be composed of members who are capable, independent, and protected from exposure 
to liability when acting in good faith.
One area where general agreement was not shared by survey respondents and interviewees concerned 
internal accounting controls. The survey respondents did not view mandatory disclosure of internal ac­
counting control weaknesses or mandatory auditor examination of internal accounting control as promising 
changes. Most interviewees believed that changes were probably desirable in current standards and practices 
concerning the evaluation of and reporting on internal control.
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RESEARCH STUDY: Fraudulent Financial Reporting: The Potential for 
Educational Impact
PRIMARY RESEARCHER: Dr. Jean C. Wyer, Associate Professor 
College of William and Mary
STUDY SPONSOR: American Accounting Association
ABSTRACT
This study addresses the question of how education can have an impact on the way in which corporate 
management and independent public accountants confront instances of fraudulent financial reporting. The 
study draws on the accounting and auditing educational literature as well as some selected works from higher 
education. A limited survey also was conducted of the way in which ethical, situational, and technical 
aspects of fraudulent financial reporting are covered in accounting and auditing textbooks. While the study’s 
observations and conclusions largely generalize to the entire business curriculum, the discussion focuses 
primarily on accounting and auditing education.
The study concentrated on two areas: (1) the way in which accounting knowledge is imparted to students 
and (2) the way in which accounting students receive instruction on ethical values. The following selected 
observations and conclusions resulted from the study:
• Being able to record a transaction correctly often has two components. The first is an understanding of 
the mechanics of the accounting model, the attendant disclosure requirements, and the operations of the 
specific accounting systems generating the financial statements. The second, which is much harder to 
teach, is the ability to work above a simple programmed level in the application of concepts to anomalous 
data.
• Many accounting textbooks rely very heavily on a procedural approach concentrating on individual 
problems—an approach that may not be sufficient for facing the challenges of the real world. Accord­
ingly, there should be more emphasis on cognitive and conceptual issues in accounting education.
•  Auditors require technical skills in addition to those required for proper accounting. Auditors must be 
conversant with the principles of logic, they must be adept at gathering information, and they must be 
shrewd evaluators of risk. Acquiring these skills requires a broad educational experience.
• The results of a survey of accounting and auditing textbooks indicate that coverage of fraudulent financial 
reporting is minimal to nonexistent.
•  The treatment of ethics is usually limited to a procedure-based examination of the AICPA’s Rules of 
Conduct during the auditing course.
• Coverage of fraudulent financial reporting and ethics should be included throughout the accounting 
curriculum. Confining such coverage to a single course (e.g., auditing) implies that these areas are not 
important to other subject matter such as financial and managerial accounting.
• Faculty must be exposed to fraudulent financial reporting and ethical reasoning in Ph.D. and post­
doctoral training. Faculty cannot be expected to teach what they have not learned.
• A robust case literature is critical to bringing the complexity, challenge, and realism of fraudulent 
financial reporting and ethical issues into the classroom.
• Improvements in the accounting curriculum depend heavily on the cooperation and support of the public 
accounting firms and business corporations that hire graduates as well as the professional organizations 
that administer the uniform certified public accountant and other professional certification examinations.
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Appendix E
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH REPORTS 
AND BRIEFING PAPERS 
PREPARED BY COMMISSION STAFF
In addition to the 10 external research studies summarized in Appendix D, the Commission’s staff conducted 
additional research studies, literature reviews, and comparative analyses which resulted in reports and 
briefing papers for the Commission. This Appendix describes the scope of these activities and summarizes 
selected findings and positions.
PROJECT Page
The Public Company
Fraud Risk Assessment 115
Management and Audit Committee Reports 115
Need for Uniform Authoritative Internal Control Standards 115
Opinion Shopping 116
Review of Recent SEC Cases Involving Fraudulent Financial Reporting 116
Review of Recent Cases Involving Fraudulent Financial Reporting by
Non-SEC Reporting Organizations 117
Role of the Audit Committee—Prevention and Detection of Fraudulent
Financial Reporting 117
Whistleblowing 118
Independent Public Accountants
Analytical Review 118
Changes in the Independent Public Accountant’s Responsibilities Concerning
Audit Committee Communications 119
Changes in the Independent Public Accountant’s Responsibility to Detect and 
Report Errors and Irregularities 119
Comparison of the Internal Auditor’s and the Auditing Standards Board’s
Definition and Concept of Control 119
Independent Public Accountant’s Standard Report 120
Individual and Situational Forces and Pressures Within Public Accounting Firms 120
Nonaudit Services and the Independent Public Accountant’s Independence 121
Public Accounting Profession’s Self-Regulatory Programs 121
113
Reports on Internal Control by Independent Public Accountants 121
Second Partner Review 121
Structure of the Auditing Standards Board 122
Regulatory and Legal Environment
Criminal Law Enforcement Survey 122
Legislative Initiatives Relating to Fraudulent Financial Reporting 122
Overview of Disclosure Requirements and Enforcement Under Federal and
State Securities Laws 122
Public-Private Debate on Rule 2(e) Proceedings 123
General
Analysis of the Proposed Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act of 1986 123
Analysis of Related Studies on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 123
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The Public Company
Fraud Risk Assessment
This research study summarizes risk factors that may contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. In addition 
to risk factors identified by the Commission’s other research activities, this summary draws on the following 
sources:
•  A survey of the risk assessment and client acceptance and retention policies of 10 of the 14 largest public 
accounting firms in the United States
• The AICPA’s “ Warning Signals of the Possible Existence of Fraud,” published in the March 12, 1979, 
CPA Letter
•  The following books on business fraud:
—  Corporate Fraud, 2nd ed., by Michael J. Commer [McGraw-Hill (United Kingdom), 1985]
—  How to Detect and Prevent Business Fraud, by W. Steve Albrecht, Marshall B. Romney, David 
J. Cherrington, I. Reed Payne, and Allan V. Roe (Prentice-Hall, 1982)
—  Management Fraud: Detection and Deterrence, by Robert K. Elliott and John J. Willingham 
(Petrocelli Books, 1980)
—  Corporate Fraud: The Basis of Prevention and Detection, by Jack Bologna (Butterworth Publish­
ers, 1984).
The results of this study are presented in Appendix H as Good Practice Guidelines for Assessing the Risk 
of Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Management and Audit Committee Reports
This study analyzes the contents of positions taken by the SEC, the Cohen Commission, and the Financial 
Executives Institute regarding management reports to be included in corporate annual reports to stockhold­
ers. The study also reviews the contents of a limited number of actual management and audit committee 
reports included in corporate annual reports during the last 5 years and examines Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 19, Client Representations. Drawing on these sources, illustrative management and audit 
committee reports are developed.
Need for Uniform Authoritative Internal Control Standards
This briefing paper summarizes the current internal control practices and standards in the United States. The 
paper is based primarily on current literature describing the nature of internal control practices, focusing 
particularly on two research studies sponsored by the Financial Executives Institute Foundation: Internal 
Control in U.S. Corporations: The State of the Art (1980) and Criteria for Management Control (1981). 
Both books were authored by a research team from the University of Michigan Graduate School of Business 
Administration under the direction of Dr. Robert K. Mautz.
The paper notes that many different groups, including Congress, corporate management, and accountants, 
are becoming increasingly interested in the concepts of internal control and accountability and how to 
implement these concepts effectively. There is, however, diversity in internal control practices among public 
companies and in the definitions and terminology used to discuss internal control among the various groups 
who have studied it. A sa  result, management, internal auditors, and independent public accountants often 
disagree as to whether a public company’s internal control is adequate. The definition of internal accounting 
control developed by independent public accountants and adopted by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is 
the most widely used. Since this definition was developed primarily to guide independent public accountants
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in conducting an audit, however, it is deliberately the most narrow and may not provide the best guidance 
for other purposes.
Opinion Shopping
This briefing paper discusses the issues surrounding the practice of “ opinion shopping’’, the practice of 
consulting various independent public accountants to find one that will accept an inappropriate or ques­
tionable accounting treatment. The paper summarizes the existing guidance to independent public accoun­
tants concerning this issue, principally Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 50, Reports on the 
Application of Accounting Principles. It also summarizes current disclosure requirements concerning 
changes in independent public accountants and the SEC’s July 1, 1985, concept release requesting comments 
on opinion shopping (Release No. 33-6594; File No. S7-33-85), which proposes several modifications to 
these requirements.
The paper notes that differences of opinion do arise in financial reporting, especially when complex or novel 
transactions are involved. Consultation with another independent public accountant often is a legitimate 
method of resolving these differences. Opinion shopping occurs when management introduces commercial 
pressure into the process of resolving the financial reporting issue to obtain an opinion based on its desires 
rather than sound reporting principles. The briefing paper concludes that neither SAS No. 50 nor current SEC 
regulations adequately addresses the problems associated with opinion shopping and the paper presents some 
additional procedures for consideration.
Review of Recent SEC Cases Involving Fraudulent Financial Reporting
This research study analyzes all accounting and financial disclosure cases brought by the SEC against public 
companies, individuals associated with these companies, and independent public accountants between July 
1, 1981, and August 6, 1986. The analysis was conducted by reviewing public documents for each case. 
After omitting duplications and cases with insufficient information for analysis, 119 cases against public 
companies and 42 cases against independent public accountants were analyzed.
The following are the major findings:
• Forty-four percent of the cases against public companies occurred in industries that were experiencing, 
or about to experience, a general economic decline.
• Eighty-seven percent of the cases against public companies involved manipulation of the financial 
disclosures, as opposed to misappropriation of assets for personal gain (13 percent). Frequently used 
techniques were improper revenue recognition methods (47 percent), deliberate overstatements of com­
pany assets (38 percent), and improper deferral of current period expenses (16 percent). In 27 percent 
of the cases against public companies, the SEC alleged that other information disseminated to the public 
was inadequate or otherwise contained false and misleading statements.
• In 45 percent of the cases against public companies, the SEC alleged that the fraud occurred because of 
a breakdown of the company’s internal controls. In many of these instances, the company had adequate 
internal accounting controls; these controls, however, were overridden by management.
• In 17 percent of the cases against public companies, misrepresentations were made to the company’s 
independent public accountants.
• The SEC cited a member of upper-level corporate management (chief executive officer, chief financial 
officer or president) as being involved in 66 percent of the cases against public companies. In 5 percent 
of the cases, nonmanagement personnel were cited by the SEC. The personnel involved could not be 
determined in the remaining 29 percent of the cases.
• In contrast to SEC and professional studies showing that 85-90 percent of public companies have audit 
committees, in only 69 percent of the cases against public companies was an audit committee maintained. 
This percentage excludes 39 cases where the staff could not determine whether or not the company had 
an audit committee. The 69 percent appears generous because it is likely the percentage would drop if
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the 39 unknown cases were determined since these companies were not listed on the NYSE, filed no 
proxy material with the SEC, and many were involved in an initial public offering.
• In 67 percent of the cases against independent public accountants, the auditor failed to obtain sufficient 
competent evidential matter.
•  In 36 percent of the cases against independent public accountants, the auditor failed to recognize or 
pursue with sufficient skepticism certain warning signs or “ red flags "  that existed at the time the audit 
was conducted.
• Although 84 percent of all public companies are audited by national public accounting firms, 74 percent 
of the actions brought against independent public accountants were against smaller, regional, or local 
firms or sole practitioners. Moreover, 64 percent of the actions were brought against firms that were not 
members of the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section.
Review of Recent Cases Involving Fraudulent Financial Reporting by
Non-SEC Reporting Organizations
This briefing paper summarizes the circumstances involved in the following alleged cases of fraudulent 
financial reporting:
• E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc.
• Home State Savings and Loan of Ohio
• American Savings and Loan Association of Florida
• Penn Square Bank
• Continental Illinois Bank
• Beverly Hills Savings and Loan Association
• United American Bank
• Drysdale Government Securities.
While these organizations are not under the SEC’s jurisdiction, they were reviewed because they have been 
cited in Congressional hearings as examples of fraudulent financial reporting and/or audit failure.
The material for the paper was obtained primarily from the transcripts of the 1985 and 1986 hearings of the 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, chaired by 
Congressman John Dingell. Additional material was obtained from business periodicals and the transcripts 
of other Congressional hearings.
Role of the Audit Committee—Prevention and Detection of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
This research study analyzes the role of audit committees in preventing and detecting fraudulent financial 
reporting. The study involved reviewing previous research on audit committees and brochures discussing 
audit committee duties published by public accounting firms.
The study notes that over 85 percent of all public companies maintained audit committees during 1981. The 
wide adoption of audit committees appears to be due to the NYSE’s requirement that its listed companies 
have such committees, the SEC’s strong advocacy of them, recognition of the benefits of such bodies, and 
the liability to which board members may be exposed if the board has no audit committee.
The study also notes that there is general agreement that a key ingredient in having an effective audit 
committee is the independence of its members. Various bodies have, however, different definitions of 
independence and different requirements as to the number of independent members. Some of these alter­
native definitions are contrasted with the NYSE definition of independence.
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The study concludes by describing customary audit committee functions and alternative functions proposed 
by several bodies. It also presents suggested audit committee guidelines tailored to the prevention and 
detection of fraudulent financial reporting. Some of these guidelines are incorporated into Chapter Two in 
the discussion of audit committee functions while others are included in Appendix K.
Whistleblowing
This briefing paper is based on a review of current cases, statutes, and legal research on the subject of 
whistleblowing. The paper discusses both internal whistleblowing (within the structure of the public com­
pany) and external whistleblowing (to government authorities or other third parties).
As to internal whistleblowing, the paper notes that courts universally have found a duty of loyalty to be an 
obligation of employment. Such duty extends to the firm’s operating rules and procedures, its reputation, 
and its commercial opportunities. The duty of loyalty also means that a company has the right to know about 
its problems first before any disclosure to outsiders is made. If this proposition is to operate successfully, 
a company must have a widely known and accessible internal complaint and appeal mechanism for receiving 
complaints, conducting impartial investigations, applying clearly defined standards of judgment, and, if 
necessary, providing a fair hearing.
While the duty of loyalty suggests that a potential whistleblower should exhaust all internal procedures 
provided to ensure the accuracy and appropriateness of his disclosure, there are recognized exceptions where 
external whistleblowing is appropriate. Once an employee decides to go outside the company, he can seek 
protection against reprisal from three sources: common law as interpreted by the courts, federal statutes, and 
state statutes. The actual protection against reprisal afforded by the law, however, is often not predictable 
and many times inadequate.
The paper concludes that, for the most part, those making disclosures of alleged wrongdoing or illegality 
find little or no protection. Whistleblowers almost inevitably pay a heavy price. With few exceptions, they 
are driven out of not only their jobs, but also their professions.
Independent Public Accountants
Analytical Review
This research study analyzes the independent public accountant’s use of analytical review procedures and 
the effectiveness of these procedures in detecting fraudulent financial reporting. The study included re­
viewing (1) authoritative auditing standards, (2) the auditing policies concerning analytical review of several 
of the larger public accounting firms, and (3) several published academic studies on the use of analytical 
review. The researcher also held discussions on how analytical review procedures can be improved with a 
limited group of experienced independent public accountants.
The resulting briefing paper first analyzes the existing authoritative auditing guidance concerning the use of 
analytical review procedures contained in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 23, Analytical Review 
Procedures. The paper observes that SAS No. 23 does not require the use of analytical review procedures 
in an audit and includes little specific procedural guidance on how and when analytical review procedures 
can be used, who on the audit team should perform them, and why specific analytical review procedures may 
prove more fruitful than others in specific circumstances.
The paper observes that there is considerable diversity in the use of analytical review procedures among the 
larger public accounting firms in the United States and that there exists a perception that these procedures 
have a relatively low degree of precision. It also notes that instead of being used as a planning tool, analytical 
review procedures are often mechanically applied by less experienced staff at the completion of the 
engagement.
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The paper concludes by discussing two recent studies that demonstrate the potential effectiveness of 
analytical review procedures. The first, an empirical study of financial statement errors conducted by Robert 
E. Hylas and Robert H. Ashton and entitled “ Audit Detection of Financial Statement Errors” (The 
Accounting Review, October 1982), found that more errors were initially signaled by analytical review 
procedures than by any other single category of event or procedure. The second, a study of several 
well-publicized cases of fraudulent financial reporting conducted by Frank Coglitore and entitled “ Ana­
lytical Review: A Defensive Necessity,” points out how timely application of analytical review procedures 
could have highlighted the materially misleading financial information.
Changes in the Independent Public Accountant’s Responsibilities Concerning Audit Committee 
Communications
This briefing paper summarizes the proposed Statement on Auditing Standards entitled, Communication 
With Audit Committees or Others With Equivalent Authority and Responsibility. The paper notes that current 
auditing standards require that independent public accountants communicate to management and audit 
committees only material weaknesses in internal accounting control and information relating to errors and 
possible irregularities. The proposed standard requires independent public accountants to discuss with audit 
committees many other items involving the audit or management, including the following: significant 
accounting policies, management’s judgment and accounting estimates, implications of audit adjustments, 
the independent public accountant’s responsibility under GAAS, disagreements with management, the 
independent public accountant’s responsibility for other information in the financial statements, difficulties 
encountered in performing the audit, and issues discussed with management prior to retention.
Changes in the Independent Public Accountant’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities
This briefing paper summarizes the proposed Statement on Auditing Standards entitled, The Auditor’s 
Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities. The proposed standard would supersede 
Statement of Auditing Standards No. 16, The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the Detection of 
Errors and Irregularities.
The paper notes that the proposed standard includes (1) an explicit statement that the audit should be 
designed to detect material misstatements, (2) a list of specific factors that could heighten or mitigate the 
independent public accountant’s concern about the risk of material irregularities, (3) a discussion of the 
independent public accountant’s use of professional skepticism in planning and performing the audit, and 
(4) a description of the characteristics of errors and irregularities that influence the independent public 
accountant’s ability to detect such misstatements. The proposed standard also includes a clearer and more 
comprehensive discussion of the independent public accountant’s responsibility to report errors and irreg­
ularities than is included in current auditing literature.
Comparison of the Internal Auditor’s and the Auditing Standards Board’s Definition and Concept 
of Control
This briefing paper contrasts (1) the definitions of internal control, (2) the control objectives analyzed, and 
(3) the required control assessments that are developed in the research study, “ Control and Internal 
Auditing,”  prepared for the Commission (see Appendix D) under the sponsorship of the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) with those developed in the Auditing Standards Board’s (ASB) proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards, The Auditor’s Responsibility for Assessing Control Risk.
The briefing paper notes that the IIA paper’s definition of control and control objectives is broader than that 
of the ASB’s. The former’s definition includes the company’s business plan and the way in which the 
company plans to conduct business and relates to both the corporate entity and the individuals within the 
corporation. The ASB’s definition centers on the financial reporting processes and activities and relates more 
to the corporation as a reporting entity and less to individuals within the company.
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The IIA paper’s control assessment also is broader. While the ASB’s assessment is concerned primarily with 
testing controls that indicate that the company can adequately and effectively prepare reliable financial 
reports, the IIA paper’s assessment is concerned with the company’s controls in both operational and 
financial areas.
Independent Public Accountant’s Standard Report
This briefing paper discusses the history of the independent public accountant’s standard report and recent 
attempts to change it. The paper notes that the current independent public accountant’s standard report has 
remained substantially the same since 1948. This version of the report has been criticized as being hard to 
understand and defensive. Two attempts by the public accounting profession to revise the report failed 
largely because of concerns that a report that better describes the audit process would be seen as an attempt 
to dilute the profession’s responsibilities.
The paper concludes by discussing the costs and benefits of potential changes to the auditor’s standard report 
that the Auditing Standards Board and other parties have suggested. These changes fall into two general 
categories: (1) those that involve a better description of the audit process and its limitations but do not involve 
any change in the scope of the independent public accountant’s work or in the extent of his responsibilities, 
and (2) those that would result in a change in the independent public accountant’s responsibilities and a 
corresponding change to the independent public accountant’s report to communicate such new responsi­
bilities.
Individual and Situational Forces and Pressures Within Public Accounting Firms
This research study explored some of the individual and situational forces and pressures that can affect 
independent public accountants. A review of the literature dealing with this subject was conducted and 
independent public accountants from a national public accounting firm were interviewed.
The study identifies the following external factors that can affect audit quality:
•  The ambiguity of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS), to which management can appeal in attempts to influence the independent public 
accountant’s interpretation of GAAP and GAAS
• The intense level of competition among public accounting firms which may lead to audit budget pressure, 
reduced audit scopes, and increased leveraging of partner and manager time on individual audits
• Client desires to release earnings shortly after year-end, which increases pressure to rely more heavily 
on interim work and decreases time to complete the year-end examination
• The increasing complexity of the business environment and information technology, which require 
greater training, technical expertise, and experience and may present difficulties for smaller firms with 
limited resources
•  Public concern over the independent public accountant’s responsibility to detect fraud and the resulting 
increased exposure to litigation, which can encourage improved audit quality, but also can result in 
decisions based on potential liability rather than on appropriate accounting or auditing principles.
The research study also identifies the following forces, internal to public accounting firms, that potentially 
can affect audit quality:
•  Staff competence, which is influenced by, among other things, a firm’s hiring practices and the quality 
of experience and training received by its staff
•  Individual motivation, which is influenced by compensation levels, other organizational incentives, and 
overtime levels
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•  Time budget pressure, which can encourage independent public accountants to substitute lower quality 
audit evidence or to omit specific auditing procedures.
Nonaudit Services and the Independent Public Accountant’s Independence
This briefing paper summarizes the historical debate concerning nonaudit services provided by a public 
company’s independent public accountant. In doing so, the paper presents the arguments made during the 
late 1970s concerning the desirability of public disclosure of nonaudit services. It discusses SEC Accounting 
Series Release No. 250, which required disclosure of nonaudit services performed by a public company’s 
auditor, and No. 263, which discussed the factors the SEC believed relevant to an audit committee’s 
evaluation of the independent public accountant’s independence. The paper also summarizes the factors that 
led the SEC to rescind both releases.
The paper concludes by summarizing the results of two recent surveys that deal with this issue: (1) “ A 
Survey of Perceptions, Knowledge, and Attitudes Toward CPAs and the Accounting Profession,”  con­
ducted on behalf of the AICPA by Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. (released October 1986) and (2) “ Public 
Perceptions of Management Advisory Services Performed by CPA Firms for Audit Clients,” conducted for 
the Public Oversight Board by Audits and Surveys, Inc. (released November 1986).
Public Accounting Profession’s Self-Regulatory Programs
This briefing paper summarizes the current self-regulatory programs of the public accounting profession. The 
paper, which drew its information from current literature and AICPA manuals, discusses several key 
components of the profession’s system of self-regulation. These include the AICPA Division for CPA Firms, 
consisting of the SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies Practice Section, the Public Oversight 
Board, the peer review process, concurring or second partner reviews, the Special Investigations Committee 
and quality control standards. In conjunction with the discussion of the peer review process, the briefing 
paper summarizes the peer review results during the last 3 years for the 14 largest public accounting firms.
Reports on Internal Control by Independent Public Accountants
This briefing paper summarizes current auditing standards as they relate to the independent public 
accountant’s evaluation of internal control and his reports to management. These standards include State­
ments on Auditing Standards No. 1, Section 320, The Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal Control; 
No. 20, Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control; and No. 30, 
Reporting on Internal Accounting Control. Among other things, these standards require the independent 
public accountant to inform the company’s management and audit committee or board of directors of 
material weaknesses in the company’s system of internal accounting control noted during the audit.
The paper presents five alternatives to the current professional guidance and discusses the costs and benefits 
of each alternative. The paper concludes by summarizing the significant changes in auditing standards 
contemplated in the proposed Statement on Auditing Standards entitled The Auditor’s Responsibility for 
Assessing Control Risk, and The Communication of Control-Structure Related Matters Noted in an Audit. 
These proposals are intended to clarify and broaden the types of controls an independent public accountant 
considers during the course of his audit, extend the minimum level of internal control review, and clarify 
the types of situations regarding the company’s internal controls that should be communicated to manage­
ment and the audit committee. If adopted, these proposals would replace SAS No. 1, Section 320, and SAS 
No. 20.
Second Partner Review
This briefing paper summarizes the emergence of second partner reviews, enumerates the current SECPS 
requirements concerning these reviews, and describes the policies that a group of national public accounting 
firms have for implementing second partner review. The paper notes that the firms’ second partner review 
policies vary from general guidelines to more detailed instructions.
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Structure of the Auditing Standards Board
This briefing paper contrasts the organizational structure of the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), the body 
responsible for establishing generally accepted auditing standards, and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), the body responsible for establishing generally accepted accounting principles. The briefing 
paper also summarizes the Cohen Commission’s recommendations (1978) concerning the auditing standard­
setting process and presents a number of potential changes to the ASB. The paper concludes by discussing 
the anticipated benefits and costs of two possible modifications of the ASB: (1) moving to a smaller, full-time 
body, and (2) including a larger number of representatives on the ASB from outside the public accounting 
profession.
Regulatory and Legal Environment
Criminal Law Enforcement Survey
This research survey asked the 71 members of the White Collar Crime Committee of the American Bar 
Association’s Criminal Justice Section whether the regulatory and law enforcement environment may have 
tolerated unwittingly or contributed to the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. The major conclusions 
drawn from the 20 respondents were:
• Over 75 percent considered fraudulent financial reporting to be as important a problem as insider trading 
and commodities fraud.
• More than 50 percent believed that increased sanctions (jail terms and fines) against convicted offenders 
would be highly effective in deterring or preventing fraudulent financial reporting.
• More than two-thirds agreed to some degree that the current level of law enforcement resources directed 
to fraudulent financial reporting is deficient and should be increased.
• Eighty-nine percent considered the public company’s shareholders to be the category of persons most 
adversely affected by fraudulent financial reporting.
Legislative Initiatives Relating to Fraudulent Financial Reporting
This briefing paper summarizes the potential impact on financial reporting of several bills introduced during 
the 99th Congress. These Congressional initiatives include a provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that 
treats one-half of a corporation’s adjusted net book income in excess of the alternative minimum taxable 
income as a tax preference. This provision drew the attention of the FASB because of concerns (1) that 
linking financial reporting and tax regulations could have an adverse impact on financial accounting 
standard-setting, and (2) that the provision may provide public companies with a new incentive for fraud­
ulent financial reporting—reducing their federal taxes. Other Congressional initiatives (none of which was 
enacted into law) proposed amendments to the bribery and accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977.
Overview of Disclosure Requirements and Enforcement Under Federal and State Securities Laws
This briefing paper summarizes the portions of the federal and state securities laws that are relevant to the 
Commission’s study of fraudulent financial reporting. The major topics included are the purpose and 
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, adminis­
trative and civil injunctive enforcement provisions of the federal securities laws, criminal penalties for 
violations of the federal securities laws, private causes for actions under the federal securities laws, state law 
actions, and primary and secondary liability for securities laws violations.
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Public-Private Debate on Rule 2(e) Proceedings
This briefing paper summarizes the issues concerning proposed amendments to one of the SEC’s rules of 
practice, Rule 2(e). That rule gives the SEC the power to deny an individual the right to practice before it 
temporarily or permanently. Subpart (7) of the rule provides that all hearings “ shall be nonpublic unless the 
SEC on its own motion or the request of another party otherwise directs.’’
The paper notes that on September 29, 1986, the SEC published for comment alternative amendments to 
Rule 2(e)(7) that would provide for (1) public Rule 2(e) proceedings, (2) public proceedings only in certain 
circumstances, or (3) a requirement that the SEC determine on a case-by-case basis whether the hearing shall 
be public or nonpublic. The paper summarizes the arguments for altering Rule 2(e)(7) that the SEC included 
in the September 29, 1986, request for comments, and the arguments against public Rule 2(e) proceedings 
included in the public response to a similar proposal the SEC made in 1974.
General
Analysis of the Proposed Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act of 1986
This briefing paper includes a section-by-section summary of the provisions of the original Financial Fraud 
Detection and Disclosure Act of 1986 (H.R. 4886), introduced on May 22, 1986, and the revised bill (H.R. 
5439), introduced on August 15, 1986. The bill is an outgrowth of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, hearings on the public accounting profession, 
financial reporting by public companies, and the SEC’s oversight and enforcement activities.
Analysis of Related Studies on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
This report summarizes the recommendations related to fraudulent financial reporting that were included in 
the following 13 studies:
• Improving the Accountability of Publicly Owned Corporations and Their Auditors, Senate Subcommittee 
on Reports, Accounting and Management -  Lee Metcalf, Chairman, 1977.
• Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations— 
John E. Moss, Chairman, 1976.
• The Public Accounting Regulatory Act, H.R. 13175, June 16, 1978, Introduced by Congressman John 
Moss.
• The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and Recommendations, AICPA— 
Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, 1978.
• Restructuring Professional Standards to Achieve Professional Excellence in a Changing Environment, 
AICPA—George D. Anderson, Chairman, April 16, 1986.
• The Future Relevance, Reliability, and Credibility of Financial Information, (Recommendations to the 
AICPA Board of Directors) by Arthur Andersen & Co., Arthur Young, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells, Ernst & Whinney, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., and Touche Ross & Co., April 
1986.
• Challenge and Opportunity for the Accounting Profession: Strengthening the Public’s Confidence, Price 
Waterhouse, December 1985.
• A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President, President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management, David Packard, Chairman, June 1986.
• Preparing for Special Examinations of Federal Crown Corporations: A Status Report, Canadian Com­
prehensive Auditing Foundation, September 1985.
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• The Extra Mile—A Commitment to Soundness and Service in Banking, American Bankers Association, 
July 1986.
• Report of the Working Party on Fraud Submitted to the General Purposes and Finance Committee of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, July 1985.
• The Report of the Special Committee to Examine the Role of the Auditor, Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, 1978.
• Substandard CPA Audits of Federal Financial Assistance Funds—The Accounting Profession is Failing 
the Taxpayers, H.R. 99-970, The House Committee on Government Operations, Jack Brooks, Chair­
man, October 7, 1986.
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PERSONS CONSULTED BY THE COMMISSION
Dr. Jerry L. Arnold, School of Accounting, University of Southern California
Donald W. Baker, Vice President—Controller, Southwire Company
Theodore Barreaux, Vice President, Government Relations, American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants (AICPA)
Dr. Michael J. Barrett, Department of Accounting, University of Illinois at Chicago
Richard H. Bertholdt, Vice Chairman—Accounting and Auditing Services, Price Waterhouse
William G. Bishop, III, Senior Vice President, Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., Quality Assurance 
Division, Corporate Audit Department
Zane Blackburn, Director, Bank Accounting Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office (GAO)
Dr. Douglas Carmichael, School of Business and Public Administration, City University of New York— 
Baruch College
Roger N. Carolus, Senior Vice President—Audit, NCNB Corporation
Philip B. Chenok, President and Chief Staff Officer, AICPA
Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, OCC
Dana Cook, Special Adviser to the Comptroller, OCC
J. Michael Cook, Chairman, AICPA (1986-1987) and Chairman, Deloitte Haskins + Sells
David Cooke, Assistant to the Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Rhett B. Dawson, Staff Director, President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard 
Commission)
Emmet E. Delay, Manager, Corporate Treasury and Accounting Services, General Electric Company
Albert J. Derbes, III, President-Elect, National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) and 
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Appendix G
COMPOSITE CASE STUDIES IN 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, 
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
Disctech Inc.
On a grey December day in 1985 Mr. William Winslow, the newly appointed president of Disctech Inc., 
sat at his desk contemplating the future of the company. Disctech had been the rising star of the computer 
disk memory industry. After going public in 1979, sales had grown at a compound rate of 33% and earnings 
had grown at 47%. Earnings per share (EPS) had risen every quarter, and the stock price had increased from 
$3.00 a share in 1979 to $67.50 a share in October 1985. (See Exhibits 1 and 2 for financial data.)
In just the last week the entire fortune of the company changed for the worse as the company was rocked 
by reports of fraudulent sales, inflated inventory values, and possible insider stock trading. The board of 
directors had stepped in and asked the chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and the 
executive vice president for sales and marketing to take leave without pay until their investigation of the 
matter was complete, and they abruptly resigned. The board also selected a new president/CEO, Mr. 
Winslow, and retained an outside law firm to conduct an investigation of possible improprieties.
Bill Winslow viewed his job for the next few months as reorganizing the company to get it through this 
difficult period. This would require identifying and relieving the stresses that had brought on this crisis and 
restoring employee, consumer and investor confidence in the company.
The Hard Disk Industry
Disctech manufactured and sold disk drives. Disks are circular platters covered with magnetic material on 
which data are recorded in concentric circles. Disks access data more slowly than true random access devices 
like semiconductors or magnetic cores but faster than magnetic tape. Since the mid-1960s, disks had 
dominated the rapid access portion of the data storage market.
Although disk technology was well-established, the market was fast-growing and dynamic. Data capacity 
was doubling every three years, and this trend was expected to continue. Market positions changed rapidly, 
and disk drive manufacturers had to keep up with technological advances in order to survive.
The market for disk drives can be divided into two distinct submarkets: one for disks installed as part of large 
computer systems and one for those installed as part of minicomputer systems. The market for large 
computer disk drives was dominated by IBM, although other large mainframe manufacturers such as Sperry 
and Control Data also made disk drives for their own use. Independent disk drive manufacturers served this 
market by supplying IBM plug-compatible systems directly to end users. Independent disk drive manufac­
turers concentrated on replacing IBM drives because the sales volume for non-IBM models was considered 
too small. The mainframe disk drive market was expected to grow at about 5% per year.
The market for minicomputer disk drives, in which Disctech participated, was highly competitive. Some 
leading minicomputer manufacturers made some of their own disk drives, but most minicomputer manu-
Copyright © 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Harvard Business School case 9-187-066.
This case was prepared by Joseph P. Mulloy under the direction of Kenneth A. Merchant as the basis for class discussion rather than 
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The case is based on knowledge of actual company 
situations, but the facts have been disguised, and any resemblance to actual people or events is unintentional. Reprinted by permission 
of the Harvard Business School.
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facturers were part of the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) market serviced by a large number of 
small independent disk drive manufacturers. This market was expected to grow 25-30% per year.
Disctech
Disctech was founded in 1977 by Mr. John Garvey, an executive who had left his job with a large 
manufacturer of minicomputers and computer disk memories. John was an electrical engineer by training, 
but was better known for his interest in and talent for organizing. John had felt constrained by the staid 
corporate environment and wanted to venture out on his own. He felt that with a good product, good 
marketing, and the right pitch to the capital markets a “ killing could be made.”  Three other talented 
executives left the large company to join with John in his new endeavor: Ed Steinbom (controller for the 
large manufacturer) became Disctech’s chief financial officer, Peter Farrell (director of manufacturing) 
became the vice president for Design and Operations, and Mary Foley (manager of Minicomputer Mar­
keting) became the executive vice president for Sales and Marketing. (See Exhibit 3 for an organization 
chart.)
The period 1977-78 was spent organizing the corporation and building prototypes of the advanced 14- and 
8-inch disk drives that the company would market. Early in 1979 the corporation went public with 3.3 
million shares offered at $3.00 a share. At a large party for shareholders and analysts, John announced that 
the corporation already had significant amounts of guaranteed sales for its new drives and that he expected 
Disctech products to become an industry standard. John also stated that the company expected to increase 
revenues and earnings per share (EPS) by a minimum of 30% per year.
Since the inception of the company, the planning cycle had been a very simple, top-down process. During 
the summer of each year, John met with Mary and Ed and set sales growth for the next year. This sales figure 
would then be rolled to the bottom line using expected margins and estimates of fixed expenses to get a net 
income figure and a tentative EPS. Prior to the beginning of the fiscal year in October, these goals for net 
income and EPS would then be passed down through the Finance and Marketing organizations where they 
became “ law.”  The Design and Operations division planned production from the expected revenue and 
gross margin figures, while the R&D budget was negotiated separately between John and Peter.
Strategies to reach the annual plan were conceived and implemented at regularly scheduled “ revenue 
meetings.’’ Attendees included John, Ed, Mary, and the senior people of the marketing and sales staff. These 
meetings primarily sought the means of identifying and generating potential revenues.
Revenues for Disctech were derived from the sale and service of the company’s equipment. Revenues were 
recorded at the time of shipment of products or performance of services. Customer orders were initiated by 
Disctech’s receipt of an Equipment Order Form (EOF); this was either completed by the customer, or 
prepared by Disctech personnel pursuant to a Master Sales Agreement signed by the customer. The EOF 
included a description of the equipment, the price of the equipment, and the earliest equipment delivery date 
that was acceptable to the customer.
Board o f Directors and Audit Committee. Since the company’s inception, Disctech’s board of directors had 
consisted of seven members: two inside directors (the CEO and the CFO) and five outside directors. The 
board usually met four times a year to review the corporation’s progress and plans for the future. The 
meetings were generally short and standardized, with John in control of the agenda. The outside directors 
were all impressed with the company’s performance and the dedication displayed by the top officers.
The Audit Committee of the board consisted of three outside directors. The members of the Audit Committee 
served three-year terms on a rotating basis, although the chairman of the committee usually served for a 
longer period. The Audit Committee generally met twice a year, before and after the annual audit.
A number of changes came about in 1982 after Richard (Rich) O’Donnell, an outside director, was named 
as chairman of the Audit Committee. Rich firmly believed that an audit committee “ could not be effective 
without being active.”  He increased the committee’s schedule to at least four meetings a year and set up 
private meetings between the committee and the outside auditors. Rich tried to get the committee to look
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at the company’s exposures and to question discretionary items in the financial statements. He suggested that 
the inside and outside auditors make some unannounced inspections and audits, and he wanted to strengthen 
the internal audit function, such as through training and improved hiring practices.
Rich admitted in 1983 that he had some concerns about serving on a board of directors and, particularly, 
on an Audit Committee.
A member of an Audit Committee is always a potential victim of management and the outside auditors 
since you depend on them so much. To a great extent you have to trust them. However, I try to set 
a tone of watchfulness by asking a lot of questions at all of our meetings; but I need to get other board 
members to do it or I will just look like an old crank.
Perhaps my concerns are just excessive caution, however, because it appears that the top officers are 
very talented, and John Garvey is very dedicated to the company. He wants to make good disk drives 
and sell a lot of them.
Internal and External Audit. The Internal Audit division, consisting of the head auditor, Doug McAneny, 
and two staff members, reported to Ed Steinborn (CFO). The primary roles of Internal Audit were to ensure 
that corporate accounting policies were followed and that safeguards existed to ensure that the company’s 
assets were protected. A secondary role was to be alert to opportunities for cost-cutting and efficiency.
At the request of Rich O’Donnell, Doug McAneny had attended some meetings of the Audit Committee. 
Rich tried to establish a rapport with Doug and assured him that any misgivings that he had about anything, 
or anyone, in the company would be brought to the attention of the Audit Committee.
Disctech’s external audit firm was Touche, Young and Andersen (TYA), a Big Eight firm. Each year in July, 
the auditors met with top management and the Audit Committee to lay out the schedule of the annual audit 
and to review changes in the company since the previous year.
1979-82
The years 1979-82 were very exciting at Disctech; sales revenues grew at a compound rate of 39%. Every 
quarter the company announced record earnings, and the stock market reacted as John predicted, with the 
trading price continually reaching new highs. John made regular announcements about the company, stating 
how earnings were going to continue to grow at above industry rates. The total market in 1979 for 
minicomputer disk memories at OEM prices was $2.1 billion, so there was plenty of room for Disctech to 
grow.
Disctech had continued to make modest R&D expenditures, but by the middle of 1982 its once “ head of 
the pack”  products were beginning to fall behind the latest technology. In response, John applied pressure 
to the Product Design division to come out with new products, even if they were only slight improvements 
on existing products.
1983
The sales pattern in 1983 proved to be a little erratic. John Garvey and Mary Foley (Executive Vice 
President-Sales and Marketing) agreed that quarterly sales (and earnings) had to continue to grow to keep 
the glowing image of Disctech alive. To maintain this growth record, they sometimes found it necessary to 
have the shipping department work round-the-clock during the last few days of each quarter in order to push 
as many orders as possible out the door so as to recognize the revenue for those transactions.
Mary also decided to take advantage of the way some OEMs ordered disk drives. Many OEMs would place 
a large order for 100-200 disks, get a discount, and then ask for delivery at a date 2 to 3 months in the future. 
This assured them of a supply of the disks and a delivery date that supported their computer construction 
and shipment schedules. Many times an order placed in one quarter would not be scheduled for delivery until 
the next quarter. To recognize these sales in the present period, Mary directed that as many orders as possible
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receive early shipment to the OEM, with the understanding that the OEMs would not be liable for payment 
until the previously agreed-upon delivery dates.
The auditors from TYA questioned this early shipment program but Ed Steinborn was able to convince them 
that the sales met the requirements of “ sales”  as defined under generally accepted accounting principles: 
Title to the disks did transfer to the OEM upon shipment; under the contract the OEM was obliged to pay 
Disctech for the disks; and Disctech did contact the OEM prior to shipment to get their authorization. What 
was not clear at the time was that some of these authorizations were verbal: the salesperson responsible for 
an account would get the authorization and call it back to the home office.
This early shipment policy was fine with some OEMs, but many other OEMs did not have extra storage room 
and would not accept early delivery. The salespeople were told to “ use their imaginations” and find storage 
at the local Disctech distributor or another convenient location. The company needed the sales and the 
salespeople were told to “ get as many authorizations as possible.”
The net result of these two policies was that by the end of 1983 revenues had grown from $81.1 million to 
$107.1 million, but $5.9 million of the 1983 sales were for disks originally scheduled for delivery in 1984. 
(Of the $5.9 million, $3.7 million were shipped without a valid authorization.)
1984
The only major change at Disctech in 1984 was in marketing policy. John Garvey had long thought that the 
minicomputer memory industry would slowly evolve to become more like the mainframe business, with 
fewer sales to computer manufacturers and more sales directly to end users. This evolution was accelerated 
as the economy slowed, as many companies held onto the systems they already had installed. John believed 
that a truism of computers— “ information to be stored, quickly grows to fill all available memory” —would 
be the salvation of Disctech. More salespeople were hired, and the sales force was directed to start 
approaching all current users of minicomputers compatible with Disctech disk memories to attempt to 
generate sales in this potentially large market.
After the results of the second quarter were announced (another record high), John called Mary, Ed, and 
Peter together for a private meeting. John indicated that he was very proud of their results and that he knew 
they would continue to outperform the industry. He pointed out, however, that each quarter’s goals had been 
harder and harder to reach, and that delays in the completion of new disk designs and prototype construction 
and the growing obsolescence of their inventory might level or even decrease the company’s short-term 
earnings.
John went on to say that with his children nearing college age he needed a lot of money set aside that was 
not tied up in risky investments. As a result he had begun quietly to sell some of his Disctech stock, which 
had appreciated so much since 1979. He told them he was still optimistic about the company’s future but 
that it might be wise for them to look carefully at their own financial needs. If they were going to sell stock, 
he reminded them that they would have to inform the Securities and Exchange Commission of the sales, but 
he urged them to be discreet about the sales in all other ways.
The marketing shift toward memory end users was a big success and significantly contributed to another 
record year, and early shipments continued to increase as the marketing department pressured OEMs and 
salespeople for early authorization. Total sales for the year were $134.9 million. Early-shipment revenues 
were $12.4 million of which $9.8 million was shipped without a valid authorization.
Inventory Control and Reserves for Obsolescence
Inventory at Disctech was broken down into three categories: raw materials, work in process (WIP) and 
finished goods inventory (FGI). In 1981, over 85% of total inventory was in FGI, and this percentage 
increased in later years. This unusual inventory mix was the result of a general shortage of raw materials 
in the industry, and Disctech and other manufacturers responded by sending raw materials directly to the
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production line. In addition, Disctech wanted as little work-in-process inventory as possible because partially 
assembled disk drives were highly susceptible to damage; even the slightest dirt or dent rendered the disk 
or its drive unit inoperable.
Assembled units were tested and then stored until sale and shipment. The company’s first-year production 
capacity was very limited, so units were shipped out as soon as they were assembled. Efforts to improve 
efficiency and cleanliness raised production yields, and by 1980 production began to produce drives for 
inventory.
In 1982 the Design Division began to make a large number of small improvements to the disk drives to ensure 
that the product remained competitive. This had a large effect on inventory levels. Disassembling the 
finished disk drive often caused complete disk failure, and as a result very little rework on FGI drives was 
done. Instead, new drives in production would be modified and then assembled. Thus each change or 
alteration created another layer of FGI slightly different from the last.
Disctech’s policy for creating reserves for obsolescence of inventory was:
• Any equipment over two years old would be reserved at 5% per quarter for five years so that at the end 
of seven years there would be a 100% reserve.
• Any equipment declared unmarketable would have a 100% reserve taken against it.
These rules resulted in small reserves. Very little equipment that was technically obsolete was actually very 
old. Moreover, Disctech had no corporate standards or guidelines for determining when disk drives became 
unmarketable. This problem was intensified by the corporate attitude that Disctech equipment was not 
subject to obsolescence.
At the end of 1982 a production controller forwarded a memo via Peter Farrell to the CFO and the executive 
vice president for Sales and Marketing that summarized a study he had done on the growing inventory 
problem. It listed three recommendations:
1. A study to produce a new reserve policy, since it appeared that the product life cycle was far shorter 
than five years.
2. An intensive effort by the Marketing department to sell the older inventory as soon as possible.
3. An increase in the reserve for obsolescence from $800,000 to $1.4 million.
This memo was discussed by the senior corporate officers who all felt that the problem was not that serious; 
they were absolutely unwilling to increase the reserve by any amount. Marketing, however, attempted to 
stimulate sales of the older disk drives with various specials, discounts, and promotions. The CFO also stated 
that he would “ closely watch the inventory problem.’’
In 1983 the amount of obsolete inventory grew faster than the reserves, and by the end of the fiscal year the 
deficit was estimated by the production controller to be almost $2.4 million. The outside auditors did not 
see the total extent of the problem but they did question the reserve policy in their management letter.
Continual monitoring of Disctech’s FGI reserve policy is required and procedures should be implemented to 
develop historical experience to measure the propriety of the formula adopted. The policy should also be extended 
to recognize obsolescence of products no longer in production sooner than required by the present formula.
Disctech’s management acknowledged the auditors’ report but also informed the Audit Committee that they 
already had done an internal study in 1982 and were working actively to fix all problems with inventory 
control.
During 1984, Disctech management was aware that the exposure for FGI obsolescence was increasing, but 
little was done other than continuing the marketing promotions and taking reserves as calculated by the 
reserve formula. Disctech’s management maintained that reserving for or writing Qff inventory made it less
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likely that it would be sold. They stressed that they had an obligation to the stockholders to find uses for 
the inventory rather than write it off.
By the time of the 1984 year-end audit, the auditors had become more agitated by the inventory situation 
(in addition to the aggressive revenue recognition practices) and sought written assurance from Disctech’s 
management that a formal program existed to “ significantly impact the obsolescence exposure.”  The CFO, 
Ed Steinborn, wrote to the auditors:
Our response to the problems in the inventory area will be to outline the programs we have underway to reduce 
inventory levels. We will agree to study policy alternatives in the area of providing reserves for excess equipment; 
however, affordability considerations really preclude our ability to make any meaningful change in this area this 
year.
Management informed the board and the Audit Committee that a problem with inventory control still existed 
and that efforts to rectify the situation were ongoing. They were also told that “ reserves for obsolescence 
may have to be increased next year as the product life cycle for disk memories shortens.” They were not 
given an exhibit to the 1984 auditors’ management letter that contained the following sentence:
This policy results in full valuation of excess inventory, overstates inventory, and may lead to serious future 
financial adjustments.
The board was not told that the exposure on FGI had grown to an estimated $3.9 million.
The Audit Committee asked questions about inventory valuation, but John and Ed had quick answers and 
were confident that the inventory situation would soon be under control. Nevertheless, the Audit Committee 
in a private session with the outside auditors admitted that some things, including inventory obsolescence, 
had begun to worry them. They also told the engagement partner that they intended to meet more often in 
1985 and they wanted a senior representative from the outside auditors and Doug McAneny, the head of 
internal auditing, at their meetings.
1985
The year 1985 was difficult for Disctech, and tremendous pressure was placed on the sales force to achieve 
the planned sales goal. A combination of a soft market for the 14-inch disk drives and unexpected delays 
in production of the advanced 8- and the new 5¼-inch drives made sales difficult.
Some salespeople came up with some ingenious ideas to stimulate sales that were often designed to take 
advantage of the company’s aggressive revenue policies. For example, one such scheme could occur when 
a customer filled out an EOF with a delivery date far in the future and submitted it to Disctech for processing. 
Within a week or two the responsible salesperson would contact the Marketing department and inform them 
that he had convinced the customer to accept an early delivery in the current quarter—with the understanding 
that payment would not be due until the date on the EOF. From the salesperson’s view this made everyone 
happy: Disctech booked a sale, the salesperson got a commission, and the customer received a disk memory 
at a reasonable price with delayed payments and no finance charges.
At the same time sales were becoming more difficult, order cancellations were becoming a problem. As 
Disctech’s competitors came out with new products, many OEMs switched disk memory suppliers; direct 
end-user sales were also affected because people wanted more memory and shorter access time for their 
dollars.
Near the end of the first quarter of 1985, a Marketing department meeting was held to discuss the order 
cancellation problem. Mary chose this opportunity to announce a new policy: any order cancelled within six 
weeks of expected delivery would still be shipped and the revenue recorded. Her staff told her that most 
customers would just refuse to accept delivery. She responded that on each of these deliveries the responsible 
salesperson would go along and ensure that “ the sale stuck.”  All of these problems caused a lot of
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consternation in the sales force but they all knew better than to argue with Mary when her mind was 
made up.
A Midyear Meeting. At midyear John Garvey called a meeting of the top officers to review some pressing 
problems. The first problem was financing. As receivables had grown, cash was getting short. Consequently 
$10 million in bonds would be issued for public sale early in the fourth quarter; $4 million of the cash raised 
would be used to retire the bonds currently outstanding, and the rest of the proceeds would go to operations.
Second, inventory problems were getting worse. An internally generated estimate of the current obsoles­
cence exposure was $6.8 million, and this was expected to grow to over $8 million by the end of the year. 
The outside auditors were very worried about the obsolescence exposure, but John explained he had placated 
them by informing them that the company was currently doing another internal study of obsolescence 
policies and that he expected a significant writedown probably as early as the first quarter of 1986.
Third, the new disk memory designs still had development problems but John expected them to be available 
before the end of the calendar year. Finally, there was a growing problem with returned equipment. This 
would probably cause a significant reversal in revenues in future periods.
Putting these all together, John admitted that the record string of growth and profits would probably be 
broken. John wanted the company to take all its “ lumps” in the first quarter of 1986, and he wanted to take 
the inventory writedown at the same time as the new product announcement. He also stated that strong 
quarterly and annual results in 1985 would help the bond issue and would likely mitigate the impact of a 
loss in the first quarter of 1986. Everyone came away from the meeting clearly understanding that they had 
to make the 1985 budget—no matter what they had to do.
Despite heroic efforts by the sales force, fourth quarter predictions indicated that without further action 
Disctech would come up short of the 1985 budget. A plan was worked out in the Marketing department to 
make a large shipment to a warehouse rented by Disctech under another name; this shipment (for $4.2 
million) was booked as revenue in 1985. Plans were to use the equipment to help fill early 1986 orders.
In the end, the 1985 goal of $162 million in sales was achieved; total annual sales were $164.6 million. Early 
shipment revenues totaled $15.8 million, of which $10.6 million was equipment shipped without authori­
zation. This $15.8 million did not include the $4.2 million shipped to the new warehouse.
1986
The board of directors met in late October to review the results of 1985. John first went over the high points 
of the year and the records achieved. He next turned to the inventory problem and gave a quick summary 
of the events of the last few years. John then told them that to bring inventory back in line, a one-time 
writedown of $8.2 million would be required.
Unfortunately for John, this did not take the outside directors by surprise. Prompted by knowledge of a large 
number of customer complaints, increasing levels of returned equipment, and the possible inventory 
obsolescence problem, they had asked the external and internal auditors to conduct some additional inves­
tigations in the last two quarters. The outside directors proceeded to ask John some difficult questions about 
the company’s policies and practices and also questioned him on his personal finances and his recent stock 
dealings.
Receiving nothing but evasive answers, they told John they were retaining an outside law firm to conduct 
an investigation to be reported directly to the Audit Committee. The board also informed John that it would 
be best if he, Ed, and Mary were to go on leave until the investigation was complete.
With feelings of anger and humiliation, all three resigned immediately rather than accept the forced leave 
of absence. Disctech hired an interim president, Bill Winslow, and the SEC was informed that an internal 
investigation was being started that could impact their reported financial statements for the last three years.
135
Exhibit 1
DISCTECH, INC.
Income Statements fo r Fiscal Years Ending September 30 
(000s omitted)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Revenue $5,997 $30,003 $42,004 $59,646 $81,119 $107,076 $134,916 $164,598
Cost of Sales 6,531 21,288 29,403 41,752 55,161 72,812 91,743 111,927
Gross Margin (534) 8,715 12,601 17,894 25,958 34,264 43,173 52,671
R&D Expense 1,354 2,528 3,760 3,772 4,056 4,283 4,722 4,938
SG&A Expense 1,990 4,138 5,220 6,561 10,545 13,920 17,539 21,398
Operating Profit (3,878) 2,049 3,621 7,561 11,357 16,061 20,912 26,335
Interest Income 131 (517) 84 119 162 214 (104) (541)
Profit before Tax (3,747) 1,532 3,705 7,680 11,519 16,275 20,808 25,794
Income Tax 0 767 1,704 3,533 5,299 7,487 9,572 11,866
Profit after Tax $(3,747) $ 765 $ 2,000 $ 4,147 $ 6,220 $ 8,788 $ 11,236 $ 13,928
Tax Loss
Forward 0 685 1,400 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income $(3,747) $ 1,450 $ 3,401 $ 4,147 $ 6,220 $ 8,788 $ 11,236 $ 13,928
Earnings per
Share $ (1.06) $ 0.21 $ 0.50 $ 0.60 $ 0.90 $ 1.27 $ 1.61 $ 1.99
Source: Annual reports.
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Exhibit 2
DISCTECH, INC.
Consolidated Balance Sheets at September 30 
(000s omitted)
Assets
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Cash and Marketable
Securities $10,020 $ 3,654 $ 3,778 $ 3,273 $ 2,947 $ 2,808 $ 3,920
Accounts Receivable (net) 8,752 9,801 11,921 15,508 22,091 30,843 39,300
Inventories (net) 12,221 8,601 11,241 15,122 22,046 27,557 36,682
Prepaid Expenses 142 375 525 746 730 750 809
Total Current Assets 31,135 22,431 27,465 34,649 47,814 63,958 80,711
Property, Plant
and Equipment (net) 2,110 6,901 9,661 13,719 18,657 24,628 31,031
Other 929 120 169 239 284 321 364
Total Assets $34,174 $29,452 $37,295 $48,607 $66,755 $86,907 $112,106
Liabilities
Notes Payable $ 4,050 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0
Accounts Payable 5,664 3,600 5,041 9,158 12,734 16,849 23,190
Accrued Liabilities 1,179 1,500 2,100 2,982 4,056 5,354 6,746
Total Current Liabilities $10,893 $ 5,100 $ 7,141 $12,140 $16,790 $18,203 $ 29,936
Bank Debt 0 0 0 0 0 2,000 0
Capital Leases 1,363 4,485 6,820 8,917 12,127 16,008 18,170
Bonds 3,570 0 0 0 4,000 4,000 10,000
Equity
Common Stock 3,651 3,677 3,703 3,729 3,755 3,782 3,807
Other Capital 20,978 21,020 21,062 21,104 21,146 21,188 21,231
Retained Earnings (6,281) (4,831) (1,431) 2,717 8,937 17,726 28,962
Total Liabilities
and Equities $34,174 $29,452 $37,295 $48,607 $66,755 $86,907 $112,106
Source: Annual reports.
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Graves Industries Inc. (A)
At the annual stockholders’ meeting in April 1981, Henry Graves, chairman, CEO, and president of Graves 
Industries, announced the creation of a new division of Graves Industries Inc.:
Ever since the founding of Graves Industries we have worked to be on the leading edge of technology, 
always seeking to create machines for the factory of the future. Today, we are taking a large step into 
that future with the founding of the Flexible Manufacturing Systems division. The world of computer- 
integrated manufacturing has become so complex that we have created a new division dedicated to that 
industry. Big steps like this don’t come cheaply. In the next four years we will spend over $100 million 
in research and development alone, for this division. You say this is a large risk, and I agree with you, 
but the potential payoff is tremendous....
This new division fundamentally alters the way we look at the corporation and what we view as our 
primary business. I have authorized a number of new programs designed to cut costs throughout the 
corporation and improve our profitability. We will continue to be the standard of excellence in our other 
businesses, but clearly our focus is on the future......
This case provides background information on Graves Industries Inc. for use with the (B) case focused on 
Graves’ Marine Hardware division and/or the (C) case focused on the Consumer Hardware division.
Company History
Graves Industries was founded in the early 1920s as a manufacturer of industrial hardware and tooling. The 
company went public in 1926 and was listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The company was small 
and experienced only modest growth until 1941. Then, capitalizing on the rapid growth of industry during 
the war, Graves Industries grew tremendously. Revenues climbed from $8.2 million in 1941 to $41.5 million 
in 1945.
From 1946 until 1981 the corporation changed little except to branch out into other areas of hardware and 
tooling. In 1946, Graves started a small consumer products division to produce and sell tools and hardware 
to hardware distribution chains. The Consumer Products division was very successful, and by 1981 sales 
had risen to $122 million. In 1958, a separate automotive division was founded by splitting out the 
automotive sections of the Consumer and Industrial divisions. In 1963, the corporation moved into marine 
hardware by acquiring the Lohnes Marine Hardware Company of Portsmouth, N.H.
In the 1970s, Henry Graves, now the chairman and CEO, recognized that flexible manufacturing was the 
wave of the future and that to be part of it Graves Industries would have to make some large investments. 
The company started by building numerically controlled (NC) tools in the Industrial division. This field was 
so complex, however, and the potential market was so large ($26 billion in 1982) that in 1981 a new division 
was formed. (Exhibit 1 presents a financial summary of recent fiscal years.)
Organization
Graves Industries used a divisionalized organization structure. The corporate headquarters, located in 
Groton, Connecticut, consisted of the principal corporate officers and their relatively small staffs. The 
operating divisions were relatively autonomous; operating companies (see Exhibit 2) and division managers 
were directly responsible for the division’s products and services. They also operated their own research and 
development, manufacturing, and marketing facilities. Division staff reported directly to division managers 
and had relatively weak, “ dotted line” relationships with corporate staff.
Copyright © 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Harvard Business School case 9-187-045.
This case was prepared by Joseph P.Mulloy under the direction of Kenneth A. Merchant as the basis for class discussion rather than 
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The case is based on knowledge of actual company 
situations, but the facts have been disguised, and any resemblance to actual people or events is unintentional. Reprinted by permission 
of the Harvard Business School.
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Headquarters controlled divisional performance by reviewing plans and budgets and by monitoring financial 
reports. If performance was in line with corporate financial goals, few inquiries were made into divisional 
operations, but if negative variances resulted, headquarters gave divisions a great deal of attention, and 
pressure was applied to improve results. Formal reviews were held quarterly to discuss the actual results and 
the forecast for the year.
Henry Graves felt that it was very important for the corporation, and thus the divisions, to maintain a steady 
pattern of growth because “ that is what the stock market values.”  Thus, consistency and predictability were 
the watchwords; surprises were to be avoided. One division president noted that, “ There are only two things 
important in this company: profit, and turning it in in a predictable fashion.”
Profit Planning
Profit planning was done in two distinct cycles: strategic planning and budgeting. Strategic planning 
involved creative thinking about corporate strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the next 
three-year period. The division managers were required to submit a narrative analysis of their businesses and 
plans, supported by summary numerical schedules. Presentations of the strategic plans were made to top 
management in August and September.
After the strategic plans were approved, the divisions began working on their budgets. The budgets were 
expressed in terms of monthly income statements and balance sheets for the coming year. They were 
reviewed by top management and the board of directors in November and December. The budgets were 
considered a commitment of earnings and return on net assets (RONA) from division managers to the 
corporation and from the corporation to the board of directors.
While the intent of the profit planning process was “ bottom-up,” it was typical for the division managers 
to have to adjust their targets after the review meetings. Henry Graves liked his managers to have aggressive 
budgets, and it was often said that “ Henry always wants to take something from each division when he 
leaves the table.”
Management Incentive Plan
Graves offered its management personnel a base salary that was slightly below that of its competitors, and 
it relied on a Management Incentive Plan (MIP) to help motivate and retain its key personnel. The MIP 
offered annual cash awards based on the actual vs. budgeted levels of RONA achieved by the entity to which 
the individual was assigned (division or above).
About 60 employees were enrolled in the MIP, including most managers down to one level below division 
manager. The payouts in the plan were potentially lucrative. For example, the payouts for a division manager 
ranged up to 100% of salary, as shown in Figure 1.
The incentive plan clearly attracted the attention of the managers. In a survey done several years after the 
plan was implemented, the managers all reported that they understood how the plan worked and that it 
affected their decision making.
Board of Directors
The board of directors consisted of five members, two inside directors (Henry and the president of the 
Industrial Division, Steve Sinko), and three outside directors. The outside directors were all either active 
or retired executives who were long-time acquaintances of Henry Graves. The board usually met four times 
a year to review the corporation’s progress and plans for the future.
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FIGURE 1
MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE PLAN PAYOUT FOR DIVISIONAL PRESIDENT
Payout
of Base Salary)
Actual RONA (%  of Budget)
The Audit Committee consisted of the three outside directors. This committee was created in 1973 in 
response to the endorsement of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York Stock Exchange 
for all publicly held companies to establish audit committees.
Internal Audit
The Internal Audit staff consisted of the head auditor and three staff members. The Internal Audit group 
ensured that corporate accounting policies were followed and verified that safeguards existed to protect the 
company’s assets. Their workload was heavy and even though they were scheduled to visit each division 
each year, sometimes they were able to perform audits only on alternate years.
Outside Auditors
Since 1971 Graves had used a Big Eight accounting firm, Ernst, Mitchell and Sells (EMS). Harvey Krantz 
had been the EMS partner on the Graves account for the last three years, and during that period Harvey and 
Henry Graves had developed an excellent working relationship. Socially, they were involved in many of the 
same activities, were members of the same country club, and occasionally played golf together.
In the last two years, however, the relationship had been strained as Graves applied pressure to reduce the 
audit fees. The growth of the FMS division, as described in the opening comment of this case, created a 
need to free up capital through cost cutting and other measures.
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Exhibit 1
GRAVES INDUSTRIES INC. (A)
Consolidated Income Statements 
for Years Ending December 31 
($ millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Revenue $476.3 $524.9 $580.0 $640.9 $708.2
Cost of Sales 319.1 351.7 388.6 429.4 460.3
Gross Margin $157.2 $173.2 $191.4 $211.5 $247.9
R&D Expense 20.2 31.0 36.0 44.0 58.3
SG&A Expense 56.6 62.0 68.2 74.8 82.2
Operating Profit $ 80.4 $ 80.2 $ 87.2 $ 92.7 $107.4
Corporate Expense 11.9 13.1 14.5 16.0 17.7
Interest Expense 7.0 7.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Profit before Tax $ 61.5 $ 60.1 $ 63.7 $ 67.7 $ 80.7
Income Tax 28.3 27.6 29.3 31.1 37.1
Net Income $ 33.2 $ 32.5 $ 34.4 $ 36.6 $ 43.6
Source: Corporate records.
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Graves Industries Inc. (B) 
Lohnes Marine Hardware Division
In January 1986, Don O’Grady, controller and financial officer of the Lohnes Marine Hardware Division 
of Graves Industries Inc., reviewed the financial results for 1985. It was another record year for the Lohnes 
division: sales were up 12% and operating profits had increased 13% (see Exhibit 1). Don knew that the 
division president, Paul Lohnes, would be very happy to see that the final figures were a couple of million 
dollars above budget. The company was also well positioned for a big jump on 1986’s budgeted goals.
In contrast to 1984, the fourth quarter of 1985 had been relatively relaxed. Sales were strong throughout the 
year, and by the beginning of the last quarter the division had already achieved almost 90% of budgeted 
profits and sales. In 1984, the division had only 68% of budgeted goals going into October, and it had taken 
a large effort by all employees to make sure the division finished on budget.
The distress of last year reinforced in Don’s mind the advice he had received on his first job out of school. 
The controller of that company had told him (when discussing the accounting policies of his new employer) 
that “ only a fool does not have reserves salted away for rainy days.”  The reserves the Lohnes division built 
up had been very important in 1984. But now Don wondered if the division reserves went beyond the bounds 
of reasonableness.
The Division
Lohnes Marine Hardware was founded in 1954 by Paul Lohnes. Paul was an avid sailboat builder in the 
Portsmouth, N.H., area who became frustrated by the poor support existing marine hardware companies 
were giving sailboat builders and owners. Paul reasoned that a full-service marine hardware and tooling 
business that provided special services for sailboaters could be very successful. He also felt that as disposable 
income increased in the United States, boating would become increasingly popular, and the market would 
grow rapidly.
The new Lohnes Company did very well; by 1963 the company was well-established in New England, and 
Paul was looking at expanding into other regions. An important part of this success was the tools and marine 
rigging that Paul had originally designed and built for his own use that were now marketed by his company. 
The boating market was still young and growing, and Paul figured that if he could expand quickly and get 
a toehold across the country, he would be in good position to take his share of the market. Paul had the 
knowledge, but lacked the financial resources to support a large expansion.
During the summer of 1963 Paul was approached by Henry Graves, executive vice president of Graves 
Industries Inc., a large producer and distributor of industrial and commercial hardware and tooling. The 
Graves wanted to expand into marine hardware, but they did not have any experience in this specialized area 
and were looking to make an acquisition.
At first Paul rejected the Graves’ offers, but in the fall of 1963 he reconsidered, and a deal was quickly 
hammered out. For an undisclosed sum (rumored to be quite sizeable), 100% interest in Lohnes Marine 
Hardware was transferred to Graves Industries Inc. This transfer included the name of the company, Lohnes 
Marine Hardware Company, and all the proprietary products manufactured by the company. As part of the 
agreement Paul was to remain as president of the new marine division.
One of the major reasons Paul agreed to the acquisition was the Graves’ decentralized management 
philosophy; the company would leave him in control of the Lohnes division with almost no corporate 
interference as long as results were at or above the corporation’s long-term growth targets of 8% in sales
Copyright © 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Harvard Business School case 9-187-046.
This case was prepared by Joseph P. Mulloy under the direction of Kenneth A. Merchant as the basis for class discussion rather than 
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The case is based on knowledge of actual company 
situations, but the facts have been disguised, and any resemblance to actual people or events is unintentional. Reprinted by permission 
of the Harvard Business School.
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and profits, and budgets were consistently achieved. Lohnes’ organization, personnel policies, and ac­
counting systems would remain as they were before the acquisition. (See organization chart in Exhibit 2.) 
The only additional procedures required were a formal capital appropriation request and a monthly reporting 
of financial results to headquarters for consolidation. Corporate staff monitored division results (primarily 
sales, profits, cash and asset control), and occasionally the division president or controller was asked for 
explanations of variances from budget.
The infusion of capital was just what the Lohnes Marine division needed, and sales grew from $4.1 million 
in 1963 to $88.4 million in 1982—a compound growth rate of 17.5%. The division almost always met its 
budget targets. The toughest years were during the energy crisis of 1974-75, which rocked the power boat 
industry. While the marine division did not make budget those years, it still remained very profitable due 
to its strength in the sailboat segment of the market.
During his tenure with Graves Industries, Paul realized that good performance, although well rewarded, was 
soon forgotten during the next fiscal year. Furthermore, because of the way the budget cycle and bonus 
program worked, an excellent year this year tended to make next year’s goals even higher. This was not 
really much of a problem for the Marine division, however, as expanded production and a booming boat 
market caused it to be consistently among Graves’ best-performing divisions.
In the early 1980s the situation in Graves changed because of the formation of the Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems (FMS) division within Graves Industries. The FMS division had a R&D budget of $14 million in 
1982, and this grew to $46 million in 1985, and the corporation was trying to fund this division internally 
by raising growth goals for the operating divisions and by instituting cost-cutting programs. The new, more 
aggressive goals made management of the Lohnes division very difficult because the boating industry was 
hit hard by the second oil crisis in 1979 and a business downturn in 1984.
1983
In late January 1983, Paul met with his new controller/financial officer, Don O’Grady, to go over the 
division’s financial condition and to consider plans for the future. Don pointed out that 1982 had been a 
relatively good year; sales had reached $88.4 million, slightly in excess of the division’s goal of $85 million. 
In addition the division had been able to maintain relatively large reserves where “ a few nuts were stored 
away for a bad winter.”
Paul said that was all well and good, but that he was worried about future prospects, and he wanted to have 
more control over his reported sales and profits. He suggested a number of ways the increased control could 
be brought about. He told Don that when the division was having a good period he wanted to meet the 
assigned goals and then be very conservative in the accounting so as to have a good start on making the goals 
for the next period. For example, if the division was near its quarterly target, it would be good to declare 
a shipping moratorium for the last week or two of the quarter to shift some sales to the next quarter. He also 
suggested increasing the reserves taken against inventory, accounts receivable, and potential liabilities.
Paul said Don should meet with Patti Allen of Sales and Jack Nelan of Production and Purchasing to do some 
brainstorming for more ideas. He also told Don that the discussions should be discreet. Even though none 
of this was illegal, he did not want to cause waves at headquarters. Don indicated that he understood.
The year 1983 proved to be surprisingly good, and by mid-March the division had exceeded its quarterly 
sales goal. Patti Allen imposed a shipping moratorium for the last ten days of March, and $3.8 million in 
finished goods were held until the first days of April. Even though she agreed with trying to smooth earnings, 
Patti did complain to Don and Paul that complete halts in shipping caused problems with workload 
scheduling, product damage, and delayed deliveries to customers. Paul agreed there were costs associated 
with this shipment policy, but he felt they could be minimized.
Patti said that she would like to be able to do some shipping to their large customers. She suggested that 
she could ship some large orders in the current quarter but ensure that they were not entered in the shipping 
log. She would date the invoices and the bills of lading for the beginning of the next quarter and hold them 
on her desk until the second week of the new quarter. She would then submit the invoices to the accounting
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department for processing as a new-quarter sale, and make the entries to the shipping log. In case any 
auditors asked why the invoices were out of order, she planned to tell them that the shipments had been held 
up for a brief time at the last minute.
In 1983 sales continued strong, and Patti’s invoice-dating program allowed for smooth growth in quarterly 
earnings. On December 31, Patti held invoices for $7.4 million in goods to be “ shipped”  in the first week 
of January.
Other company efforts to prepare for the unknown future included a buildup of obsolescence, liability, and 
bad debt reserves (a total of $900,000) and a new marketing-expense program. This latter program, worked 
out between the Sales & Marketing department and the Marine division’s advertising firm, allowed for the 
prepayment of part of the next year’s marketing expenses. Rather than being booked as a prepaid expense, 
however, these expenses would appear on a bill from the ad agency which listed them as services for the 
current year; and the division would then book them as an expense of the current period. The Sales and 
Marketing department kept a separate ledger to keep track of these expenditures to ensure that the paid-for 
services were received. A total of $600,000 of 1984 advertising expenditures was paid for in 1983.
1984
The long-anticipated downturn came in 1984; sales were very sluggish for the first two quarters. Paul and 
Don were somewhat worried but took no action other than maintaining their pressure on Sales and Mar­
keting. When the third quarter continued the slow trend, Don started to liquidate some of the reserves, and 
by the end of 1984, reserves were reduced by $1.8 million. The auditors questioned these changes in 
reserves, but Don and Paul gave them an explanation based on an analysis of changes in inventory 
composition and estimates of forthcoming bad debt losses and expenses. The auditors were skeptical, but 
they eventually concurred with the changes.
Another big step taken by the division was the establishment of the Early Order Program for distributors and 
larger boat builders. Those who ordered early (e.g., the end of 1984 instead of early 1985) received large 
discounts. This program also provided liberal credit terms; no payments were due for 90 days, and no 
late-payment penalties were assessed until at least 120 days after receipt of the shipment. Some of the more 
aggressive salespeople told their clients to ‘ ‘order the stuff now and don’t worry about any payment dates; 
just pay us when you sell it, and you get to pocket the extra margin.”  Although this was never formally 
sanctioned, a flurry of fourth quarter sales brought the year-end results just above the budgeted goal of 
$108 million.
1985
The first quarter of 1985 was slow due to all of the Early Orders that were placed in 1984. But by the middle 
of the second quarter, sales had picked up and were soon roaring along. In fact, third quarter results were 
so good that $4.7 million had to be “ transferred”  to the fourth quarter, and the Early Order Program of 1984 
was suspended.
By the end of 1985 the company had not only passed all required goals, but also had a $10.4 million start 
on 1986 revenues, had restored $2.2 million in reserves, and had paid for $0.8 million of 1986’s advertising. 
Once again the changing of the reserves was questioned, but the auditors accepted Don’s explanation of 
“ wanting to be conservative.”
1986
Don knew the Lohnes division was well-positioned for the new year but he worried where all this man­
agement of earnings would lead. He had hoped it would not continue, but the financial drains of the FMS 
division were growing, and he expected the corporation to start pressing all of the other divisions even more. 
He also knew that Paul and Patti were already discussing new ways to smooth income, and Don wondered 
what he should do and whom he could speak to about this sensitive matter.
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Exhibit 1
GRAVES INDUSTRIES INC. (B)
Lohnes Marine Hardware Division 
Divisional Income and Budget Statements 
fo r Fiscal Years Ending 31 December 
($ millions)
1982 1983 _____1984 1985
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual
Revenue $85.0 $88.4 $96.0 $99.1 $108.0 $109.2 $119.0 $122.2
Cost of Sales 55.7 57.5 62.4 64.4 71.8 72.9 77.4 79.4
Gross Margin $29.3 $30.9 $33.6 $34.7 $ 36.2 $ 36.3 $ 41.6 $ 42.8
R&D Expense 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
SG&A Expense 10.8 10.9 11.2 12.1 11.8 11.3 14.0 14.8
Operating Profit $17.9 $19.4 $21.6 $21.8 $ 23.6 $ 24.2 $ 26.8 $ 27.2
Source: Corporate records.
147
GR
AV
ES
 I
ND
US
TR
IE
S 
IN
C. 
(B
) 
ex
h
ib
it
 2
Lo
hn
es
 M
ar
in
e 
Ha
rd
wa
re
 D
ivi
sio
n 
Or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l C
ha
rt
Dir
ec
tor
Hu
ma
n
Re
so
urc
es
Dir
ec
tor
De
sig
n
De
pa
rtm
en
t
Pr
es
ide
nt 
of 
the
 
Lo
hn
es
 M
ari
ne
 D
ivi
sio
n
Pa
ul 
Lo
hn
es
VP
 fo
r P
rod
uc
tio
n 
an
d 
Pu
rch
as
ing
Ja
ck
 N
ela
n
VP
 fo
r S
ale
s 
an
d 
Ma
rke
tin
g
Pa
tti 
All
en
Co
ntr
oll
er 
an
d 
Fin
an
cia
l O
ffic
er
Do
na
ld 
O’G
rad
y
So
urc
e: 
Co
rpo
rat
e 
rec
ord
s.
148
Graves Industries Inc. (C)
Consumer Hardware Division
It was one week before Christmas in 1984 and Leo Gladue, the president of the Graves Industries’ Consumer 
Hardware division, had just returned to his offices after a long and difficult budget meeting with Henry 
Graves, the chairman and CEO of Graves Industries Inc. It had been a tough year for the Consumer division, 
and they had just barely made budget. Leo had argued that with a slow economy the division could only 
expect growth of 3-4% in 1985, but Henry insisted that growth of at least 8% was possible. Leo resisted, 
but he gave in when Henry chided him for his lack of aspiration and questioned whether he had the vision 
necessary to manage the business. (See Exhibit 1 for financial results and budgets for 1982-85.)
As he sat in his office, Leo knew that possibly a lot more than just his bonus was riding on making the 
division’s assigned goals for 1985. The growth of the new Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) division 
was affecting the whole corporation; the other divisions were being squeezed hard for profits so as to fund 
this FMS growth. Leo wondered if they were being squeezed too much.
Division History
The Consumer division was founded in 1946 to allow the company to branch out and use its large, wartime 
production capacity effectively. The division started out producing simple home tools that were sold through 
distributors. Realizing the Graves name could be a distinct advantage, the division’s managers moved into 
producing a wide variety of high-quality tools and hardware. The division developed a brand-name image 
and sold only through distributors to selected hardware chains.
The Consumer Hardware division experienced slow, steady growth until the mid-1950s, when Henry Graves 
took over as divisional president. Henry had just returned from serving with the Navy during the Korean 
War, and he had some new ideas. He promoted the idea of “ professional tools for the home mechanic”  and 
pushed the safety and reliability of Graves products. He also expanded the product line and the distribution 
system in search of faster growth. He continued to find ways to grow, and for the next 12 years the division 
enjoyed revenue growth at a compound annual rate of 11%.
In 1968, Henry was promoted to CEO; his father retained the chairmanship until 1972. Leo Gladue, who 
had worked for the Graves for 22 years in the Industrial and the Consumer Hardware divisions, was 
appointed as the next president of the Consumer division. Leo was well regarded for his technical knowledge 
and his ability to get along with the distributors, but his knowledge of finance and accounting was considered 
relatively weak.
In the late 1970s and early 1982, the division’s growth began to slow. Sales targets were getting harder to 
reach, and the startup of the FMS division only compounded the problem as the Consumer Hardware division 
was expected to continue to achieve Graves’ long-term growth target of 8% per year.
Revenue Recognition
The Consumer Hardware division sold its goods to distributors who took title as soon as the orders were 
shipped. No goods were put on consignment, so sales revenue was recognized as soon as the goods were 
loaded on a truck. As was the industry standard, Graves Consumer division did offer large discounts for 
distributors who placed large orders early and used a wide variety of seasonal promotions as needed to 
stimulate sales.
Copyright © 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Harvard Business School case 9-187-047.
This case was prepared by Joseph P. Mulloy under the direction of Kenneth A. Merchant as the basis for class discussion rather than 
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The case is based on knowledge of actual company 
situations, but the facts have been disguised, and any resemblance to actual people or events is unintentional. Reprinted by permission 
of the Harvard Business School.
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Every now and then the Consumer Hardware division had been known to load some of the trucks in their 
fleet at the end of a fiscal period to generate “ sales in place. ’ ’ The loaded trucks would move a short distance 
away from the loading dock and park until it was time to make their deliveries.
1984
The year 1984 was difficult for the Consumer Hardware division; the economy was slow and interest rates 
were high—the worst combination for a hardware and tool business. As midyear approached and predictions 
for the annual totals did not look good, Leo applied additional pressure to the Sales and Marketing 
department to “ get more orders.’’ Sales and Marketing responded with a plan that they implemented but 
kept secret for a long time. Tim Bonsaint and John Ahem were the only senior managers to know about the 
plan in 1984. (See Exhibit 2 for a recent organizational chart.)
The Consumer division used approximately 30 distributors, but eight of them generated 75% of Graves’ 
business. Tim and John’s plan was to ship additional, unordered products to the large distributors; these 
unordered shipments would be rotated among the large distributors and sent out along with their regular 
orders near the end of the month. These extra shipments would then be recorded as revenues. Four methods 
were used to cause the unordered product to be shipped including: (1) reentering a previously entered order; 
(2) doubling, tripling, or otherwise increasing the amount of product actually ordered; (3) creating fictitious 
orders on behalf of the distributors; and (4) shipping an unordered product when the product ordered was 
not in stock.
Once the unordered shipments were delivered, steps were taken to keep the goods from being returned or 
at least to delay their return. Overshipments were blamed on administrative and computer errors, and 
salespeople were directed to “ make the sales stick” by (1) offering special prices for credit terms, 
(2) exchanging the goods for other Consumer division goods, (3) storing the goods (at Graves’ expense) until 
needed, (4) arranging trades between distributors, and (5) ignoring the distributors’ attempts to return the 
goods until the distributor had time to “ digest”  the shipment.
This plan worked rather well; even though the amount of “ returned goods”  increased, the net effect was 
to increase revenues by $2.8 million and operating profit by $600,000.
A Planning Meeting
Leo Gladue, unaware of Tim and John’s scheme, scheduled a meeting for the second week in January 1985. 
He wanted his management team to review 1984 and start planning on where to come up with the additional 
sales required under the new budget.
The meeting was held on January 10, 1985. The first item on the agenda was a review of the 1984 final 
results. The financial officer, John Ahem, reported that the level of sales had just come in over budget. 
Operating profits were close to budget, and after a few journal entries were made to reduce June reserves 
held against inventories and receivables, the operating profit and RONA targets would be met.
The next item was the most important one: identifying new sources of revenues and other areas of cost 
savings that would be necessary for meeting the new budget. The discussion went on for hours, but there 
were no clear solutions. When the meeting adjourned, Leo Gladue instructed all department heads to 
commence internal studies to identify potential revenue sources and cost savings.
Sales and Marketing
In the following week, the Sales and Marketing department decided to expand the overshipment program 
started at the end of 1984, and they decided not to tell Leo about the specifics of the program. Tim Bonsaint, 
the head of Sales and Marketing, just promised Leo that through “ selective discounts and promotions we 
will increase the average order size of our largest distributors.”  The actual size of the overshipments was 
to be carefully controlled by Tim, using forecasts of actual quarterly and annual sales.
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Production and Purchasing
The Production and Purchasing department could do little to help with new revenues, but its manager, 
Kimberly Colson, knew she could have a large impact on controlling the expenses of the company’s 
contracts with its suppliers. Some of Graves’ suppliers sold both machines and parts to the division, and it 
was possible to alter contracts to adjust the amount of the expenditure to be capitalized. For example, Graves 
had a contract with the Riley Machine Company for $500,000; $200,000 of this amount was for two new 
ratchet machines, and the rest of the money was for 50,000 ratchet assemblies. By having Riley change the 
invoices to indicate that $300,000 was for the two machines, the price of the individual ratchet assemblies 
would drop by 33%. The extra $100,000 could be capitalized (and expensed over the life of the machines), 
and the immediate effect was an increase in profit.
Kim knew many variations on this scheme, such as adding a special “ tooling charge” to the reduced base 
price of the ratchet. This tooling charge could be capitalized by the Consumer division, the price of the 
machines would not have to be changed, and Graves would still get the ratchets at the reduced price. And 
by mixing methods, no clear pattern would emerge. Such a system could easily be run by Kim and a few 
of her purchasing people, so she only told Leo that by putting pressure on suppliers, she had negotiated some 
price reductions on components.
1985 Results
The year 1985 was slow, and the Consumer Hardware division struggled; but with the assistance of the two 
special programs, it was able to meet budget. By the end of the year the Sales and Marketing department 
had “ overshipped” (after returns) a total of $8.9 million in goods that increased operating profits by $1.8 
million, and Production and Purchasing had negotiated contracts that reduced current expenses by $2.7 
million ($2.2 million after depreciation). Not all of this went completely unnoticed, however, and by the 
end of the year Leo had started to ask questions about the higher-than-normal level of returns, complaints 
from distributors and capital expenditures.
The Auditors
In the first week of December, Roger Sexauer, the manager assigned to the Graves Industries audit, was 
sitting in his office at Ernst, Mitchell & Sells when he received a phone call from Don Hubbard, the senior 
assigned to the audit of the Consumer Hardware and Automotive divisions of Graves Industries. The 
conversation went approximately as follows:
Roger: Hello Don, what can I do for you?
Don: I am calling in regard to the Consumer Hardware division audit. I have come across some 
unusual transactions and I can’t seem to get any reasonable answers from the company staff.
Roger: What’s the problem?
Don: One of my staff accountants was performing a review of capital expenditures for this past year 
and found some things that didn’t seem right.
Roger: Like what?
Don: Large price hikes in what appears to be standard equipment for this division and an unusually 
large total of “ tooling charges”  and “ tooling premiums.”
Roger: Have you investigated the reason? Perhaps the equipment has been specially modified and, 
as a result, costs more. Also, this division has always had “ tooling charges.”  For any special 
product they want produced they help the supplier pay for the modifications to his equipment. 
Since this is a capital improvement they can capitalize the portion that they pay for.
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Don: I know that, but I have checked a lot of this equipment myself and it all looks to be the same 
as the ones bought previously. When I ask people in Purchasing, they don’t have a good 
answer. They say the differences are caused by inflation or some kind of internal modifi­
cation. Now, as to the tooling charges, in 1984 they totaled $147,000. This year, through 
November, they total over $400,000.
Roger: That is a sharp increase. Perhaps they have made modifications to the parts in question and 
the supplier has billed them to cover his fixed investment.
Don: I don’t think so because the parts do not look like they have changed. However, this leads 
me to what I think is the heart of the matter. Do you remember when we asked Kim Colson 
about the decrease in price on some of the parts they were purchasing?
Roger: Yes I do, and if I remember correctly, she said that since Graves had become such a large 
buyer for the output of some of their suppliers she was able to negotiate large discounts. Also, 
she said something to the effect that the suppliers had made so many of the items that their 
cost of production per item had gone down significantly.
Don: That’s right. But when you stand back and look at the whole situation, the suppliers that gave 
them the large discounts on parts are the same ones that either raised their prices on capital 
equipment and/or are charging them for tooling charges.
Roger: Now I see the picture. This is either an incredible coincidence or there is a systematic plan 
to capitalize current expenses and overstate profits.
Don: Right! Now comes the hard question—what do I do now? Should I talk to the division’s 
president now or wait for you to get here?
Roger: No, no! Keep on going with the audit, but be extra careful. If there is one problem like this 
there may be others. This division is under a lot of pressure to increase operating profits. What 
is the total impact of this on their bottom line?
Don: We are still working on this but it looks like about $1.7 million to $1.9 million for 1985, and 
it could be higher.
Roger: Well that should only be about 4-5% of the division’s operating profit and corporate net 
income. Right?
Don: As of right now that’s correct, but if we find anything else it could go higher, especially if 
this has been going on for a couple of years.
Roger: That’s true. Well, you push on there. I will talk to Harvey1 and let him know what you have 
found. Then I’ll meet you and look over what you have found. In the meantime don’t say 
anything to anyone at the company till I get back to you.
Roger sat at his desk and thought about what Harvey would do if his suspicions were correct. The amount 
of money involved so far was large for the division, but perhaps immaterial from the standpoint of the entire 
corporation.
1Harvey Krantz, the partner assigned to the Graves audit.
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December 1985
In the middle of December, Tim and John, finding it increasingly difficult to keep their scheme going and 
virtually impossible to meet their 1985 targets, decided they had better be honest with Leo. They were sure 
that with his support they could lay out a convincing story for the events of 1985 and get the auditors off 
their backs.
As they told the whole story, Leo sat dumbfounded. Shortly thereafter, Kim explained what she had been 
doing. Leo felt he had no choice but to inform corporate headquarters and the external auditors immediately.
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Exhibit 1
GRAVES INDUSTRIES INC. (C) 
Divisional Income and Budget Statements 
31 December 1985 
($ millions)
1982 1983 1984 1985
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget
Revenue $125.0 $127.5 $139.0 $140.3 $153.5 $154.3 $168.0
Cost of Sales 80.0 81.6 89.0 89.2 98.2 98.3 107.5
Gross Margin $ 45.0 $ 45.9 $ 50.0 $ 51.1 $ 55.3 $ 56.0 $ 60.5
R&D Expense 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5
SG&A Expense 15.2 15.1 16.4 16.2 17.9 18.5 20.6
Operating Profit $ 28.7 $ 29.6 $ 32.3 $ 33.6 $ 36.0 $ 36.1 $ 38.4
Source: Corporate records.
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Good Practice Guidelines for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting
I. Introduction
Many different incentives and opportunities can contribute to fraudulent financial reporting. Effectively 
preventing and detecting fraudulent financial reporting requires understanding these incentives and oppor­
tunities, and assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting that these factors can create in a company.
These guidelines describe such incentives and opportunities. Because these incentives and opportunities are 
present to some degree in every public company, the guidelines are not necessarily predictive or diagnostic. 
That is, they are not intended to be used as a means for reliably predicting specific companies where 
fraudulent financial reporting will occur. Rather, they are intended to help sensitize the participants in the 
financial reporting process to the broad range of factors that can have implications for the risk of fraudulent 
financial reporting. The inescapable fact is that doing business inherently introduces forces that can lead to 
fraudulent financial reporting, and the starting point for checking and controlling these risks is awareness.
All the participants in the financial reporting process— management, the audit committee, internal auditors, 
and independent public accountants—should assess the risks of fraudulent financial reporting present in the 
company’s financial reporting environment.
For corporate management, the factors described in these guidelines are frequently the same as those dealt 
with in connection with a wide variety of business operating and administrative decisions. For example, 
many incentives and opportunities result from perfectly valid management techniques, such as management 
by objective and decentralized operations. So assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting does not 
necessitate a separate effort but only a heightened awareness and sensitivity to the implications of these 
factors for fraudulent financial reporting. This sensitivity enables the company to design and implement 
internal controls to minimize the risks it identifies. Audit committees also should be sensitive to the potential 
risks these factors may create and to the need for management awareness.
These guidelines should not suggest a separate effort by internal auditors. Internal auditors would consider 
the factors discussed herein when planning their financial audits. The guidelines provide internal auditors 
with an appreciation for the potential financial statement effect of the results of their operational audits.
The Commission recommends in Chapter Three that independent public accountants be required to assess 
the risk of fraudulent financial reporting when planning and conducting each audit. These guidelines may 
provide insight into the causes of fraudulent financial reporting; therefore sensitivity to the factors in these 
guidelines may assist an independent public accountant in completing audit planning and risk assessment.
Sensitivity to the factors in these guidelines not only helps to detect and prevent fraudulent financial reporting 
but it is good business practice for corporate management, the audit committee, and auditors. Public 
companies can benefit from such sensitivity through reduced probability of inadvertent financial statement 
errors and through enhanced internal controls that improve profitability and efficiency. Similarly, auditors 
will benefit through improvements in both audit efficiency and effectiveness that inevitably result from a 
better-focused examination.
The factors discussed in these guidelines were drawn from various sources, including the Commission’s 
study of SEC enforcement actions, a review of the auditing policies and procedures of 10 of the 14 largest 
public accounting firms in the United States, and a review of published academic and professional literature 
that relates to fraudulent financial reporting.
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These guidelines do not constitute a “ cookbook”  approach meant to be applied mechanically, but present 
a frame of reference for understanding and assessing the types of factors that may contribute to the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting. These guidelines are not all-inclusive; they capture the broader points and 
subjects applicable to most public companies and illustrate the types of factors that can be important in 
assessing the risk of financial reporting fraud. Judgment and creativity applied to this starting point will 
generate additional ideas about matters relevant to particular circumstances.
II. The Effect of the Environment on the Risk of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting
A. Why the Environment Is Assessed
The company’s internal and external environments influence the inherent risk of fraudulent financial re­
porting. The Commission’s studies of the financial reporting system revealed that the environmental, 
institutional, and individual forces and pressures that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting are present 
to some degree in every public company. These forces and pressures provide incentives and opportunities 
for individuals and companies to engage in fraudulent financial reporting.
Assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting involves (1) analyzing the company’s internal and 
external environment to identify the unique incentives and opportunities present in the company and (2) 
assessing how these incentives and opportunities affect the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. Chapter 
One of the report discusses the general types of incentives and opportunities noted in our review of alleged 
instances of fraudulent financial reporting and how the presence of these factors contributes to fraudulent 
financial reporting.
These guidelines present environmental considerations as neutrally as possible, because not all environ­
mental considerations increase the risk of fraudulent financial reporting; some decrease the risk. Assessing 
how a risk factor affects an individual company requires judgment, experience, and knowledge of the 
particular circumstances. For example, one consideration discussed here is the impact of new accounting 
pronouncements affecting the industry. Such an event can decrease the risk of fraudulent financial reporting 
by providing clearer accounting guidance in an evolving area, eliminating a potential opportunity for 
fraudulent financial reporting. On the other hand, a new accounting pronouncement could have a material 
adverse impact on a company’s financial position, resulting in an incentive to fraudulently manipulate other 
portions of the financial statements. While the objective was a neutral discussion, fraudulent financial 
reporting generally takes the form of overstated income and assets. Accordingly, many examples discuss 
these conditions.
B. The Interaction of Incentives and Opportunities
While one or more incentives and opportunities are present in most instances of fraudulent financial 
reporting, the presence of one or more incentives or opportunities does not automatically mean fraudulent 
financial reporting has occurred or is likely to occur. Most companies and managers at one time or another 
experience intense incentives and are exposed to inviting opportunities without succumbing to fraudulent 
financial reporting. So identifying any certain number of risk factors is not an accurate predictor of fraudulent 
financial reporting.
The interaction of several different incentives and opportunities produces the combustible mixture that 
elevates the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. For example, the combination of declining profits due to 
product obsolescence, a weak control environment, a risk-taking management, and the use of aggressive 
accounting principles presents a much greater risk of fraudulent financial reporting than the sum of the risks 
presented individually by these factors.
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Finally, each company has its own unique and evolving culture and chemistry that determine the relative 
risk of each factor. Thus the factors that produce this combustible mixture change from company to 
company and from year to year. Effectively assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting requires 
seasoned judgment, experience, and creativity to properly identify, understand, and assess each company’s 
environmental risks.
III. Factors to Be Considered
A. The Internal Environment
The internal environment consists of the conditions, circumstances, and influences affecting the company’s 
operations subject to management’s influence. Internal environmental conditions include the company’s (1) 
internal controls, (2) financial characteristics, (3) operations, (4) individual management characteristics, and 
(5) accounting policies and procedures.
1. Internal Controls
Chapter Two discusses the importance the Commission places on maintaining internal controls adequate to 
prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting. This chapter also notes that it refers to internal controls 
broader than the traditional definition of internal accounting control—it includes the control environment. 
Both internal accounting controls and the control environment are discussed here.
a. Internal Accounting Controls
A company’s internal accounting controls consist of its accounting system and specific controls.
The accounting system comprises the methods and records established to identify, assemble, classify, 
analyze, record, and report an entity’s transactions, and to maintain accountability for the related assets. An 
effective accounting system has both adequate physical documents and records, and adequate procedures to: 
(1) identify and record all valid transactions, (2) describe the transactions in sufficient detail to permit them 
to be properly classified, (3) measure the value of the transactions accurately, (4) ensure the transactions are 
recorded in the proper accounting period, and (5) present and disclose the transactions properly in the 
financial statements.
Specific controls are the individual policies and procedures pertaining to processing transactions that 
management establishes to provide assurance its objectives will be achieved. Effective specific controls help 
to ensure: (1) functions are adequately segregated, (2) all transactions are executed in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization, (3) adequate physical control is maintained over assets and 
accounting records, and (4) regular, independent checks on performance, and comparison and reconciliation 
of assets to recorded accountability, are made.
Specific control procedures include clerical checks, document comparisons and cancellations, transaction 
approvals such as standard price lists or customer credit limits, computer comparison of run to run totals, 
reconciliations, reviews of data used to prepare management reports, independent asset counts, segregation 
of duties such as requiring that the bank reconciliation be performed by individuals with no cash receipts 
or disbursements responsibilities, and control over access to and use of computer programs and data files 
by procedures such as passwords and secured facilities.
The accounting system and specific controls a company establishes are influenced by its size, complexity, 
ownership characteristics, and business nature. A company designs its accounting system and specific 
controls to provide reliable financial statements. So internal accounting controls address many different types 
of situations. Some portions of the internal accounting controls, such as segregation of duties and clerical 
checks, are designed to prevent or detect inadvertent errors or corporate frauds such as embezzlements.
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Other portions of the internal accounting controls, such as review of management reports, are more closely 
associated with preventing and detecting fraudulent financial reporting.
Descriptions of methods of implementing effective accounting systems and specific controls abound within 
the accounting and auditing literature. Accordingly, this Appendix does not include extensive discussions 
of the merits of individual procedures. Because many portions of a company’s internal accounting controls 
are important in preventing and detecting fraudulent financial reporting, however, they should be considered 
when assessing the risk of such fraud.
b. Control Environment
As Chapter Two makes clear, internal accounting controls are important, but a company also must look to 
its control environment to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
The company’s control environment is the corporate atmosphere in which the accounting controls exist and 
the financial statements are prepared. A strong control environment reflects management’s consciousness of 
and commitment to an effective system of internal control. While a strong control environment does not 
guarantee the absence of fraudulent financial reporting, it reduces the chance that management will override 
internal accounting controls. On the other hand, a weak control environment undermines the effectiveness 
of a company’s internal accounting controls and may reflect a predisposition toward misrepresentations in 
the financial statements.
A company’s control environment consists of its organizational philosophy and operating style, organiza­
tional structure, methods of communicating and enforcing the assignment of authority and responsibility, 
organizational control methods, and personnel management methods. (This description of the control 
environment is based in large part on the discussion in the Auditing Standards Board’s proposed Statement 
on Auditing Standards on Control Risk.)
A company’s organizational philosophy and operating style encompass a broad range of characteristics, such 
as (1) management’s and the board of directors’ attitudes and actions toward financial reporting, ethics, and 
business risks, (2) management’s emphasis on meeting budget, profit, or other financial or operating goals, 
(3) management’s preference for centralized or decentralized administration and operations, and (4) the 
extent to which one or a few individuals dominate management. A company’s philosophy and operating style 
are often the most important parts of the control environment.
An effective organizational structure gives the company an overall framework for planning, directing, and 
controlling its operations. It considers such matters as (1) the form, nature, and reporting relationships of 
an entity’s organizational units and management positions, and (2) the assignment of authority and respon­
sibility to these units and positions and the constraints established over their functioning. A key part of an 
effective organizational structure is a vigilant, informed, and effective audit committee.
Effective methods of communicating and enforcing the assignment of authority and responsibility clarify the 
understanding of, and improve compliance with, the organization’s policies and objectives. These methods 
consider such matters as: (1) the delegation of authority and responsibility for matters such as organizational 
goals and objectives, operating functions, and regulatory requirements, (2) the policies regarding acceptable 
business practices and conflicts of interest, and (3) employee job descriptions delineating specific duties, 
responsibilities, and constraints. A key method of communicating employee responsibility is through a 
written code of corporate conduct.
Organizational control methods affect the company’s ability to control and supervise its employees and 
operations effectively. Effective organizational control methods consider such matters as: (1) establishing 
adequate planning, accounting, and reporting systems, (2) requiring reports that communicate to appropriate 
individuals exceptions from planned performance, (3) establishing procedures to take appropriate corrective 
action when exceptions are identified, and (4) monitoring accounting and control systems so they can be 
modified when necessary. An effective internal audit function is often a particularly important organizational 
control method.
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Personnel management methods influence the company’s ability to employ sufficient competent personnel. 
Effective personnel management methods consider such matters as policies for hiring, training, evaluating, 
promoting, and compensating employees.
Because of the subjective nature of a company’s control environment, assessing its individual components 
can be difficult. The overall strength of the control environment, however, can be assessed by an individual 
with sufficient wisdom, experience, and judgment to consider such matters as:
• The degree of emphasis placed on achieving earnings forecasts, meeting budgeted targets, and main­
taining or manipulating the market value of the company’s stock. Management may be unduly interested 
in the market price of the company’s stock to assist the company with future financing, to prevent secured 
loans from being called, or to make stock options and other stock compensation more valuable.
• Turnover in key personnel, with special consideration given to unusual retirements or replacements of 
in-house counsel, internal auditors, or key individuals in the accounting department.
• Management’s compensation plans. Plans featuring significant bonuses tied to reported earnings or other 
quantified targets warrant special attention, as do situations where a significant part of management’s 
compensation results from stock options.
• The company’s relationships with outside parties. This analysis considers, for example, how often the 
company changes independent public accountants, legal counsel, and bankers.
• The company’s organizational structure. An unnecessarily complex organizational structure can be used 
to conceal fraudulent activities.
• Management’s attitude toward financial reporting, particularly toward the selection and application of 
accounting policies.
• The company’s delegation of authority and responsibility. This analysis considers whether operating unit 
management has adequate authority to manage the unit’s operations, or whether one or a few individuals 
dominate the company’s financial and operating decisions. Special consideration is given to whether 
management is so dominant that it impairs the ability of the board of directors and audit committee to 
exercise their oversight responsibility.
•  The capabilities of the company’s accounting department. This analysis considers the training and the 
experience of the key accounting personnel, and the adequacy of overall staffing levels for handling the 
department’s day-to-day activities.
• The effectiveness of the company’s internal audit department. This analysis considers such matters as 
whether the internal auditors have independent access to the audit committee and the CEO, whether the 
auditors have been adequately trained, and whether they have had sufficient experience. In large entities 
with decentralized operations, this analysis also can consider the focus and findings of recent internal 
audit examinations, and the operation’s response to the audit findings.
• Management’s concern for possible or existing weaknesses in the internal control system, and its 
responsiveness to known weaknesses in the system.
• The adequacy of the company’s internal reporting system. This analysis considers such factors as the 
quality and the historical accuracy of the company’s budgets, whether budgeted and actual amounts are 
regularly compared, and whether the responsible parties promptly pursue the resolution of any identified 
differences.
• The company’s personnel policies and practices. This analysis considers, for example, whether back­
ground checks are made before hiring new employees, whether the company’s promotion criteria are fair 
and adequate, and what the company’s policies are for disciplining employees who violate company 
policies.
• The company’s written code of corporate conduct, if one exists. This analysis also considers top 
management’s attitudes toward the written (or unwritten) code of corporate conduct—the key factor 
determining compliance with the code.
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• Management’s attitudes toward compliance with laws and regulations affecting the company. This 
analysis might consider, for example, whether management strives to comply with the full spirit and the 
intent of regulations or attempts to meet only the minimum standards required.
• Whether the company maintains an established mechanism to report to upper management apparent 
violations of company policy. Methods frequently used to accomplish this objective include hotlines and 
ombudsmen. This analysis also considers how the company protects employees from reprisal.
2. Financial Characteristics
When assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting, it is important to consider the company’s current 
and future financial characteristics. Such a review encompasses the company’s profitability, liquidity, and 
capital adequacy. Fraudulent financial reporting has traditionally been associated with companies experi­
encing financial difficulties. While the Commission’s studies revealed that most instances of fraudulent 
financial reporting are detected when the company is experiencing financial difficulties, there is some 
evidence that the fraudulent activity sometimes starts during good economic conditions. The fraudulent acts 
may be discovered more often during financial difficulties because of the increased scrutiny a company 
receives at these times. So while the following discussion focuses on financial difficulties, profitable 
companies should consider these characteristics when assessing their exposure to fraudulent financial 
reporting. Examples of specific factors for consideration include:
• The company’s liquidity. This analysis considers such matters as the adequacy of the company’s working 
capital and the trend in cash flow. Significant differences between net earnings and cash flow may 
indicate the use of improper revenue or expense recognition policies. Furthermore, inadequate cash flow 
may result in curtailment of supplies, less-generous credit terms, or bankruptcy proceedings forced on 
an otherwise profitable company—all incentives for fraudulent financial reporting.
• The relative profitability of the company. This analysis considers such matters as:
— The trend in sales and profits. A decrease in the quality of sales—which may indicate the potential 
for lower sales and profits in future periods—may be evidenced by a liberalization of the company’s 
credit policies, the introduction of unusual discount and payment programs, or other changes in 
business practices. This analysis also may involve reviewing the company’s sales backlog. A 
significant decrease in the sales backlog may predict financial difficulties in future years.
— Whether the company’s sales and profits forecasts can be achieved.
— How the company’s sales and profits compare to others in the industry.
— The adequacy of the company’s reserves, e.g., provision for bad debts or loan losses.
• The need and the ability of the company to obtain additional borrowing. Analysis of the need for 
additional borrowing includes consideration of such factors as the need for funds for research and 
development, an inability to pay current bills, and the need to expand productive capacities. Analysis 
of the ability to obtain additional borrowing considers such matters as the company’s credit ratings, 
current debt-to-equity ratio, the amount of unrestricted collateral, the marketability of existing collateral, 
and existing debt restrictions.
• The company’s compliance with restrictive debt covenants. A projection of a narrow margin of com­
pliance with a particular covenant may be of as much concern as situations where the restrictive covenant 
already has been violated.
•  The quality of the company’s accounts receivable. Significant increases in the aging of the receivables, 
or slowdowns in average daily receipts, may portend significant economic difficulties for the company.
3. Operations
To assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting effectively, it is important to consider the company’s 
current and future operating characteristics. Many different operating characteristics influence the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting. Examples of specific factors for consideration include:
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•  Any recent or planned changes in the company’s operations, such as:
— Introduction of new production techniques, which might increase available inventories, encouraging 
management to increase sales fraudulently by shipping without customer authorization. This factor 
also can increase sales costs, providing an incentive to manipulate other portions of the financial 
statements so earnings are not adversely affected.
— New types of marketing arrangements, especially those involving sales incentive programs, which 
might provide sales personnel with an incentive to increase sales fraudulently.
— Installation of new computer hardware or software, which might give employees or management 
opportunities to automate fraudulent activities.
— Realignment of the company’s operating divisions (e.g., alignment by product instead of by 
geography), which might help conceal a fraudulent manipulation of financial records. This change 
also could reduce the risk of fraudulent financial reporting by ensuring rotation of employees.
— Introduction of a new compensation system for company employees, which might encourage 
manipulation of financial performance to ensure receipt of performance bonuses.
• Any planned, pending, or probable mergers or acquisitions. Such events may encourage fraudulent 
financial reporting to increase the company’s stock price.
• The company’s relationship with its customers. The level of customer complaints and/or returns may 
indicate a problem in the quality of revenue and signal the existence of an incentive for fraudulent 
financial reporting. Among other things, this review looks at the reason for any significant changes in 
the pattern of customer complaints and/or returns.
• The company’s relationship with related parties. The existence of related-party transactions that are 
material, individually or in the aggregate, gives management an opportunity to manipulate the financial 
statements fraudulently. Of special concern are significant transactions that do not appear to have been 
negotiated at arms-length.
• Whether the company maintains significant business relationships with a limited number of customers 
or suppliers. Such relationships allow these customers or suppliers to impose additional external over­
sight in the normal course of protecting their own self-interests, thus potentially reducing the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting. Furthermore, a company may try to maintain and project a positive 
corporate ethical climate to further close relationships with a key supplier or customer. On the other hand, 
the loss of a key supplier or customer can create an incentive for fraudulent financial reporting.
4. Individual Management Characteristics
The personal characteristics of the company’s management play an important role in the company’s internal 
environment. If an individual in a sensitive area of the company has weak ethics, the potential for fraudulent 
financial reporting is significantly increased. Accordingly, to assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting 
effectively it is important to consider whether there are managers with characteristics such as:
•  A record of criminal convictions, SEC civil proceedings, or participation in other inappropriate activities 
(e.g., previous violations of company policies).
•  Significant personal financial difficulties arising from such factors as high personal debts, inadequate 
income, extensive stock market speculation, gambling, or heavy use of drugs or alcohol.
•  A significant level of instability in personal life.
• A feeling of being treated unfairly or inadequately by the organization.
• An extreme need to succeed or be accepted within the organization arising from such complex factors 
as community or social expectation, peer group pressure from within the company, or simple factors such 
as personal greed.
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5. Accounting Policies and Procedures
A company’s accounting policies and procedures are the specific methods used to apply Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). These methods are influenced by the company’s size, the nature of its 
operations, and the industry in which it conducts its business. Many opportunities to commit or conceal 
fraudulent activities involve the company’s accounting policies and procedures. So the quality of the 
company’s accounting policies and procedures has a significant impact on the risk that fraudulent financial 
reporting may occur.
Examples of specific matters concerning a company’s accounting policies and procedures include:
• The existence of transactions involving contentious, difficult, or evolving accounting issues.
•  The existence of significant inventory balances, or other assets, with special valuation problems.
• The occurrence of any very large transactions or unusual adjustments at or near year-end or quarter-end.
•  Whether the company’s procedures for identifying and recording related-party transactions are adequate 
in the circumstances.
• The overall quality of the company’s accounting records. This analysis considers such matters as whether 
the records are well designed and well organized, the accounting procedures are performed in a con­
scientious fashion, an up-to-date accounting policies and procedures manual is maintained, routine 
transactions are processed in a systematic manner, and reasonable procedures are used when computing 
significant estimates and judgments.
• The quality of the company’s accounting principles. This analysis might consider whether the company 
employs exceptionally aggressive, controversial, unusual, or liberal interpretations of GAAP— espe­
cially with regard to revenue recognition—and whether disputes between the company and its indepen­
dent public accountants concerning the company’s application of GAAP are frequent.
• The quality of the company’s internal financial reporting system. This analysis might consider such 
matters as whether management uses these reports in controlling the operations of the company, and 
whether financial statements are submitted at regular intervals to the board of directors.
•  The existence of financial statement elements that depend heavily on the exercise of subjective judgment 
or unusually difficult or complex calculations.
B. The External Environment
The external environment is made up of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect operations 
beyond management’s direct control. External environmental conditions include matters affecting (1) the 
company’s industry, (2) the business environment, and (3) regulatory and legal considerations.
1. Industry Conditions
Analysis of the industry establishes an overall perspective from which to assess the company’s operations. 
Events affecting the industry usually affect the individual companies within the industry. Knowing how the 
company compares to the industry as a whole can point out unusual situations. For example, when the overall 
industry’s sales have decreased by 20 percent, an increase in company sales of 10 percent points to a situation 
that warrants further investigation.
The analysis concentrates on the matters currently influencing the company’s industry. However, matters 
that have influenced the industry in the past, and those likely to influence it in the future, are also considered. 
Industry conditions include such matters as:
• Whether specific trends are prevalent in the industry. This analysis considers such matters as the overall 
demand for the industry’s products (e.g., whether the industry’s products are becoming out of fashion
165
or technologically obsolete and how demand is influenced by price changes), whether any favorable or 
adverse economic events are affecting the industry, and whether the industry is expanding or declining.
• The impact of any new accounting pronouncements affecting the industry.
• Whether the industry is subject to cyclical or seasonal fluctuations. If so, the analysis considers what 
stage of the cycle the industry is currently experiencing. The strategies commonly used to minimize the 
vulnerability to the fluctuations also are assessed.
• The industry’s capital needs. Both initial start-up costs and continuing capital needs are assessed. As an 
example of the latter, in many high-technology or capital-intensive industries, it is necessary regularly 
to spend large amounts of money on research and development or on facilities and equipment to remain 
competitive.
• Whether the industry is currently in a state of transition. When the industry is in a state of rapid evolution, 
management may find it is no longer able to control the company’s operations in the same fashion as 
before. Control systems may not evolve to keep pace with rapid changes in, for example, products, 
services, lines of business, and methods of operating. Furthermore, the company’s profits may shrink 
dramatically. Such situations can place inordinate pressure on the company, its management, and its 
financial statements at a time when the company’s control systems are vulnerable.
2. Business Environment
In addition to industry matters it is important to consider the company’s business environment—external 
matters that relate to the economy as a whole. Among these are:
• The current credit environment. This analysis considers the general availability of funds for additional 
borrowing and the prevailing interest rates.
• The current equity market. This analysis considers the general level and direction of market activity as 
well as any unusual activity or price fluctuations in the company’s shares. This analysis also considers 
how the price of the company’s stock relates to the company’s current condition and prospects for future 
performance, particularly in relation to others in the company’s industry.
• Contests for ownership of the company. This analysis considers whether the company is undergoing an 
internal contest for control or is the target of a hostile takeover. It also considers management’s 
perception of whether the company is vulnerable to a hostile takeover. Such a perception can lead to 
pressure to increase the company’s stock price, and raises the incentive for fraudulent financial reporting.
• The sensitivity of the company’s operations and profits to such economic and political factors as inflation, 
interest rates, unemployment, foreign exchange rates, and restrictions on the repatriation of profits and 
cash from foreign operations or subsidiaries.
• The continued viability of the company’s products in the marketplace. Consideration generally is given 
to such matters as the potential for technological obsolescence resulting from innovations in competing 
products, and the price of the company’s products in relation to those of competitors.
3. Legal and Regulatory Considerations
Increasing government involvement in business operations worldwide has resulted in significant regulatory 
legislation, particularly in employee protection, environmental protection, and consumer protection. Fur­
thermore, governments continue to regulate many aspects of their capital and credit markets.
These increases in regulation have had a significant impact on many companies’ operations and can be a 
significant factor in determining the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. Examples of matters for consid­
eration include:
•  The status of the company’s business licenses or agreements. This analysis gives particular attention to 
situations where it appears the company’s licenses or agreements may be suspended or revoked. This 
potential is heightened when the company’s record of compliance with regulatory requirements is poor.
166
• The potential impact of new tax laws or interpretations.
• The company’s relationships with regulatory bodies. This analysis considers the general history of the 
company’s relationship, the results of any recent investigations by government agencies, and the impact 
of rulings on matters currently under investigation. Rulings or findings that adversely affect the 
company’s operations may increase the incentives for fraudulent financial reporting. On the other hand, 
continual review by regulators may reduce the company’s opportunities to commit fraudulent financial 
reporting.
•  The extent of government control over operations, prices charged, the quality of the company’s products, 
and so forth. This analysis is concerned with how these regulations have affected past development of 
the industry and how they will affect future development. These considerations are particularly important 
when a dramatic change has occurred or is likely to occur in the extent of government regulation.
IV. Conclusion
By illustrating the types of environmental conditions that can produce incentives and opportunities for 
fraudulent financial reporting, these guidelines should heighten the sensitivity of the participants in the 
financial reporting process to the wide range of factors that can influence the risk of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Incentives and opportunities cannot be viewed in isolation or simply be added together. It is the complex, 
dynamic interaction of these conditions that may produce the combustible mixture leading to fraudulent 
financial reporting. Identifying risk factors does not necessarily mean that fraudulent financial reporting will 
occur, but simply indicates that the potential for such fraud, of which management and others should be 
aware, may be greater.
These guidelines do not represent a “ cookbook” approach, meant to be applied mechanically. Effectively 
assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting requires judgment, experience, and creativity to properly 
identify and weigh the various incentives and opportunities in a company’s unique environment.
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100 INDEPENDENCE
INTERNAL AUDITORS SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF THE ACTIVITIES THEY AUDIT.
.01 Internal auditors are independent when they can carry out their work freely and objectively.
Independence permits internal auditors to render the impartial and unbiased judgments essential to 
the proper conduct of audits. It is achieved through organizational status and objectivity.
110 Organizational Status
The organizational status of the internal auditing department should be sufficient to permit the ac­
complishment of its audit responsibilities.
.01 Internal auditors should have the support of management and of the board of directors so that they 
can gain the cooperation of auditees and perform their work free from interference.
.1 The director of the internal auditing department should be responsible to an individual in the
organization with sufficient authority to promote independence and to ensure broad audit 
coverage, adequate consideration of audit reports, and appropriate action on audit recommen­
dations.
.2 The director should have direct communication with the board. Regular communication with 
the board helps assure independence and provides a means for the board and the director to keep 
each other informed on matters of mutual interest.
.3 Independence is enhanced when the board concurs in the appointment or removal of the director 
of the internal auditing department.
.4 The purpose, authority, and responsibility of the internal auditing department should be defined 
in a formal written document (charter). The director should seek approval of the charter by 
management as well as acceptance by the board. The charter should (a) establish the 
department’s position within the organization; (b) authorize access to records, personnel, and 
physical properties relevant to the performance of audits; and (c) define the scope of internal 
auditing activities.
.5 The director of internal auditing should submit annually to management for approval and to the 
board for its information a summary of the department’s audit work schedule, staffing plan, and 
financial budget. The director should also submit all significant interim changes for approval 
and information. Audit work schedules, staffing plans, and financial budgets should inform 
management and the board of the scope of internal auditing work and of any limitations placed 
on that scope.
.6 The director of internal auditing should submit activity reports to management and to the board 
annually or more frequently as necessary. Activity reports should highlight significant audit 
findings and recommendations and should inform management and the board of any significant 
deviations from approved audit work schedules, staffing plans, and financial budgets, and the 
reasons for them.
120 Objectivity
Internal auditors should be objective in performing audits.
.01 Objectivity is an independent mental attitude which internal auditors should maintain in performing 
audits. Internal auditors are not to subordinate their judgment on audit matters to that of others.
.02 Objectivity requires internal auditors to perform audits in such a manner that they have an honest 
belief in their work product and that no significant quality compromises are made. Internal auditors 
are not to be placed in situations in which they feel unable to make objective professional 
judgments.
.1 Staff assignments should be made so that potential and actual conflicts of interest and bias are 
avoided. The director should periodically obtain from the audit staff information concerning 
potential conflicts of interest and bias.
.2 Internal auditors should report to the director any situations in which a conflict of interest or 
bias is present or may reasonably be inferred. The director should then reassign such auditors.
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.3 Staff assignments of internal auditors should be rotated periodically whenever it is practicable 
to do so.
.4 Internal auditors should not assume operating responsibilities. But if on occasion management 
directs internal auditors to perform nonaudit work, it should be understood that they are not 
functioning as internal auditors. Moreover, objectivity is presumed to be impaired when 
internal auditors audit any activity for which they had authority or responsibility. This impair­
ment should be considered when reporting audit results.
.5 Persons transferred to or temporarily engaged by the internal auditing department should not 
be assigned to audit those activities they previously performed until a reasonable period of time 
has elapsed. Such assignments are presumed to impair objectivity and should be considered 
when supervising the audit work and reporting audit results.
.6 The results of internal auditing work should be reviewed before the related audit report is 
released to provide reasonable assurance that the work was performed objectively.
.03 The internal auditor’s objectivity is not adversely affected when the auditor recommends standards 
of control for systems or review procedures before they are implemented. Designing, installing, 
and operating systems are not audit functions. Also, the drafting of procedures for systems is not 
an audit function. Performing such activities is presumed to impair audit objectivity.
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200 PROFESSIONAL PROFICIENCY
INTERNAL AUDITS SHOULD BE PERFORMED WITH PROFICIENCY AND DUE PROFES­
SIONAL CARE.
.01 Professional proficiency is the responsibility of the internal auditing department and each internal 
auditor. The department should assign to each unit those persons who collectively possess the 
necessary knowledge, skills, and disciplines to conduct the audit properly.
The Internal Auditing Department 
210 Staffing
The internal auditing department should provide assurance that the technical proficiency and educa­
tional background of internal auditors are appropriate for the audits to be performed.
.01 The director of internal auditing should establish suitable criteria of education and experience for 
filling internal auditing positions, giving due consideration to scope of work and level of respon­
sibility.
.02 Reasonable assurance should be obtained as to each prospective auditor’s qualifications and 
proficiency.
220 Knowledge, Skills, and Disciplines
The internal auditing department should possess or should obtain the knowledge , skills, and disciplines 
needed to carry out its audit responsibilities.
.01 The internal auditing staff should collectively possess the knowledge and skills essential to the 
practice of the profession within the organization. These attributes include proficiency in applying 
internal auditing standards, procedures, and techniques.
.02 The internal auditing department should have employees or use consultants who are qualified in 
such disciplines as accounting, economics, finance, statistics, electronic data processing, engi­
neering, taxation, and law as needed to meet audit responsibilities. Each member of the depart­
ment, however, need not be qualified in all of these disciplines.
230 Supervision
The internal auditing department should provide assurance that internal audits are properly super­
vised.
.01 The director of internal auditing is responsible for providing appropriate audit supervision. Su­
pervision is a continuing process, beginning with planning and ending with the conclusion of the 
audit assignment.
.02 Supervision includes:
.1 Providing suitable instructions to subordinates at the outset of the audit and approving the audit 
program.
.2 Seeing that the approved audit program is carried out unless deviations are both justified and 
authorized.
.3 Determining that audit working papers adequately support the audit findings, conclusions, and 
reports.
.4 Making sure that audit reports are accurate, objective, clear, concise, constructive, and timely. 
.5 Determining that audit objectives are being met.
.03 Appropriate evidence of supervision should be documented and retained.
.04 The extent of supervision required will depend on the proficiency of the internal auditors and the 
difficulty of the audit assignment.
.05 All internal auditing assignments, whether performed by or for the internal auditing department, 
remain the responsibility of its director.
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The Internal Auditor
240 Compliance with Standards of Conduct
Internal auditors should comply with professional standards of conduct.
.01 The Code of Ethics of The Institute of Internal Auditors sets forth standards of conduct and provides 
a basis for enforcement among its members. The Code calls for high standards of honesty, 
objectivity, diligence, and loyalty to which internal auditors should conform.
250 Knowledge, Skills, and Disciplines
Internal auditors should possess the knowledge, skills, and disciplines essential to the performance of 
internal audits.
.01 Each internal auditor should possess certain knowledge and skills as follows:
.1 Proficiency in applying internal auditing standards, procedures, and techniques is required in
performing internal audits. Proficiency means the ability to apply knowledge to situations likely 
to be encountered and to deal with them without extensive recourse to technical research and 
assistance.
.2 Proficiency in accounting principles and techniques is required of auditors who work exten­
sively with financial records and reports.
.3 An understanding of management principles is required to recognize and evaluate the materi­
ality and significance of deviations from good business practice. An understanding means the 
ability to apply broad knowledge to situations likely to be encountered, to recognize significant 
deviations, and to be able to carry out the research necessary to arrive at reasonable solutions.
.4 An appreciation is required of the fundamentals of such subjects as accounting, economics, 
commercial law, taxation, finance, quantitative methods, and computerized information sys­
tems. An appreciation means the ability to recognize the existence of problems or potential 
problems and to determine the further research to be undertaken or the assistance to be obtained.
260 Human Relations and Communications
Internal auditors should be skilled in dealing with people and in communicating effectively.
.01 Internal auditors should understand human relations and maintain satisfactory relationships with 
auditees.
.02 Internal auditors should be skilled in oral and written communications so that they can clearly and 
effectively convey such matters as audit objectives, evaluations, conclusions, and recommenda­
tions.
270 Continuing Education
Internal auditors should maintain their technical competence through continuing education.
.01 Internal auditors are responsible for continuing their education in order to maintain their profi­
ciency. They should keep informed about improvements and current developments in internal 
auditing standards, procedures, and techniques. Continuing education may be obtained through 
membership and participation in professional societies; attendance at conferences, seminars, col­
lege courses, and in-house training programs; and participation in research projects.
280 Due Professional Care
Internal auditors should exercise due professional care in performing internal audits.
.01 Due professional care calls for the application of the care and skill expected of a reasonably prudent 
and competent internal auditor in the same or similar circumstances. Professional care should, 
therefore, be appropriate to the complexities of the audit being performed. In exercising due 
professional care, internal auditors should be alert to the possibility of intentional wrongdoing, 
errors and omissions, inefficiency, waste, ineffectiveness, and conflicts of interest. They should 
also be alert to those conditions and activities where irregularities are most likely to occur. In 
addition, they should identify inadequate controls and recommend improvements to promote 
compliance with acceptable procedures and practices.
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.02 Due care implies reasonable care and competence, not infallibility or extraordinary performance. 
Due care requires the auditor to conduct examinations and verifications to a reasonable extent, but 
does not require detailed audits of all transactions. Accordingly, the internal auditor cannot give 
absolute assurance that noncompliance or irregularities do not exist. Nevertheless, the possibility 
of material irregularities or noncompliance should be considered whenever the internal auditor 
undertakes an internal auditing assignment.
.03 When an internal auditor suspects wrongdoing, the appropriate authorities within the organization 
should be informed. The internal auditor may recommend whatever investigation is considered 
necessary in the circumstances. Thereafter, the auditor should follow up to see that the internal 
auditing department’s responsibilities have been met.
.04 Exercising due professional care means using reasonable audit skill and judgment in performing 
the audit. To this end, the internal auditor should consider:
.1 The extent of audit work needed to achieve audit objectives.
.2 The relative materiality or significance of matters to which audit procedures are applied.
.3 The adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls.
.4 The cost of auditing in relation to potential benefits.
.05 Due professional care includes evaluating established operating standards and determining whether 
those standards are acceptable and are being met. When such standards are vague, authoritative 
interpretations should be sought. If internal auditors are required to interpret or select operating 
standards, they should seek agreement with auditees as to the standards needed to measure 
operating performance.
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300 SCOPE OF WORK
THE SCOPE OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT SHOULD ENCOMPASS THE EXAMINATION AND 
EVALUATION OF THE ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ORGANIZATION’S 
SYSTEM OF INTERNAL CONTROL AND THE QUALITY OF PERFORMANCE IN CARRYING 
OUT ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITIES.
.01 The scope of internal auditing work, as specified in this standard, encompasses what audit work 
should be performed. It is recognized, however, that management and the board of directors 
provide general direction as to the scope of work and the activities to be audited.
.02 The purpose of the review for adequacy of the system of internal control is to ascertain whether 
the system established provides reasonable assurance that the organization’s objectives and goals 
will be met efficiently and economically.
.03 The purpose of the review for effectiveness of the system of internal control is to ascertain whether 
the system is functioning as intended.
.04 The purpose of the review for quality of performance is to ascertain whether the organization’s 
objectives and goals have been achieved.
.05 The primary objectives of internal control are to ensure:
.1 The reliability and integrity of information.
.2 Compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws, and regulations.
.3 The safeguarding of assets.
.4 The economical and efficient use of resources.
.5 The accomplishment of established objectives and goals for operations or programs.
310 Reliability and Integrity of Information
Internal auditors should review the reliability and integrity of financial and operating information and 
the means used to identify, measure, classify, and report such information.
.01 Information systems provide data for decision making, control, and compliance with external 
requirements. Therefore, internal auditors should examine information systems and, as appropri­
ate, ascertain whether:
.1 Financial and operating records and reports contain accurate, reliable, timely, complete, and 
useful information.
.2 Controls over recordkeeping and reporting are adequate and effective.
320 Compliance with Policies, Plans, Procedures, Laws, and Regulations
Internal auditors should review the systems established to ensure compliance with those policies, plans, 
procedures, laws, and regulations which could have a significant impact on operations and reports, 
and should determine whether the organization is in compliance.
.01 Management is responsible for establishing the systems designed to ensure compliance with such 
requirements as policies, plans, procedures, and applicable laws and regulations. Internal auditors 
are responsible for determining whether the systems are adequate and effective and whether the 
activities audited are complying with the appropriate requirements.
330 Safeguarding of Assets
Internal auditors should review the means of safeguarding assets and, as appropriate, verify the 
existence of such assets.
.01 Internal auditors should review the means used to safeguard assets from various types of losses 
such as those resulting from theft, fire, improper or illegal activities, and exposure to the elements.
.02 Internal auditors, when verifying the existence of assets, should use appropriate audit procedures.
340 Economical and Efficient Use of Resources
Internal auditors should appraise the economy and efficiency with which resources are employed.
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.01 Management is responsible for setting operating standards to measure an activity’s economical and 
efficient use of resources. Internal auditors are responsible for determining whether:
.1 Operating standards have been established for measuring economy and efficiency.
.2 Established operating standards are understood and are being met.
.3 Deviations from operating standards are identified, analyzed, and communicated to those 
responsible for corrective action.
.4 Corrective action has been taken.
.02 Audits related to the economical and efficient use of resources should identify such conditions as: 
.1 Underutilized facilities.
.2 Nonproductive work.
.3 Procedures which are not cost justified.
.4 Overstaffing or understaffing.
350 Accomplishment of Established Objectives and Goals for Operations or Programs
Internal auditors should review operations or programs to ascertain whether results are consistent with 
established objectives and goals and whether the operations or programs are being carried out as 
planned.
.01 Management is responsible for establishing operating or program objectives and goals, developing 
and implementing control procedures, and accomplishing desired operating or program results. 
Internal auditors should ascertain whether such objectives and goals conform with those of the 
organization and whether they are being met.
.02 Internal auditors can provide assistance to managers who are developing objectives, goals, and 
systems by determining whether the underlying assumptions are appropriate; whether accurate, 
current, and relevant information is being used; and whether suitable controls have been incor­
porated into the operations or programs.
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400 PERFORMANCE OF AUDIT WORK
AUDIT WORK SHOULD INCLUDE PLANNING THE AUDIT, EXAMINING AND EVALUAT­
ING INFORMATION, COMMUNICATING RESULTS, AND FOLLOWING UP.
.01 The internal auditor is responsible for planning and conducting the audit assignment, subject to 
supervisory review and approval.
410 Planning the Audit
Internal auditors should plan each audit.
.01 Planning should be documented and should include:
.1 Establishing audit objectives and scope of work.
.2 Obtaining background information about the activities to be audited.
.3 Determining the resources necessary to perform the audit.
.4 Communicating with all who need to know about the audit.
.5 Performing, as appropriate, an on-site survey to become familiar with the activities and controls 
to be audited, to identify areas for audit emphasis, and to invite auditee comments and 
suggestions.
.6 Writing the audit program.
.7 Determining how, when, and to whom audit results will be communicated.
.8 Obtaining approval of the audit work plan.
420 Examining and Evaluating Information
Internal auditors should collect, analyze, interpret, and document information to support audit results. 
.01 The process of examining and evaluating information is as follows:
.1 Information should be collected on all matters related to the audit objectives and scope of work. 
.2 Information should be sufficient, competent, relevant, and useful to provde a sound basis for
audit findings and recommendations.
Sufficient information is factual, adequate, and convincing so that a prudent, informed person 
would reach the same conclusions as the auditor.
Competent information is reliable and the best attainable through the use of appropriate audit 
techniques.
Relevant information supports audit findings and recommendations and is consistent with the 
objectives for the audit.
Useful information helps the organization meet its goals.
.3 Audit procedures, including the testing and sampling techniques employed, should be selected 
in advance, where practicable, and expanded or altered if circumstances warrant.
.4 The process of collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and documenting information should be 
supervised to provide reasonable assurance that the auditor’s objectivity is maintained and that 
audit goals are met.
.5 Working papers that document the audit should be prepared by the auditor and reviewed by 
management of the internal auditing department. These papers should record the information 
obtained and the analyses made and should support the bases for the findings and recommen­
dations to be reported.
430 Communicating Results
Internal auditors should report the results of their audit work.
.01 A signed, written report should be issued after the audit examination is completed. Interim reports 
may be written or oral and may be transmitted formally or informally.
.02 The internal auditor should discuss conclusions and recommendations at appropriate levels of 
management before issuing final written reports.
.03 Reports should be objective, clear, concise, constructive, and timely.
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.04 Reports should present the purpose, scope, and results of the audit; and, where appropriate, reports 
should contain an expression of the auditor’s opinion.
.05 Reports may include recommendations for potential improvements and acknowledge satisfactory 
performance and corrective action.
.06 The auditee’s views about audit conclusions or recommendations may be included in the audit 
report.
.07 The director of internal auditing or designee should review and approve the final audit report before 
issuance and should decide to whom the report will be distributed.
440 Following Up
Internal auditors should follow up to ascertain that appropriate action is taken on reported audit 
findings.
.01 Internal auditing should determine that corrective action was taken and is achieving the desired 
results, or that management or the board has assumed the risk of not taking corrective action on 
reported findings.
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500 MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNAL AUDITING DEPARTMENT
THE DIRECTOR OF INTERNAL AUDITING SHOULD PROPERLY MANAGE THE INTERNAL 
AUDITING DEPARTMENT.
.01 The director of internal auditing is responsible for properly managing the department so that:
.1 Audit work fulfills the general purposes and responsibilities approved by management and 
accepted by the board.
.2 Resources of the internal auditing department are efficiently and effectively employed.
.3 Audit work conforms to the Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
510 Purpose, Authority, and Responsibility
The director of internal auditing should have a statement of purpose, authority, and responsibility for 
the internal auditing department.
.01 The director of internal auditing is responsible for seeking the approval of management and the 
acceptance by the board of a formal written document (charter) for the internal auditing depart­
ment.
520 Planning
The director of internal auditing should establish plans to carry out the responsibilities of the internal 
auditing department.
.01 These plans should be consistent with the internal auditing department’s charter and with the goals 
of the organization.
.02 The planning process involves establishing:
.1 Goals.
.2 Audit work schedules.
.3 Staffing plans and financial budgets.
.4 Activity reports.
.03 The goals of the internal auditing department should be capable of being accomplished within 
specified operating plans and budgets and, to the extent possible, should be measurable. They 
should be accompanied by measurement criteria and targeted dates of accomplishment.
.04 Audit work schedules should include (a) what activities are to be audited; (b) when they will be 
audited; and (c) the estimated time required, taking into account the scope of the audit work 
planned and the nature and extent of audit work performed by others. Matters to be considered in 
establishing audit work schedule priorities should include (a) the date and results of the last audit; 
(b) financial exposure; (c) potential loss and risk; (d) requests by management; (e) major changes 
in operations, programs, systems, and controls; (f) opportunities to achieve operating benefits; and 
(g) changes to and capabilities of the audit staff. The work schedules should be sufficiently flexible 
to cover unanticipated demands on the internal auditing department.
.05 Staffing plans and financial budgets, including the number of auditors and the knowledge, skills, 
and disciplines required to perform their work, should be determined from audit work schedules, 
administrative activities, education and training requirements, and audit research and development 
efforts.
.06 Activity reports should be submitted periodically to management and to the board. These reports 
should compare (a) performance with the department’s goals and audit work schedules and 
(b) expenditures with financial budgets. They should explain the reason for major variances and 
indicate any action taken or needed.
530 Policies and Procedures
The director of internal auditing should provide written policies and procedures to guide the audit staff.
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.01 The form and content of written policies and procedures should be appropriate to the size and 
structure of the internal auditing department and the complexity of its work. Formal administrative 
and technical audit manuals may not be needed by all internal auditing departments. A small 
internal auditing department may be managed informally. Its audit staff may be directed and 
controlled through daily, close supervision and written memoranda. In a large internal auditing 
department, more formal and comprehensive policies and procedures are essential to guide the 
audit staff in the consistent compliance with the department’s standards of performance.
540 Personnel Management and Development
The director of internal auditing should establish a program for selecting and developing the human 
resources of the internal auditing department.
.01 The program should provide for:
.1 Developing written job descriptions for each level of the audit staff.
.2 Selecting qualified and competent individuals.
.3 Training and providing continuing educational opportunities for each internal auditor.
.4 Appraising each internal auditor’s performance at least annually.
.5 Providing counsel to internal auditors on their performance and professional development.
550 External Auditors
The director of internal auditing should coordinate internal and external audit efforts.
.01 The internal and external audit work should be coordinated to ensure adequate audit coverage and 
to minimize duplicate efforts.
.02 Coordination of audit efforts involves:
.1 Periodic meetings to discuss matters of mutual interest.
.2 Access to each other’s audit programs and working papers.
.3 Exchange of audit reports and management letters.
.4 Common understanding of audit techniques, methods, and terminology.
560 Quality Assurance
The director of internal auditing should establish and maintain a quality assurance program to evaluate 
the operations of the internal auditing department.
.01 The purpose of this program is to provide reasonable assurance that audit work conforms with these 
Standards, the internal auditing department’s charter, and other applicable standards. A quality 
assurance program should include the following elements:
.1 Supervision.
.2 Internal reviews.
.3 External reviews.
.02 Supervision of the work of the internal auditors should be carried out continually to assure 
conformance with internal auditing standards, departmental policies, and audit programs.
.03 Internal reviews should be performed periodically by members of the internal auditing staff to 
appraise the quality of the audit work performed. These reviews should be performed in the same 
manner as any other internal audit.
.04 External reviews of the internal auditing department should be performed to appraise the quality 
of the department’s operations. These reviews should be performed by qualified persons who are 
independent of the organization and who do not have either a real or an apparent conflict of interest. 
Such reviews should be conducted at least once every three years. On completion of the review, 
a formal, written report should be issued. The report should express an opinion as to the 
department’s compliance with the Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing and, 
as appropriate, should include recommendations for improvement.
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Appendix J
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED 
COMPANY MANUAL, SECTION 3, 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY-
AUDIT COMMITTEE
303.00 Audit Committee
Exchange Policy
Each domestic company with common stock listed on the Exchange, as a condition of listing and continued 
listing of its securities on the Exchange, shall establish no later than June 30, 1978 and maintain thereafter 
an Audit Committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and free from any relation­
ship that, in the opinion of its Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment 
as a committee member. Directors who are affiliates of the company or officers or employees of the company 
or its subsidiaries would not be qualified for Audit Committee membership.
A director who was formerly an officer of the company or any of its subsidiaries may qualify for membership 
even though he may be receiving pension or deferred compensation payments from the company if, in the 
opinion of the Board of Directors, such person will exercise independent judgment and will materially assist 
the function of the committee. However, a majority of the Audit Committee shall be directors who were not 
formerly officers of the company or any of its subsidiaries.
Supplementary Material
In order to deal with complex relationships that may arise, the following guidelines are provided to assist 
the Board of Directors to observe the spirit of the policy in selecting members of the Audit Committee.
A director who has been or is a partner, officer or director of an organization that has customary commercial, 
industrial, banking or underwriting relationships with the company which are carried on in the ordinary 
course of business on an arms-length basis may qualify for membership unless, in the opinion of the Board 
of Directors, such director is not independent of management or the relationship would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment as a committee member.
A director who, in addition to fulfilling the customary director’s role, also provides additional services 
directly for the Board of Directors and is separately compensated therefor, would nonetheless qualify for 
membership on the Audit Committee. However, a director who, in addition to his director’s role, also acts 
on a regular basis as an individual or representative of an organization serving as a professional advisor, legal 
counsel or consultant to management, would not qualify if, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such 
relationship is material to the company, the organization represented or the director.
A director who represents or is a close relative of a person who would not qualify as a member of the Audit 
Committee in the light of the policy would likewise not qualify for the committee. However, if the director 
is a close relative of an employee who is not an executive officer or if there are valid countervailing reasons, 
the Board of Directors’ decision as to eligibility shall govern.
While rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933 may be helpful to the Board of Directors in determining 
whether a particular director is an affiliate or a close relative for purposes of this policy, it is not intended 
to be so technically applied as to go beyond the spirit of this policy.
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Appendix K
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES
Introduction
An audit committee consisting of independent directors is the primary vehicle that the board of directors uses 
to discharge its responsibility with respect to the company’s financial reporting. An informed and vigilant 
audit committee represents one of the most effective influences for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting. 
Thus the Commission has recommended in Chapter Two that the board of directors of all public companies 
be required to establish an independent audit committee with a prominent role in overseeing the company’s 
financial reporting process. The mere existence of an audit committee is not enough, however, and the 
Commission therefore reinforces its general recommendation by delineating certain duties and responsibil­
ities that are essential for audit committee effectiveness.
First, specific recommendations directed to audit committees highlight the need for the audit committee (1) 
to be informed and vigilant, (2) to have its duties and responsibilities set forth in a written charter, and (3) 
to be given resources and authority adequate to discharge its responsibilities. Among other things, the audit 
committee should review management’s evaluation of factors related to the independence of the company’s 
public accountant, help preserve that independence and approve in advance the types and extent of man­
agement advisory services to be performed by the independent public accountant.
In addition, the Commission highlights other important audit committee functions throughout Chapter Two. 
The audit committee should annually review the company’s process of assessing the risk of fraudulent 
financial reporting and should review compliance with the code of corporate conduct, including top 
management’s compliance. The audit committee should have open lines of communication with the chief 
accounting officer and the chief internal auditor. In fact, the chief internal auditor’s direct and unrestricted 
access to the audit committee is vital to his objectivity. Management should advise the audit committee when 
it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue. Audit committees should increase their oversight 
of the quarterly reporting process, among other things approving quarterly financial results prior to their 
release, and the independent public accountant should communicate the results of his review of quarterly 
results to the audit committee. Finally, the chairman of the audit committee should write a letter describing 
the committee’s activities and responsibilities for inclusion in the annual report to stockholders.
The Commission developed this set of recommended audit committee duties and responsibilities from a 
review and consideration of the practices many well-managed companies follow today, the extensive 
guidance the public accounting and legal professions have published on the subject, practices suggested by 
the results of the Commission’s research projects, and by presentations made to the Commission.
The Commission believes that more detailed delineation and description of responsibilities is best left to the 
discretion of management and the board of directors to tailor to the needs and circumstances of each 
company. In the course of its research and deliberations, however, the Commission has identified additional, 
more specific practices and procedures that can help audit committees perform their oversight role effec­
tively. The Commission is not prescribing these additional measures, and therefore has not included them 
as recommendations, but offers this guidance in the form of the following Good Practice Guidelines, which 
companies can consider within the exercise of their judgment. To companies that already have audit 
committees, the guidelines will serve as a standard for review and assessment. Other companies — those 
just establishing audit committees or those seeking to improve their committees’ effectiveness — may find 
them to be helpful in suggesting practical ways for audit committees to discharge their responsibilities.
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General Guidelines
• Size and Term of Appointment. An audit committee normally should consist of not fewer than three 
independent directors. The maximum size may vary, but the committee should be small enough so that 
each member is an active participant. The term of appointment is at the discretion of the board of 
directors, but it is desirable to have terms arranged to maintain continuity while bringing fresh perspec­
tives to the work of the committee.
• Meetings. The committee should meet on a regular basis and special meetings should be called as 
circumstances require. The committee should meet privately with the internal auditor and the indepen­
dent public accountant.
• Reporting to the Board of Directors. The committee should report its activities to the full board on a 
regular basis, such as after each meeting, so that the board is kept informed of its activities on a current 
basis.
• Expand Knowledge of Company Operations. A systematic and continuing learning process for audit 
committee members will increase their effectiveness. One way is to review various financial aspects of 
the company on a planned basis.
• Company Counsel. The committee should meet regularly with the company’s general counsel, and 
outside counsel when appropriate, to discuss legal matters that may have a significant impact on the 
company’s financial statements. In a number of companies the general counsel and/or outside counsel 
attend meetings.
• Audit Plans. The committee should review with the chief internal auditor and the independent public 
accountant their annual audit plans, including the degree of coordination of the respective plans. The 
committee should inquire as to the extent to which the planned audit scope can be relied upon to detect 
fraud or weaknesses in internal controls.
• Electronic Data Processing. The committee should discuss with the internal auditor and the indepen­
dent public accountant what steps are planned for a review of the company’s electronic data processing 
procedures and controls, and inquire as to the specific security programs to protect against computer fraud 
or misuse from both within and outside the company.
• Other Auditors. The committee should inquire as to the extent to which independent public accountants 
other than the principal auditor are to be used and understand the rationale for using them. The committee 
should request that their work be coordinated and that an appropriate review of their work be performed 
by the principal auditor.
• Officer Expenses and Perquisites. The committee should review in-house policies and procedures for 
regular review of officers’ expenses and perquisites, including any use of corporate assets, inquire as to 
the results of the review, and, if appropriate, review a summarization of the expenses and perquisites of 
the period under review.
• Areas Requiring Special Attention. The committee should instruct the independent public accountant 
and the internal auditor that the committee expects to be advised if there are any areas that require its 
special attention.
Selection of an Independent Public Accountant
A primary responsibility of the audit committee should be the selection of an independent public accountant 
for the company. The actual selection generally is proposed by management, with the audit committee 
confirming management’s selection, and is ratified by the stockholders. Suggested below are a number of 
considerations that may enter into the decision. There will be variations, of course, including those that 
depend upon whether the committee is considering management’s proposal to retain the present independent 
public accountants or management’s proposal to appoint a new public accounting firm.
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Issues related to this audit:
•  Opinions on the performance of the public accounting firm by appropriate management and the chief 
internal auditor
•  The proposed audit fee and the independent public accountant’s engagement letter; explanations for fee 
changes
•  The expected level of participation by the partner and other management personnel in the audit examina­
tion, the mix of skills and experience of the staff, and staff rotation policy
• If a new public accounting firm is being considered, the steps planned to ensure a smooth and effective 
transition.
Issues related to the firm generally:
•  The report of the public accounting firm’s latest peer review conducted pursuant to a professional quality 
control program
• Any significant litigation problems or disciplinary actions by the SEC or others
• The public accounting firm’s credentials, capabilities, and reputation and a list of clients in the same 
industry and geographical area.
Post-Audit Review
•  The committee should obtain from management explanations for all significant variances in the financial 
statements between years. (This review may be performed at a meeting of the entire board.) The 
committee should consider whether the data are consistent with the Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A) section of the annual report.
•  The committee should request an explanation from financial management and the independent public 
accountant of changes in accounting standards or rules promulgated by the Financial Accounting Stan­
dards Board, Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulatory bodies, that have an effect on the 
financial statements.
• The committee should inquire about the existence and substance of any significant accounting accruals, 
reserves, or estimates made by management that had a material impact on the financial statements.
• The committee should inquire of management and the independent public accountant if there were any 
significant financial reporting issues discussed during the accounting period and if so how they were 
resolved.
• The committee should meet privately with the independent public accountant, to request his opinion on 
various matters including the quality of financial and accounting personnel and the internal audit staff.
•  The committee should ask the independent public accountant what his greatest concerns were and if he 
believes anything else should be discussed with the committee that has not been raised or covered 
elsewhere.
•  The committee should review the letter of management representations given to the independent public 
accountant and inquire whether he encountered any difficulties in obtaining the letter or any specific 
representations therein.
• The committee should discuss with management and the independent public accountant the substance of 
any significant issues raised by in-house and outside counsel concerning litigation, contingencies, claims 
or assessments. The committee should understand how such matters are reflected in the company’s 
financial statements.
•  The committee should determine the open years on federal income tax returns and whether there are any 
significant items that have been or might be disputed by the IRS, and inquire as to the status of the related 
tax reserves.
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•  The committee should review with management the MD&A section of the annual report and ask the 
extent to which the independent public accountant reviewed the MD&A section. The committee should 
inquire of the independent public accountant if the other sections of the annual report to stockholders are 
consistent with the information reflected in the financial statements.
• The committee and the board of directors should consider whether the independent public accountant 
should meet with the full board to discuss any matters relative to the financial statements and to answer 
any questions that other directors may have.
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Appendix L
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR 
MANAGEMENT’S REPORT
How management carries out its financial reporting responsibilities is of interest to the investing public. 
Widespread implementation of management reports, tailored to fit individual company circumstances, will 
improve communication with financial statement users about the nature of financial information and the 
processes and responsibilities that surround its preparation and presentation.
The Commission has recommended that all annual reports to stockholders be required by SEC rule to include 
a management report, signed by the company’s chief executive officer and chief accounting officer (de­
pending on the company, this may be the chief financial officer or controller). This report should acknowl­
edge management’s responsibilities for the financial statements and internal controls, discuss how these 
responsibilities we r e fulied,anprovmgt'shfectiveness of the company’s 
internal controls.
Content of the Management Report
An informative management report should discuss the following matters, as applicable:
• Management’s responsibilities for the financial statements. This part of the management report should 
specifically acknowledge management’s responsibilities for:
— Preparing the financial statements so that they are fairly presented in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles appropriate in the circumstances and not misstated due to material 
fraud or error
— Preparing the other information in the annual report to stockholders and ensuring that such infor­
mation is correct and consistent with the financial statements
— Determining the estimates and judgments used in preparing the financial statements.
•  Management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining an adequate system of internal control 
designed to provide reasonable assurance as to the integrity and reliability of the financial statements, 
the protection of assets, and the prevention and detection of fraudulent financial reporting. Management’s 
discussion of internal control also should include:
— Management’s opinion as to the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls as of the end of 
the company’s fiscal year, or at some other point in time during the fiscal year
—  A description of management’s basis for its opinion on the company’s internal controls
—  Management’s statement that it has appropriately responded to the internal auditor’s and indepen­
dent public accountant’s recommendations concerning the company’s internal control system.
Other Disclosures in the Management Report
The exact contents of management’s report cannot be prescribed; to attempt to do so would encourage 
boilerplate reports of little value. In addition to the matters specifically noted above, other topics that 
management may wish to discuss include:
• The financial records and documents, and minutes of important meetings, that were made available to 
the independent public accountants and the validity and accuracy of the representations that were made 
to the independent public accountants
•  A change in independent public accountants during the year
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• The reporting relationships within the company of individuals with significant roles in the financial 
reporting process
• The work of the company’s internal auditors
• The inherent limitations of internal control
• The existence of a code of conduct which is monitored and enforced; this discussion also could include 
an assessment of the company’s compliance with the code
• Uncertainties whose resolution could have a material impact on the financial statements.
Example of Management Report
The following is an illustration of a management report. Actual management reports should be tailored to 
the facts and circumstances of each company.
MANAGEMENT REPORT ON RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING
The management of ABC Corporation and its subsidiaries has the responsibility for preparing 
the accompanying financial statements and for their integrity and objectivity. The statements 
were prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a con­
sistent basis and are not misstated due to material fraud or error. The financial statements include 
amounts that are based on management’s best estimates and judgments. Management also 
prepared the other information in the annual report and is responsible for its accuracy and 
consistency with the financial statements.
The corporation’s financial statements have been audited by XYZ Co., independent certified 
public accountants, elected by the shareholders. Management has made available to XYZ Co. 
all the corporation’s financial records and related data, as well as the minutes of stockholders’ 
and directors’ meetings. Furthermore, management believes that all representations made to 
XYZ Co. during its audit were valid and appropriate.
Management of the corporation has established and maintains a system of internal control that 
provides reasonable assurance as to the integrity and reliability of the financial statements, the 
protection of assets from unauthorized use or disposition, and the prevention and detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting. The system of internal control provides for appropriate division 
of responsibility and is documented by written policies and procedures that are communicated 
to employees with significant roles in the financial reporting process and updated as necessary. 
Management continually monitors the system of internal control for compliance. The corpora­
tion maintains a strong internal auditing program that independently assesses the effectiveness 
of the internal controls and recommends possible improvements thereto. In addition, as part of 
its audit of the corporation’s financial statements, XYZ Co. completed a study and evaluation 
of selected internal accounting controls to establish a basis for reliance thereon in determining 
the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests to be applied. Management has considered the 
internal auditor’s and XYZ Co.’s recommendations concerning the corporation’s system of 
internal control and has taken actions that we believe are cost-effective in the circumstances to 
respond appropriately to these recommendations. Management believes that, as of [date], the 
corporation’s system of internal control is adequate to accomplish the objectives discussed 
herein.
Management also recognizes its responsibility for fostering a strong ethical climate so that the 
corporation’s affairs are conducted according to the highest standards of personal and corporate 
conduct. This responsibility is characterized and reflected in the corporation’s code of corporate 
conduct, which is publicized throughout the corporation. The code of conduct addresses, among 
other things, the necessity of ensuring open communication within the corporation; potential
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conflicts of interests; compliance with all domestic and foreign laws, including those relating to 
financial disclosure; and the confidentiality of proprietary information. The corporation main­
tains a systematic program to assess compliance with these policies.
Joe Doe 
Chief Executive Officer 
Jane Smith
Chief Financial Officer
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Appendix M
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR AUDIT 
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN’S LETTER
Audit committees play an important role in overseeing the financial reporting process and the establishment 
and maintenance of strong internal controls. The Commission recommends that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission require all annual reports to stockholders to include a letter from the chairman of the audit 
committee describing the committee’s responsibilities and activities.
Among other subjects, the audit committee chairman’s letter could discuss:
•  The composition of the audit committee
• The identity of each audit committee member, unless disclosed elsewhere
•  The audit committee’s purpose, objectives, and responsibilities
• The activities of the audit committee during the past year including matters such as the number of 
meetings held and the significant topics discussed with management, internal auditors, and independent 
public accountants.
The following is an example of a letter by the chairman of an audit committee. This illustrative letter does 
not contain the precise wording that the audit committee chairman should use or in any way limit the 
selection of topics the chairman may wish to discuss.
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN’S LETTER
The audit committee of the board of directors is comprised o f _____independent directors. The
members of the audit committee are: John Doe, Chairman, _____________________  , and
____________________ . The committee h e ld _____  meetings during fiscal y e a r_______ .
The audit committee is the primary vehicle to which the board of directors has delegated its 
responsibility to oversee the company’s financial reporting process. In fulfilling its responsi­
bility, the committee recommended to the board of directors, subject to shareholder approval, 
the selection of the company’s independent public accountant. The audit committee discussed 
with the internal auditor and the independent public accountant the overall scope and specific 
plans for their respective audits. The committee also discussed the company’s consolidated 
financial statements and the adequacy of the company’s internal controls. The committee met 
regularly with the company’s internal auditor and independent public accountant, without 
management present, to discuss the results of their examinations, their evaluations of the 
company’s internal controls, and the overall quality of the company’s financial reporting. The 
meetings also were designed to facilitate any private communication with the committee desired 
by the internal auditor or independent public accountant.
John Doe, Chairman 
Audit Committee
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